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OR
SURRENDER ?
THE SIMLA SUMMIT

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SUCCESS OR SURRENDER ? THE SIMLA SUMMIT

G S BHARGAVA



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THE SIMLA SUMMIT
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INTRODUCTION

There is a school of thought in India which thinks that by chanting mantra like that the Simla Agreement should succeed or be saved depending upon the situation durable peace between India and Pakistan can be achieved. People belonging to this faith—it is nothing better than that—bring to bear on any kind of dissent on the subject the sort of intolerance which religious and ideological conformists are notorious for. At the other end of the spectrum are those who indentify India Pakistan relations with the Simla Agreement and adopt a narrow nationalist approach to Pakistan in the name of opposing the Simla Agreement.

This book rejects both these superstitions. It shows that if Indo Pakistan peace is such a fragile structure as to need the prop of a document of doubtful validity like the Simla Agreement it can never be preserved. Further if the durability of India Pakistan good relations is to be a function of Bhutto's durability as President of Pakistan it is not a worthwhile objective. I am indebted to Professor Sisir Gupta of Jawahar Lal Nehru University for his guidance and help in approaching this controversial subject. I am doubly grateful because he has not allowed our differences on the assessment of the Simla Agreement to come in the way. I am also thankful to my friend Bharat Variawala of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.

To
RAM MANOHAR LOHIA
Who Gave Me a Perspective
To the Understanding of
International Relations

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Chapter 1

Hatred of Centuries

BROADCASTING to the nation at the dawn of Independence on August 15 1947 Jawaharlal Nehru spoke of "our brothers and sisters who have been cut off from us by political boundaries and wished them well"¹ Mohammed Ali Jinnah who took over as Pakistan's Governor General had reciprocated the sentiment when at the time of his departure from Bombay for Karachi he wished in a statement prosperity and peace, for Hindustan. In practice however the attitudes of neither of these leaders were vindicated by the last 25 years history of Indo Pakistan relations. Nearer the mark is Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who talks of "the hatred of centuries between Hindus and Muslims"² This is despite the fact that no other two countries

1 Quoted by Michael Brecher *Nehru A Political Biography* Oxford 1959

2 *The Indian Express* August 7 1947 The statement added "The past must be buried and let us start afresh as two independent sovereign states"

The Great Tragedy (See Appendix 2)

in the world have as much in common as India and Pakistan—historically geographically linguistically culturally and economically. It was the hope of the leaders of the two countries that once partition became an accomplished fact the bitterness and hostility of the preceding years would be overcome and India and Pakistan would learn to co exist peacefully.

The partition riots came as a serious setback followed by Pakistan sponsored tribal invasion of Kashmir which added a new dimension to the tension between the two countries. Having achieved his objective of a homeland for Muslims of India Jinnah realised that the religious bond was not enough to keep the new State together. So he found it necessary to maintain the past hatred and distrust of Hindus and India. He also tried to prevent consolidation of Indian freedom by encouraging or trying to encourage separatist tendencies among the rulers of the Indian States. The tribal invasion of Kashmir was a part of the game which led to a clash between the armed forces of the two countries. Thus Kashmir is not the cause of India Pakistan hostility. It arose out of the situation of confrontation which Jinnah created and bequeathed to his political heirs. As Professor Sisir Gupta summed it up⁴, the fundamental problems of Indo Pakistan relations arise out of a set of conflicts—a conflict over status—a conflict of images and finally a conflict generated by the problem of identity of the two new states as two new nations. In the case of India there was no problem of identity thanks to the nearly three decades of freedom struggle nor did image and status present difficulties. But not so for Pakistan.

Hardly had the fighting in Kashmir ended in a ceasefire brought into force on January 1 1949 than Pakistan whipped up hysteria against the minorities especially in what was then its eastern wing. That too was got over through the Nehru Liaquat Ali agreement (1950) on the treatment of minorities in the two countries. But durable peace between the neighbours remained elusive because Pakistan found one excuse or another

to maintain tension. A theory was propounded and successfully sold to the ruling circles in Washington and London that because of the disparity in size, resources and population between the two countries India posed a security threat to Pakistan which needed outside help for the maintenance of its territorial integrity and sovereignty. The canal waters dispute was projected as a manifestation of India's designs to starve Pakistan of life-giving waters. Differences in the interpretation of the U.N. resolution on Kashmir ceasefire added fuel to the fire. But these were all symptoms of a deeper disease which was mainly Pakistan's crisis of identity. The fantasy of Muslim unity⁵ in India received a mortal blow when partition of the country divided the community by leaving nearly 60 million of them outside the homeland. Secondly, as already stated, the new State found itself unable to stay in one piece without an undue and reinforced emphasis on Islam. The more tenuous the domestic position of the ruler, the greater the stress on the Islamic ideology of Pakistan. General Yahya Khan who is un-Islamic in his personal behaviour and Bhutto who claims to be a non-Islamic progressive are among the worst examples.

Thirdly, there was the hangover from the agitation for Pakistan which was based on the principle of parity of status between 25 per cent Muslims and the rest of the population in India. After the creation of Pakistan as the smaller of the successor States, the obsession with parity of status reasserted itself. In other words, Pakistan wanted to balance India if necessary with backing from outside. That next to Indonesia it was the largest Muslim State in the world in terms of population and that it was situated in a geopolitically strategic area reinforced the tendency. Now in 1972, with Pakistan having been more than halved in population, the urge for parity with India has become more ridiculous. But it is nonetheless for it. In fact, it has come in handy to unscrupulous politicians who wish to perpetuate themselves on the basis of myths like international Islamic unity. More of this later.

The result of the emerging Indo Pakistan situation has been that though there were brief spells of peaceful co-existence marked by mutual expressions and gestures of goodwill the basic strain in the relations between the two countries remained unmitigated. Then came in 1954 Pakistan's direct involvement in the cold war. Its leaders accepted the American concept of collective security through regional defence arrangements. To substantiate Pakistan's participation in the Baghdad Pact—later CENTO after most West Asian States had looked askance at it—the bogey of a communist threat to Pakistan through India was raised. Pakistan's entry into the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was similarly justified. The argument was twofold: (a) because of growing Communist influence in the north eastern parts of India there was threat of subversion to East Bengal; (b) by its policy of favouring the Communist bloc against the West, India was gradually sliding into the Soviet camp, thus doubling the threat it posed to Pakistan into one of potential Communist aggression. When Pakistan thus qualified itself for military aid from the US and began to receive it in a large measure the process of alienation between the two countries became practically complete.

It will be appropriate here to trace the course of tortuous negotiations since the 1950s on Kashmir which even today is claimed to be the main bone of contention between the two countries. The Indian Prime Minister visited Karachi in July 1953 and was accorded an affectionate welcome. Mohammed Ali of Bogra had just taken over as Prime Minister from Khwaja Nazimuddin, the ready acceptance of whose suggestion⁶ for a peaceful settlement on Kashmir through direct bilateral negotiations by Nehru had originally set the ball rolling. The moving spirit behind the effort being Ghulam Mohammed, Governor General of Pakistan, the change in Prime Ministership did not affect the proposal for direct talks. But there was sharp reaction in Pakistan⁷ to a plea by Nehru for elimination of outside interference in India Pakistan affairs. A Government spokesman

6 February 11 1953

7 Dawn April 7 1953

in Karachi said the UN should make definite recommendations to the parties regarding implementation of steps which would facilitate the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir. In other words the reliance was still mainly on the UN where Pakistan was assured of US support. The scope of bilateral negotiations was to be limited to get over the failure of the UN to impose a solution satisfactory to Pakistan.

Mohammed Ali of Bogra who gave up Pakistan's Ambassadorship in Washington to become the Prime Minister began his new career with an effusive statement describing Nehru as an elder brother. Though Kashmir especially the deadlock on the demilitarisation of the State preparatory to the holding of a plebiscite had briefly figured in Nehru-Liaquat Ali talks of 1950 it was in mid 1953 that earnest talks on the subject began. The reason primarily was political change in Pakistan which brought to the helm of affairs persons professing a keen desire for amity with India. Nehru having already repeatedly expressed India's anxiety to live in peace with Pakistan a dialogue became possible. In an interview with the *Press Trust of India* correspondent in Karachi the new Premier of Pakistan said he was optimistic about the solution of disputes and that once the disputes were settled they could explore the possibility of joint defence of India and Pakistan. More concretely it was agreed that the two Prime Ministers would hold preliminary talks on bilateral issues in London in June 1953 and that there would be subsequent meetings between them for settlement of all Indo-Pakistan differences. A steering committee of two officials of each Government was set up to prepare the ground for the proposed meetings.

After the London talks Mohammed Ali said the chances of a settlement were bright. But six weeks later when the talks were resumed in a more formal manner during Nehru's visit to Karachi there was no accord on Kashmir. Exchange of Cooch Behar enclaves and removal or minimisation of restrictions on travel and trade between the two countries were the

8 Quoted by Sisir Gupta *Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations* Asia Bombay 1966

only items which yielded agreement. On Kashmir the joint communique issued at the end of the talks merely said a clear understanding of each other's point of view of the issues involved and the difficulties that stand in the way of settlement has been achieved. More positive was the decision that the two Prime Ministers would meet again in New Delhi in the third week of August.

But by then the hopeful atmosphere generated by the Karachi talks and the accord reached there on ancillary matters like trade and travel had been largely dissipated. This was because of Pakistan's interpretation of internal political changes⁹ in Kashmir earlier that month as a unilateral effort by India to queer the pitch. India however assured Pakistan that the developments which resulted in the removal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah were an internal matter and that on the larger issues our policy remains what it was and we shall stand by the assurances we have given. The Delhi talks thus represented a salvage operation. The joint communique after the meeting reiterated that it was the firm opinion of the two Prime Ministers that the Kashmir dispute should be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State with a view to promoting their well being and causing the least disturbance to the people of the State. The most feasible method of ascertaining the wishes of the people was by fair and impartial plebiscite. Such a plebiscite had been proposed and agreed to some years ago. Progress however could not be made because of lack of agreement in regard to certain preliminary issues. The Prime Ministers agreed that these preliminary issues should be considered by them directly in order to arrive at agreements in regard to them. These agreements would have to be given effect to and the next step would be the appointment of a plebiscite administrator.

It was also agreed that the plebiscite administrator would be appointed by the end of April 1954. After his formal induction into office by the Jammu and Kashmir Government

9 Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah was replaced by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed as Premier of Kashmir.

the administrator would embark on the necessary steps for holding a fair and impartial plebiscite in the entire state. The communique also recorded agreement between the two Prime Ministers in settling the problem of evacuee property and restoring facilities for travel between the two countries. The concluding paragraph of the communique stressed that progress towards solution of problems which have unfortunately come in the way of good relations between the two countries could be made only in an atmosphere of peace and co-operation. Towards this end the two Prime Ministers appealed to the Press and politicians in either country to avoid words and actions which promote discord between the two countries. That the political changes which had taken place in Kashmir a few weeks earlier did not affect the chances of settlement on Kashmir was highlighted when Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed gave his unequivocal support to the joint communique issued by Nehru and Mohammed Ali.

The accord reached between the two Prime Ministers though limited was welcomed in the two countries but for different reasons. In Pakistan it was hailed as reiteration of the principle that the future of Kashmir should be decided by means of a fair and impartial plebiscite. Another source of satisfaction for Pakistan was that the Delhi talks set a provisional timetable for the holding of such a plebiscite. In India on the other hand the accent was on the fact that the Kashmir issue was being negotiated bilaterally outside the purview of the United Nations and that by agreeing to the procedure of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir inducting the plebiscite administrator into his office Pakistan had formally recognised that Government. That the proposed plebiscite would be held in the entire State and in such a manner as to cause the least disturbance to the people's lives was interpreted in India as a tacit acceptance of the existing reality of Kashmir being divided along the ceasefire line between the two countries. The Indian view on the subject was clarified by Nehru in a letter addressed to his Pakistan counterpart on September 3. Nehru wrote: "We should not allow ourselves to accept a position which

might offer some temporary relief today but which might result in sowing the seeds of future trouble and conflict. If we aim as we must at closer and co-operative relationship between India and Pakistan we must find a solution of the Kashmir problem which is not only satisfactory to the people as a whole there but is also achieved without bitterness and a sense of continuing wrong to India or Pakistan. While the interests of the people of Kashmir are paramount there are also certain national interests of India and Pakistan which come into conflict over this Kashmir affair. It also happens that a very great deal depends not only on the solution of the problem but perhaps even more so on the manner of doing it because that manner will have far reaching consequences for both India and Pakistan in the present and the future. The large minorities in India and Pakistan will be affected by that solution. If it is wrongly done then the position of these minorities might well suffer and new problems might be created even bigger than the one of Kashmir. We must at all costs avoid this. To ignore it in our extreme desire to show some quick result in Kashmir is bankruptcy of statesmanship. To submit to the momentary passion of an excited populace and take a wrong course is not leadership. It was significant that the letter extensively quoted above was couched in terms of an informal communication. The two rounds of talks with Mohammed Ali had apparently encouraged Nehru to open his heart.

Despite the transparent sincerity displayed by Nehru much heat was wantonly generated in Pakistan over the choice of a plebiscite administrator. India felt that he should be from one of the small countries which meant cancellation of the appointment of Admiral Nimitz by the UN Security Council because he belonged to one of the great Powers which are too entangled in their difficulties and often pull against each other. The subject was broached at the Delhi talks and Nehru had 'the clearest impression' that both Prime Minister Mohammed Ali and Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan had agreed with him about the desirability of a national of one of the small Powers being made the plebiscite administrator. But when Nehru said so to a Pakistani journalist there was sharp reaction in Karachi.

Dawn carried a despatch by its political correspondent which was obviously inspired by the Pakistan Government. The despatch charged Nehru with an attempt to drive a wedge between the USA and Pakistan by claiming concurrence by the Pakistan leaders in his views on Admiral Nimitz. Secondly and more importantly Nehru's statement was interpreted as a bid to create a situation in which the Kashmir dispute may for all practical purposes cease to be a live issue before the United Nations. The correspondent wrote: "It is firmly pointed out in Karachi that Pakistan will in no circumstances walk into any such trap. The Security Council remains seized of the dispute and is in no way bypassed by the current talks which are in conformity with and fall within the framework of the Security Council's resolutions and recommendations adopted from time to time."

Even more surprisingly the Pakistan Prime Minister did not at all deal with the Nimitz controversy in a letter he had addressed to Nehru on the same day on which the *Dawn* despatch was published (August 27). Apparently he could not formally disown his earlier inclination to agree with Nehru on the desirability of replacing Admiral Nimitz. He merely said that there were advantages in continuing with Admiral Nimitz and suggested that both Governments give further thought to the subject.¹⁰ Replying to Mohammed Ali's letter on August 28 Nehru referred to the unkind attacks on him in the Pakistani Press and implied that there was official inspiration behind them. Nehru asked: "Can we pursue any policy of conciliation in this context and with these continuous attacks and insinuations which have no foundation whatsoever?"

Mohammed Ali's reply sent on September 5 blandly denied having ever committed himself on the need for replace

10 At a press conference which he jointly addressed with Nehru in New Delhi on August 20 Mohammed Ali evaded the question saying: "The Prime Minister of India will answer the question so far as it relates to him. So far as I am concerned this matter is under my consideration."

ment of Admiral Nimitz. In extenuation of the Pakistani Press campaign against Nehru and India Mohammed Ali charged the Indian Press with provoking it by interpreting the Delhi agreement as a success for India and thus creating difficulties for him in Pakistan. As if to wriggle himself out of such difficulties Mohammed Ali in a broadcast on September 5 declared clearly and unequivocally that besides fixation of a time limit for the appointment of the plebiscite administrator and working out the procedure for his induction in office he had not agreed to anything else at the Delhi talks. He further said that there was no question of the Kashmir issue being taken out of the United Nations.

The episode demonstrably illustrated the futility of trying to wean Pakistan away from its involvement with outside Powers the US at that time. Subsequently during the years of Ayub Khan's Presidentship it was thought the military could not countenance the loosening of Pakistan's ties with the US because of the generous military aid from Washington. But in 1953 US military aid had not yet started and the military was not in the picture. Yet the civil service the politicians and even the Press stuck to Washington like a leech because the association enabled Pakistan to pursue its policy of parity with India. Later in the sixties China filled the same need and endeared itself even to the US oriented military leaders.

It was a misfortune because in 1953 the Kashmir question was very near solution. Ghulam Mohammed who was Governor General was said to be agreeable to a virtual division of the State along the ceasefire line and Nehru also was thinking in those terms. Mohammed Ali's suggestion of 'joint defence' no doubt indicated that the US had other ideas on the subject. The cold war was then at its height and Washington was acquiring bases abroad and buying influence everywhere with rich abandon. If Nehru had played the game and agreed to go along with Pakistan towards an American oriented foreign policy a Kashmir settlement would have been forthcoming. Pressure in that direction was also sought to be exerted through Sheikh Abdullah who was encouraged by Washington to seek

independence for Kashmir But so crude was the exercise that it boomeranged

According to another assessment Mohammed Ali also genuinely desired a break with Pakistan's earlier policy of unending hostility for India and wanted to attune his foreign policy with that of India For instance while in London for the June meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers he was one with Nehru in supporting President Nasser of Egypt He also welcomed British moves for direct talks with the Soviet Union which was at variance with the then US policy If this assessment was valid the prospects of settlement should be even brighter

Meanwhile efforts continued for an India Pakistan agreement on Kashmir A committee was set up with representatives of the two Governments to iron out differences on preliminary questions like the implications of having a regional plebiscite in Kashmir and voting rights for refugees from the State But the committee met only once and could not make any headway with the items on its agenda Worsening the situation further came the revelation that the United States had agreed to extend military aid to Pakistan Sensing that a US Pakistan military pact was in the offing Nehru addressed a letter to Mohammed Ali on December 9 pointing out the dangers inherent in such a development Retaining his earlier informal approach Nehru said in the letter When something is done in Pakistan which is likely to create powerful repercussions in India then it is only right that I should draw your attention to it just as if anything happened in India which would produce that result in Pakistan you will be perfectly entitled to draw my attention to it ¹¹ While Mohammed Ali

11 The letter dated December 9 1953 added *inter alia* Whatever the motive may be the mere fact that largescale rearmament and military expansion takes place in Pakistan must necessarily have repercussions in India The whole psychological atmosphere between the two countries will change for the worse and every question that is pending between us will be affected by it It is obvious that such an expansion of Pakistan's war resources with the help of the US can only be

failed to take Nehru into confidence about the proposed military pact with the US General Eisenhower who was US President then formally announced on February 25 1954 his decision to lend military assistance to Pakistan. As Nehru had earlier explained to Mohammed Ali the new development put Pakistan's foreign and domestic policies in a diametrically opposite position to that of India. Secondly until then there was no open friction between the US and India though continued American political support to Pakistan in the Security Council vitiated the atmosphere and made Nehru seek the replacement of Admiral Nimitz as plebiscite administrator in Kashmir. Now there was a qualitative change in the situation. Commenting on the US decision to arm Pakistan Nehru told the Lok Sabha on March 1 1954. 'I have no doubt that the US President is opposed to aggression. But we know from past experience that aggression takes place and nothing is done to thwart it. Aggression took place in Kashmir six and a half years ago with dire consequences. Nevertheless the US has not thus far condemned it and we are asked not to press this point in the interest of peace.'

Inevitably the Indo Pakistan negotiations on the steps to be taken for facilitating a plebiscite in Kashmir broke down. That the US Pakistan military pact largely if not wholly contributed to it was obvious. Nehru summed up the situation in a letter to Mohammed Ali on April 13 1954 when he said 'it is Pakistan and not India that has taken a new step which has changed the situation entirely and brought new factors which add to the complexity of the problem. As was repeatedly made clear during the Delhi talks and subsequent exchange of correspondence between the Prime Ministers the essential basis for a settlement was that India and Pakistan should sort out

looked upon as an unfriendly act in India and one that is fraught with danger. We have been discussing for a long time past the question of demilitarisation in the Kashmir State. The whole issue will change its face completely if heavy and rapid militarisation of Pakistan itself is to take place. It becomes rather absurd to talk of demilitarisation if Pakistan proceeds in the reverse direction with the help of the US.

between themselves and without interference from outside their mutual differences. Such hopes were dashed to the ground when Pakistan introduced into the picture one of the Super powers by signing a military agreement with it. The new US intrusion was a more serious negative factor than the earlier UN role in India Pakistan affairs and came at a time when India seemed to be successful in lessening the scope for outside intervention.

Attempts at bilateral settlement of India Pakistan differences thus became meaningless. Still the thread of direct negotiations was taken up in 1955. Mohammed Ali again visited New Delhi on May 14 for discussions on various problems including Kashmir once more giving rise to speculation that a settlement on the basis of division of Kashmir was being negotiated. The new hopeful factor in the situation was the emergence however briefly of the Governor General Ghulam Mohammed as the dominant figure in Pakistan politics. He dissolved the Muslim League dominated Constituent Assembly and brought into the Government civil servants like Iskander Mirza and Chaudhry Mohammed Ali. Other new entrants were General Ayub Khan the Commander in Chief of the Army and Khan Sahib the former Congress Chief Minister of the North West Frontier Province and elder brother of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Mohammed Ali of Bogra remained Prime Minister but the Muslim League's sway over the Government was neutralised. And it was at Ghulam Mohammed's initiative that the India Pakistan dialogue at the highest level was resumed. But again the hopes of a settlement were short lived. A virulent campaign was whipped up in the Press and on the platform in Pakistan denouncing the proposal for a division of Kashmir along the ceasefire line and demanding a return to the original position that nothing short of a plebiscite would be acceptable to Pakistan. Mohammed Ali did not take long to comply with the wishes of the campaigners because it also suited him in the political squabbles at home. He declared in a speech on June 8 that if at the next meeting of the Prime Ministers of the two countries no settlement of the Kashmir question was forthcoming the negotiations would be

ended and the issue taken back to the Security Council. He also affirmed that there was no question of giving up our stand for a plebiscite.

Then followed another dose of political change in Pakistan as a result of Ghulam Mohammed's illness. General Iskander Mirza took over as Governor General and Chaudhry Mohammed Ali replaced as Prime Minister his namesake from Bogra who was unceremoniously eased out of the Government. Meanwhile Pakistan also joined CENTO as the Baghdad Pact was renamed.¹² The parting of ways between the foreign policies of the two countries was complete. It was against that background that Nehru told a Press conference in New Delhi on April 2 that a plebiscite in Kashmir was no longer desirable. He also revealed that he had suggested to the leaders of Pakistan a year earlier that India was agreeable to the partition of Kashmir on the basis of the ceasefire line though it amounted to a renunciation of India's legal and constitutional title to the entire State. Thus ended the first phase of direct Indo-Pakistan negotiations with Kashmir as the main subject. The subsequent meetings between Nehru on one hand and Feroze Khan Noon and Ayub Khan on the other were even less fruitful because they did not at all come to grips with the basic issue.

That Kashmir is not a source of Indo-Pakistan tension but a symptom of a deeper disease has been vividly brought out more than once. The seeds of discord were already there at the time of partition if not earlier in the ideologies and outlook of the Congress and the Muslim League. The domestic developments in the two countries, their foreign policies and the patterns of political organisation in them further reinforced the incompatibility between the two. After his bitter experience of a decade of fruitless negotiations with a succession of Pakistan leaders, Nehru felt it would be more worthwhile if the two countries subscribed to a no-war pact. That would ensure that even if there was no peace there would at least be no

¹² After signing the US-Pakistan Mutual Security Pact in 1954, Pakistan joined SEATO in February 1955 and CENTO in June that year.

hostilities on a major scale. But the rulers of Pakistan misinterpreted it as an Indian demand for renunciation by Pakistan of its right of self defence and rejected it. In effect however between the Kashmir ceasefire of January 1 1949 and 1965 a no war no peace situation prevailed in the subcontinent until Bhutto put into practice the 19th century concept of war being diplomacy by other means. He now professes to have had second thoughts on it not because a no war no peace situation is better but because the military balance is in India's favour.

Chapter II

Ceasefire Line

“THE ceasefire which came into effect in Jammu and Kashmir at the end of December 1948 proved to be a mockery of the term wrote Lieutenant General Lionel Protip (Bogie) Sen¹ who commanded the 161 Infantry brigade in the fateful months of the Kashmir operations . More bullets have whined across the ceasefire line during the last 21 years than in the course of the fighting in 1947-48’ he added . The 490 mile long notional line came into existence not as a result of a rational assessment of the security requirements of either country nor on the basis of the actual line of control by either armies but out of a series of backroom moves . According to Lord Birdwood² it was British initiative which should receive the honours for bringing about the cessation of the Kashmir hostilities and the coming into being of the ceasefire line . It appears Sir Francis Robert Roy Bucher the last Commander in Chief of the Indian Army inspired by the supreme desire

1 *Slender was the Thread* Orient Longmans New Delhi 1969

2 *Two Nations and Kashmir* Robert Hale London 1956

to prevent a war between the two Dominions approached Nehru for agreeing to a ceasefire for the alternative was to carry the war into Pakistan ' Nehru having approved the idea General Bucher wired General Sir Douglas Gracey of Pakistan In view of the political developments my Government thinks continuation of moves and countermoves too often due to misunderstanding accompanied by fire support seems senseless and wasteful in human life besides only tending to embitter feelings My Government authorises me to say I will have their full support if I order Indian troops to remain in present positions and cease fire Naturally I cannot issue any such order until I have assurance from you that you are in a position to take immediate reciprocal and effective action General Gracey agreed and the ceasefire came into force

Opinions on the motives and forces behind the ceasefire have differed widely and the truth is perhaps an average of the different versions But as far as the military situation in Kashmir at that time was concerned there was no doubt that Bogie Sen's account is unchallenged He made out a convincing case that the British officers who still lorded it over at the Army Headquarters in New Delhi especially General Sir Rob Lockhart who became Commander in Chief in August 1947 had tried to restrain if not thwart Indian military moves in Kashmir Sir Rob whose four year tenure as Commander in Chief was inexplicably but significantly terminated in February 1948 was replaced by General Sir Roy Bucher But according to General Sen the change made no essential difference to the higher direction of the operations in Kashmir from Army Headquarters He wrote The only conclusion that one can draw is the rout of the enemy in the battle of Shalateng shattered not only the tribesmen but other quarters as well When Baramula fell within 24 hours of Shalateng and the Brigade set off for Uri its advance had to be arrested and so one battalion was withdrawn without relief When this failed to prevent the capture of Uri something else had to be thought of Hence the change of axis towards Poonch The reference was to the decision of Major General Kulwant

Singh Commander of the Jammu and Kashmir Force to stay further advance along the road to Domel and to prepare for an assault on Poonch over the Haji Pir pass

In March 1970 when General Bucher was on a private visit to India as a personal guest of the Chief of the Army Staff General S H F J Manekshaw I sought his reaction to

Bogie Sen's account of the direction of the Kashmir campaign by the British officers in New Delhi. Though there was nothing very exciting about what he had to say on the subject General Bucher restrained me from publishing his comments in *The Hindustan Times*. In fact he had skirted the thrust of

Bogie's Sen's argument that British officers General Lockhart especially hampered the progress of India's military moves and instead dwelt at length on the circumstances in which the news of Pakistan sponsored tribal invasion of Kashmir in September 1947 could not be promptly conveyed to the Indian leaders

General Sen had dealt at length with this aspect also in his provocative book *

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- 3 He wrote "In order to ensure that the partition of the Armed Forces and their assets was fairly and correctly conducted both India and Pakistan had agreed to the formation of a Supreme Headquarters with Field Marshal Auchinleck as the Supreme Commander Staffed entirely by British officers the headquarters was located in New Delhi. As a neutral body the Supreme Headquarters owed its loyalty to both Dominions. In his role as a neutral Auchinleck had free access to both Governments and their Armed Forces Headquarters and was in constant touch with them either by personal visits on telephone or wireless or through couriers

It would not have called for a great deal of thought on the part of the Supreme Commander to arrive at the inference that the induction of a large body of tribals into a princely State that had yet to make its choice of accession could have serious repercussions not excluding a clash between the two Armies of which he was the Supreme Commander. General Sir Frank Messervy the then Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army would also certainly have arrived at the same conclusion and it is therefore difficult to believe that he did not brief Auchinleck fully on the events taking place in Pakistan the intention behind them and the serious repercussions that were bound to follow

If Messervy did not keep Auchinleck fully informed then one can only view the Supreme Commander as a rather pathetic figure

badly let down by one of his senior commanders. If Auchinleck was aware of what was happening then he was not the neutral in whom India had placed its confidence and it was a case of clear betrayal of trust. The bare fact is that at no time before October 24 did Field Marshal Auchinleck call the attention of the Government of India to any untoward developments in Pakistan or in the vicinity of the Pakistan-Jammu and Kashmir border. His report came after the tribal attack on Muzaffarabad.

The two Commanders-in-Chief General Sir Frank Messervy of Pakistan and General Sir Rob Lockhart of India were no strangers to each other both having served in the undivided Indian Army for a number of years. Their headquarters were linked by direct telephone and wireless circuits and it was routine for them to have long telephone conversations during which they discussed matters of mutual interest to the two Armies and exchanged information. That Messervy knew what was happening and was about to happen can be taken for granted. It would be most extraordinary for the C in C of an army to be kept completely in the dark about a largescale operation such as the one that was being mounted involving as it did a considerable amount of equipment and the posting of officers to the headquarters of General Jebel Tariq. This headquarters was in fact located in the same building as Messervy's own headquarters. Whether he informed his counterpart in India of what was brewing is not known but if he did General Lockhart did not pass the information to Military Operations and Intelligence Directorate.

An individual who was certainly fully aware of what was happening was Sir George Cunningham the Governor of the North West Frontier Province. Thousands of tribesmen from across the Durand Line had appeared in Peshawar the capital of the NWFP and were being heavily armed. Sir George was no stranger to the NWFP as he had served there in various capacities for almost his entire career and this radical departure from the firmly maintained policy of containing the tribesmen must have shocked him. It is believed that he dropped a hint to General Sir Rob Lockhart whom he knew well the latter having been⁹ his predecessor as Governor of NWFP. However the C in C of the Indian Army was apparently unable to grasp the full implications of it. Cunningham also knew Messervy and Auchinleck well and it is more than certain that he must have warned Auchinleck.

Whether these individuals knew or did not know of the planned raid on Kashmir will never be firmly established. Suffice it to say that the Government of India which had gladly accepted the formation of Supreme Headquarters for a period of four years now demanded its dissolution. This was effected almost immediately.

Disputing Bogie Sen's contention General Bucher told me that the first information Sir Rob had was from a letter he had received from Sir George Cunningham and it was at once conveyed to the Governor General and the Prime Minister. The reason why Sir George had taken General Lockhart into confidence was apparently because the latter was earlier Governor of the NWFP. In other words General Bucher had no convincing explanation for the conduct of his compatriots at that crucial moment. Speaking generally : General Bucher expressed a poor opinion of soldiers who wielded the pen after retirement from active service to turn out history very often of controversial times. They (the soldiers) cannot obviously have a rounded picture of a many faceted situation in times of war and therefore tend to emphasise their own subjective assessments, he added. In that context General Bucher recalled with approval the conduct of General Sir Claude Auchinleck who has not said a word on his Middle East campaign but is there any doubt that but for his stand against General Rommel at El Alemein victory would not have been possible ? General Bucher has a point when he questioned the competence of soldiers to give a rounded picture of wars in which they are involved especially at the lower and middle levels. Political decisions contribute very largely to the launching or suspension of military operations especially under democratic systems and soldiers are not always able to fathom and interpret the actions and thinking of politicians. But where the military aspect of the Kashmir operation is concerned General Bucher has no convincing answer to Bogie Sen.

General Bucher also modestly disclaimed the credit thrust on him by Lord Birdwood for bringing about the ceasefire in Kashmir. How can a soldier accomplish what is essentially a politician's work ? he asked. He was emphatic that the decision to suspend military operations in Kashmir was Nehru's own and thought it was prompted by the Indian Prime Minister's love of peace and aversion for avoidable bloodshed. Some people in India put a slightly different construction on the

development and came to the conclusion that but for Nehru's softness the Kashmir operations could have been carried to the logical conclusion of complete eviction of Pakistani forces from the territory of Jammu and Kashmir⁴. Even an unbiased observer like Sisir Gupta conceded that the difficult military situation created for Pakistan in the closing months of 1948 induced that country to agree to the ceasefire⁵. It was another way of saying that a favourable military position for India had been frittered away by the ceasefire decision at the juncture. The spring offensive launched by India had succeeded in clearing the Valley of Pakistani raiders and in the north Pakistanis who had earlier gained control of strategic areas of Baltistan, Skardu, Kargil and Dras had been forced to retreat from Ladakh and Kargil. The Pakistani siege of Poonch had also been broken and India's military position showed "marked improvement" to borrow the weighted words of Michael Brecher⁶. In fact as Bogie Sen revealed in his book, an error of judgment on the part of the military authorities had cost India the whole of the Haji Pir bulge which the 161 Brigade had earlier liberated from the enemy and the ceasefire coming soon after solidified it.

One of the baleful effects of committing an inadequate number of troops to the Kashmir operations was scramble among the different sector commanders for battle trained formations. Thus late in June 1948 after Bogie Sen had fallen ill and was replaced by Brigadier T B Henderson Brooks as commander of the 161 Brigade the Divisional Commander, Major General K S Thimayya took away from the Brigade 4 Kumaon Battalion guarding the Kazinagar range. Its place was

4 Russel Brines in his *Indo-Pakistan Conflict* (Pall Mall Press London 1968) says that against the background of the favourable military situation for India there appears some confirmation in the general belief now held in New Delhi that the Indian attitude in the general Nehru's orders. If only the Indians mean "the had allowed the campaign to continue for five more days we would not have the trouble over Kashmir. With the capture of Muzaffargarh the Indians could have gone to reclaim all of Kashmir."

5 *Op cit*

6 *Nehru: A Political Biography op cit*

taken by raw troops. Pakistan took advantage of the switch and advanced along the Kazinag range from west and east and captured Pandu — a vital feature in the Pir Panjal Range overlooking the main road along the north bank of the Jhelum river. What 4 kumaon had gained through careful planning skill and unbounded courage had been thrown away in a matter of hours. ■ Bogie ' Sen put it. With Pandu in its possession Pakistan was able to bring Uri within the range of its artillery. It was also a source of constant harassment to and interference with India's line of communication. In the 1965 fighting this was undone when India straightened the Haji Pir bulge but following the Tashkent Declaration the area was returned to Pakistan and the old ceasefire line restored to the disadvantage of India. In the 1971 war Pakistan launched a brigade attack on our positions in this area. After beating back the attack the Indian Army ably supported by the air force wrested control of two features which fortified our defensive potential. The Simla Agreement does not luckily affect them.

Another costly mistake committed in the weeks preceding the 1949 ceasefire was the withdrawal of Indian troops from Ledi Gali and Pir Kanthi in the Pir Panjal Range. This was done on the ground that there was heavy snow on the Pir Panjal Range. The Pakistanis capitalized it and cut the route to Poonch over the Haji Pir pass after occupying the abandoned Ledi Gali and Pir Kanthi piquets. More than 300 square miles of territory including the vital Haji Pir pass was thus lost to Pakistan. This was also partly recovered in the 1965 operations and returned as a result of the Tashkent Declaration. The circumstances in which Lal Bahadur Shastri had to concede Pakistan's demand for the return of the Haji Pir area have been described separately.⁷

Pakistan's insistence both in 1966 and now on the restoration of the old ceasefire line is not merely for keeping alive the Kashmir dispute at the United Nations but also to retain the practical advantage which the line as it came into existence conferred on it. Even if India's favourable military balance

7 See chapter 3

forces Pakistan to behave itself and avoid another open confrontation with India the ceasefire line even in its present modified delineation enables Pakistan to harass India and keep the pot boiling. The Chinese also have a military stake in the revival of the old ceasefire line because the Srinagar-Leh highway is vulnerable to interference from Pakistani posts in the Kargil area. Of the 80 piquets held by Pakistan in this area 36 had been regained in the 1971 war with the Indian Air Forces again playing a magnificent role. Our troops also advanced in the Lipa valley but in May 1972 Pakistanis mounted a battalion attack and recaptured two of the hill features in this area. Under the Simla Agreement Pakistan should vacate the posts to restore the line of control as on December 17 1971. India will thus retain the area it recaptured at Kargil Tithwal Uri and Poonch while Pakistan will keep the stretch of land it overran in the Chhamb area. In terms of territory the balance is not favourable to India but the new line will minimise the sources of friction along the ceasefire line and help its transition to an international boundary. Secondly the Indian interpretation is that by agreeing to re-delineate the Kashmir ceasefire line Pakistan has acquiesced in delinking Kashmir from the United Nations. The Indian argument is that with the 1949 ceasefire line having disappeared there is no *locus standi* for UN military observers. Pakistan has not accepted the position. Even after formally agreeing to the re-delineation of the line of control in Kashmir Bhutto has argued that it is not incumbent on Pakistan to seek the withdrawal of UN observers.⁸ India also is lying low for the moment lest any demand

8 As a further inducement to Pakistan to live up to the spirit of the Simla Agreement in this respect India linked the delineation of the line of control in Kashmir with withdrawal of troops from the Punjab and Sind territories in its adverse possession. At the meeting of representatives of India and Pakistan held in New Delhi in August 1972 deadlines were also set for the delineation and withdrawal. Even if Pakistan ultimately reconciles itself to the new line in Kashmir and agrees to surrender the two Lipa valley posts it overran after the ceasefire it is doubtful that it will let the UN observers go. Even as late as on September 7 1972 its Education Minister Abdul Hafiz Pirzada told the National Assembly in Rawalpindi that Pakistan is not

by it for the withdrawal of UN observers should provide an opportunity for the Security Council to take up the matter India may not therefore formally ask the UN observers to quit Even if it does Pakistan can defeat the purpose of such a development by allowing the UN observers to stay on its side of the ceasefire line just as after the 1956 hostilities Egypt allowed the UN Emergency Force to be located on its territory in Sinai and Gaza after Israel refused to do so In other words re delineation of the ceasefire line in Kashmir will be useful only to the extent that it confers a partial practical advantage on the defence forces in Kashmir To stretch the point and read political and diplomatic advantages in it is to beguile the gullible elements in India

Some political commentators in India have linked the issue with the concept of bilateralism to which Pakistan committed itself at Simla⁹ Referring to Bhutto's address on July 31 to the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs in Karachi in the course of which he said 'we should give bilateralism a chance in ties with India' they argued that he was hedging on the observers issue only for domestic consumption and that he could not afford to jeopardise the return of territories (in Punjab and Sind) to which a million Pakistanis are waiting to return The logical result of such an approach will be to regard Pakistan's formal acquiescence in the delineation of the line of control in Kashmir as fulfilment of India's objective in the matter The presence or otherwise of UN observers in Kashmir becomes relevant only when Pakistan seeks to activate the issue at the UN and use it as a lever to win concessions from India

At the Simla Conference also Pakistan first insisted that the clause relating to the line of control in Kashmir should read as follows The line of control should be respected by both sides without prejudice to the *internationally* recognised

bound to ask for the withdrawal of UN observers under the Simla Agreement and that the Government had no intention of asking the UN to withdraw its observers (Pakistan radio report quoted by PTI)

position of either side (emphasis added) India opposed the incorporation of the phrase internationally recognised position on the ground that it might provide an opening for bringing the UN back into the picture. The bureaucrats in South Block who are perhaps the best in splitting legalistic hairs lacked awareness of the political issues and regarded it as a victory when Bhutto ultimately gave in and the qualification 'internationally' was dropped. But it will be nothing short of naïvete to jump to the conclusion that Bhutto has made up his mind to keep other parties out of the Kashmir dispute and that he is as keen as India to settle it bilaterally. His views on bilateralism and his professed displeasure with the UN role in Kashmir have been discussed elsewhere in the book. The only way to freeze the December 17 line of control in Kashmir is to raise the threshold of deterrence against Pakistani transgression of it. In this context India should guard itself against the baloney that pending Pakistan's formal acquiescence in conversion of the line into an international boundary it should be made into a soft frontier with freedom of movement across it. That will be as good as setting up an official reception committee for potential infiltrators.

The tortuous negotiations between the military commanders of the two countries have so far shown that Simla spirit or no Simla spirit India is not giving in to Bhutto's pressure tactics. For instance the Pakistani negotiator Lt Gen Abdul Hamid Khan wanted only the posts taken by India in Kargil and other areas to be delineated as Indian possessions leaving large chunks of no man's land. India's Lt Gen P S Bhagat rightly rejected the demand because it would have made the defence of the Indian posts very difficult. Also on the question of Pakistan's withdrawal from the Lipa Valley posts it occupied after the ceasefire and Chatchak near Akhnur across the international frontier in Jammu India took a firm line refusing Bhutto's clever plea for political level talks. The mistakes made at Simla are thus being corrected.

Chapter III

Path to Tashkent

“IT is a remarkable achievement which reverses the trends of the past seventeen years and marks a new era in relations between the two countries ¹ Such was the effusion of enthu

1 Some of the other points made in Swaran Singh's statement issued in New Delhi on January 23 1966 were

In the Tashkent Declaration India and Pakistan have chosen to turn away from mutual conflict and have resolved to base their relations on peace friendship and good neighbourliness The central point of the whole Declaration is renunciation of force by both sides for the settlement of their disputes For many years in the past India had emphasised the importance of a no war declaration by both countries to the effect that all differences and disputes should be settled peacefully without resort to arms Unfortunately no agreement could be reached on such a declaration between India and Pakistan all these years It is a tribute to the statesmanship and sincerity of purpose of the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India that at last both countries have agreed not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means

More important than the words of the Declaration is the spirit underlying it We are confident that the Tashkent Declaration

siasm with which Swaran Singh welcomed the Indo Pakistan Tashkent Declaration of 1966. But for the mention of seven teen years in the text one would have thought he was hailing the more recent Simla Agreement which he described as even better than the Tashkent accord. According to India's External Affairs Minister a new era seems to be dawning in India Pakistan relations every six years or so.

As Swaran Singh viewed it, the Tashkent Declaration automatically brought about a qualitative change in India Pakistan relations which was to be sustained and promoted by a series of do's and don'ts² agreed to by the two Governments. Given the commitment to settle disputes peacefully and without recourse to force, the new atmosphere was expected to make good neighbours of India and Pakistan. Considering India's stand subsequently that productive discussions on Kashmir would be possible only within the framework of amicable relations restored by elimination of other issues at dispute, Swaran Singh's assessment of the Tashkent Declaration was perhaps consistent but it was unrealistic. Further, it would

signed by the two Heads of Governments and witnessed by Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, embodies the spirit of peace and goodwill on which future relations can be based to the lasting benefit of their peoples. The Tashkent Declaration is a tribute to the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India. It is a declaration of peace and goodwill between India and Pakistan. It has been hailed all over the world.

2. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that both sides will discourage any propaganda directed against the other country and will encourage propaganda which promotes the development of friendly relations between the two countries.

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the High Commissioner of India to Pakistan and the High Commissioner of Pakistan to India will return to their posts and that the normal functioning of diplomatic missions of both countries will be restored. Both Governments shall observe the Vienna Convention of 1961 on diplomatic intercourse.

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed to consider measures towards the restoration of economic and trade relations, communications as well as cultural exchanges between India and Pakistan and to take measures to implement the existing agreements between India and Pakistan.

have also defeated the argument in favour of normalisation of relations by ironing out other differences because if the Declaration by itself had metamorphosed the situation further steps would be redundant

As a matter of fact the Tashkent Declaration like the Simla Agreement more recently was a limited first step towards a new approach to India Pakistan relations as Mrs Indira Gandhi after she had taken over as Prime Minister summed it up³

Let us look back at the setting in which the Tashkent Conference took place. Early in September 1965 even while the India Pakistan hostilities were going on the Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin in formal messages to the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan offered to arrange a meeting of the two leaders to re-establish peace between the two countries⁴. Undaunted by the failure of India and Pakistan to react favourably to it the Soviet Premier repeated the offer on September 13 when a definite proposal by the UN Secretary General U Thant for suspension of hostilities at 6.30 p.m. (Indian time) on September 14 was already before the two Governments. This time India readily accepted the Soviet offer 'in principle' while the Pakistan President declined it by implication saying that it would not serve any fruitful purpose unless the ground had been prepared for it at the UN level. He asked the Soviet Union to take the initiative in the Security Council for removing the cause of the trouble which according to him was Kashmir. Subsequently following his visit to Washington and a meeting with the US President

3 At her first press conference as Prime Minister on January 19 1966 Mrs Gandhi said 'It is the first step. Any step towards peace is a good step. India will honour the pledge given by the late Prime Minister. I have already welcomed it.'

4 In the course of identically worded letters to Lal Bahadur Shastri and Field Marshal Ayub Khan Kosygin wrote 'Continued Indo-Pakistan hostilities can only be welcomed by those outside forces which are trying to divide and oppose to one another (sic) States freed from the colonial yoke and which are interested in weakening the unity of the Afro-Asian countries.'

Mr Lyndon Johnson Field Marshal Ayub Khan fell in line and accepted the Soviet offer of good offices for a meeting with the Indian Prime Minister If Ayub Khan had earlier harboured illusions of a divergence of approach to the problems of the sub continent between the US and the USSR they must have been dispelled during Ayub Khan's Washington visit At the same time he might have been reassured that unlike in the past the Soviet Union was now one with the US in trying to avert a conflict in the subcontinent and in finding a peaceful settlement on Kashmir

But the approaches of the two Governments to the Tashkent Conference and their expectations from it were entirely different The Indian Prime Minister repeatedly emphasized the need for a no war declaration between the two countries if peace was to be maintained in the subcontinent Lal Bahadur Shastri declared that if Pakistan did not like the expression 'no war declaration' it could call it a treaty of peace and friendship but its basic provision should be a commitment by both countries to abjure the use of force in settlement of disputes As for Kashmir India went repeatedly on record that it was not negotiable because the State was a part of India and negotiations on the subject would compromise the country's territorial sovereignty In the short run India wanted to retain the posts it had acquired in the Tithwal and Haji Pir areas of Kashmir as an insurance against future Pakistani infiltration into the State Field Marshal Ayub Khan on the other hand repeatedly stressed the need for a 'just settlement of the Kashmir dispute' saying that without such an accord no lasting peace between the two countries was possible

Between the cessation of hostilities on September 22 1965 and the convening of the Tashkent Conference on January 4 1966 there was intense diplomatic activity both at the United Nations in Moscow and Washington to find a basis for a lasting India Pakistan settlement Throughout this effort Pakistan sought considerable Indian concessions on Kashmir Before accepting the Security Council resolution for a cease fire Pakistan put forward a three point demand

- 1 Complete withdrawal of all Indian forces from Kashmir
- 2 Establishment of a United Nations force drawn from the Afro Asian nations to maintain security in the State pending a plebiscite and
- 3 A plebiscite to be held within three months after the ceasefire

Bhutto was reported to have told the UN Secretary General U Thant that Pakistan was extremely disappointed by the fact that so far UN efforts to restore peace in the sub continent had started from the premise that the 1949 ceasefire line should be maintained and even firmed up. He was believed to have argued that if the ceasefire line could not be changed to Pakistan's advantage there should at least be a clear guarantee of future political adjustments in the status of Kashmir. That would be a far cry from the utmost concession India was prepared to make namely conversion of the ceasefire line with appropriate changes into an international boundary. Pakistan's main interest was to tack on to a military ceasefire political questions involving the future of Kashmir. Having failed in its military adventure to annex Kashmir Pakistan now wanted international pressure to be brought to bear on India to open political negotiations on Kashmir. Islamabad also thought that with the Soviet Union assuming the role of an umpire in India Pakistan disputes—from that of an avowed partisan of India—the chances of such a settlement were bright. India's requirement on the other hand was a non conditional non political ceasefire which restored the status quo ante without unfreezing Kashmir. India no doubt had the problem of Pakistani infiltrators in Kashmir. If in the name of seeking a Pakistani acceptance of complicity in the infiltration India had made it an issue of violation of its territorial sovereignty it would have led to Kashmir being formally brought into the picture. So Lal Bahadur Shastri was content with reminding the Secretary General that when consequent upon the ceasefire becoming effective we shall not agree to any disposition which will have the door open for future infiltrators or prevent us

from dealing with the victims of aggression. Subsequently, at Tashkent also the question of ensuring that Pakistan would not be able to send infiltrators again into Kashmir occupied the attention of the Indian leaders. Pakistani assurances even if they specifically covered Kashmir could not be naturally taken at their face value. Retention of control of the Haji Pir and Tithwal passes opening into the valley was the only way out. But Shastri had to soften his position ultimately and agree to withdraw from Haji Pir and Kargil for two reasons. First any agreement at Tashkent hinged on India's willingness for such a withdrawal and Shastri did not want the conference to fail on that question. Secondly the Soviet leadership was pleading with India that the concession was worth making. The Soviet leaders especially the then Defence Minister Marshal Rodion Malinovsky were reported to have impressed on their Indian counterparts that the best guarantee against repeated incursions was military capability to deal effectively with such a situation whenever it arose. So when his military advisers confirmed that the posts could be recaptured without much difficulty in the event of another outbreak of hostilities Shastri agreed to give them up. Above all Pakistan had then occupied 190 square miles of populated territory in Chhamb as against the Indian gain of 273 square miles in the Mirpur Tithwal and Kargil areas which were sparsely populated. So India could not allow Pakistan to stay on in the Chhamb region and had to agree to exchange of territories in adverse possession.

Pakistan's efforts were not totally vain because the resolution voted by the Security Council on September 20 1965 provided for some kind of reopening of the Kashmir question. Urging a ceasefire with effect from September 22 and a subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel to the positions of August 5 the resolution promised to consider what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict. While India accepted the resolution there was sharp reaction to it in Pakistan. In Karachi mobs set fire to the US Information Service library. The US Consulate in Lahore was attacked by students who blamed Washington for ensuring the passage of such an unfav

ourable resolution through the Security Council. Pakistan also broke off diplomatic relations with Malaysia as a protest against its support to the Indian position in the Security Council. Bhutto reaching New York on September 22 launched into an impassioned speech in the course of which he threatened to wage a war against India for 1 000 years. Ultimately just when the deadline for the ceasefire was expiring he dramatically produced a telegram from Field Marshal Ayub Khan saying that Pakistan had ordered a ceasefire in the interest of international peace. Bhutto who had earlier criticized the US and the Soviet Union for acting against Pakistan's interest and even threatened to quit the United Nations if the world organisation failed in its last chance to put its full force, full moral responsibility and full weight behind an equitable and honourable settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, now claimed that the reference in the UN resolution to the political problem underlying the present conflict was the result of Chinese role in the episode. He told a news conference in New York that the Chinese ultimatum to India had shaken the Super Powers into realizing that only a political settlement could lead to permanent peace.

Even after the ceasefire came into effect Pakistan maintained its political offensive against India. Its representative at the UN Ayyad Ali periodically sent complaints to the UN Secretariat alleging ceasefire violations by India and presenting them as a threat to peace in the area. On October 22 Pakistan sought an urgent session of the Security Council to consider the virtual collapse of the ceasefire because of the total disregard by India of the letter and spirit of the September 22 resolution. Meanwhile President Ayub Khan had warned the United Nations that if it failed to bring about lasting peace in the area through an honourable solution of the Kashmir dispute the subcontinent would be engulfed in a wider conflict. There were also some violent incidents in Srinagar. The first few weeks of the ceasefire thus saw a kind of twilight war between the two countries with the Kashmir Valley as the bone of contention.

It was against this background that the Soviet Union on November 21 reiterated its proposal for a summit level bilateral meeting between India and Pakistan at Tashkent. Shastri readily accepted the suggestion and Pakistan followed suit soon after. The reasons for India's immediate acceptance of the Soviet proposal were obvious: first though the Soviet Union had been consistently extending political support to India in the Security Council and outside there were definite indications that Soviet support could not be taken for granted in the changed geopolitical situation and the intensification of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Moscow was keen on mending its fences with Islamabad and made its intention sufficiently clear to India.

At the Security Council meeting convened on October 25 at Pakistan's instance Bhutto excelled himself by his anti-Indian diatribes. He accused India of cruel atrocities, genocide and a barbaric Nazi-like policy against the people of Kashmir. The Security Council, he said, should immediately send a fact-finding committee to Kashmir to suggest measures to end the intolerable situation there. When Swaran Singh, who was representing India, protested against the dragging in of Kashmir into a discussion on the alleged collapse of the military cease-fire and walked out of the Council meeting, Bhutto warmed up and remarked: 'The Indian dogs have gone home but not in Srinagar only in the Security Council'.⁵ The allusion was to a slogan alleged to be current in Srinagar asking 'Indian dogs to go home'. Bhutto added: 'The ghettos of Poland live as painful and tearful memory but the ghettos of Jammu and Kashmir are stinking to high heavens with human flesh ripped asunder by a monstrous and habitual aggressor determined to destroy like a blood-thirsty barbarian all that stands in his way'.

The purpose of recalling this nauseating rhetoric is not to highlight the morbidly anti-Indian facet of Bhutto's personality.

5 Swaran Singh informed the Rajya Sabha on August 4, 1972 that this portion of Bhutto's anti-Indian tirade has been omitted from the official UN record.

—which is sufficiently notorious—but to bring out the circumstances in which the Tashkent Conference was convened. True to his volatile disposition Bhutto was a changed man hardly one month later. Visiting Moscow on November 25 he announced that Pakistan had unconditionally accepted the Soviet offer of good offices in settling Indo Pakistan disputes. He also placed on record Pakistan's agreement with Lal Bahadur Shastri's proposal that the total relationship between the two countries should be discussed. As if to reveal the reasons for Pakistan's change of heart, Bhutto said Pakistan expected Kosygin to take part in the Tashkent meeting and be impartial. Bhutto added, 'we hope that the Soviet Union as a great power will be impartial. Good offices does not mean adjudication of a dispute.'

Apparently Bhutto's volte face caused some serious thinking in New Delhi. It was perhaps taken as confirmation of earlier indications that the Soviet Union would play the role of an impartial umpire at Tashkent and help the two sides to come to an understanding on a basis of give and take. There was nothing unusual in the Soviet Union moving to such a position to impress Pakistan of its non partisan role and induce that country to accept Soviet good offices in normalizing its relations with India. For India it would have however meant a shift in the Soviet policy of acknowledgement of the finality of Kashmir's accession to India.

Theoretically the new Soviet stance would be at variance with the official Indian position that there could be no negotiations on Kashmir with Pakistan. But in effect there is no discrepancy because the Indian position on Kashmir has been never static. India had entered into negotiations with Pakistan on Kashmir in the Fifties and again during 1962-63. But whenever Pakistan made it an issue at international forums or as in 1965 tried to grab Kashmir by force the Indian response had been firm and unequivocal. Having failed in its military objective Pakistan now launched a diplomatic offensive to activate the Kashmir issue. India met the military challenge successfully and denied Pakistan a chance to settle the Kashmir

'question by force. Against that background re opening negotiations with Pakistan on Kashmir would have amounted to allowing Pakistan to have it both ways a military solution if available or a political settlement if necessary. India was fairly successful in projecting this point of view before the Security Council and ensuring that its resolution on ceasefire and withdrawal of troops did not contain the bonus of political talks on Kashmir for Pakistan. Despite strong protests by Jordan the Security Council left the reference to the political aspect of India Pakistan disputes vague. The Soviet Union also appreciated India's position in the Security Council but subsequently there was an obvious tilt in the Soviet stand. Whether it was motivated by a desire to build bridges with Pakistan in a bid to neutralize Chinese influence over Islamabad or was prompted by a feeling that Pakistan was then more amenable than before to an amicable settlement and should therefore be encouraged in that direction was not known.

Reports from Moscow talked of a strictly legalistic approach on the part of the Soviet Union to the immediate problem of Pakistani infiltrators. It was that since Pakistan had disowned responsibility for them, it was India's duty to liquidate the infiltrators. There was no point in expecting the world community to take note of Pakistan's interference in India's internal affairs. Secondly by delinking the question of infiltrators from the political aspect of the Kashmir dispute the Soviet Union seemed to argue that reopening of negotiations with Pakistan on Kashmir would not amount to rewarding Pakistan's tactics of sending in infiltrators. Above all it was sought to be impressed on India that the Soviet Union's efforts to befriend Pakistan would be in the larger interests of India also because in the framework of such a triangular relationship India Pakistan disputes could be more easily sorted out.

The intensity of Soviet commitment to bring about an India Pakistan understanding was reflected by press reports from Moscow. P. Unnikrishnan, Moscow correspondent of *Patriot*⁶ affirmed that the Soviet circles remain convinced that

India and Pakistan should meet and settle their mutual problems by direct talks without interference from outside. Denying that Moscow intended to impose any solution he added that the Soviet Union does not want either party to make any concessions. It thinks that given goodwill and a desire for amity on both sides a settlement is possible on the basis of realities of the past decade and more. At any rate it thinks a dialogue will at least assuage feelings and help lessen tensions leading eventually to a settlement.

The significance of the quotation lies in its assertion that the Soviet Union expects neither side to make concessions. When the positions of the two countries are so wide apart there can be no meeting ground without concessions by either or both. The implication obviously is that there need not be unilateral concessions and that the two sides can meet midway. This will be a settlement on the basis of realities. It is also presumably a hint that the Soviets like the Americans have come round to the position that a political settlement involving partition of Kashmir along the 1949 ceasefire line with mutually acceptable adjustments is the only realistic way out.

There would have been perhaps a meaningful move towards such a compromise by both countries if the Tashkent Conference had not been convened in the wake of Pakistan's military misadventure in Kashmir. The atmosphere was too vitiated to allow purposeful talks on the subject. The Soviet leadership was aware of the situation and therefore appreciated the Indian position that formal talks on Kashmir should await a proper atmosphere. But Moscow advised India to let Kashmir figure at the talks in Tashkent as a sop to Pakistan.

Such a conclusion will be warranted by reading between the lines of pronouncements and comments from Moscow. In the despatch quoted earlier the *Patriot* correspondent drew attention to a statement of T. T. Krishnamachari, the then Finance Minister of India, during a visit to Moscow earlier that month. Krishnamachari had said that India would welcome any prospect of greater Soviet-Pakistan friendship. Accord

ing to the *Patriot* correspondent the statement was very well received in Moscow as a sign of maturity of Indian outlook. Writing after the conclusion of the Tashkent Conference Dev Murarka⁷ expressed confidence that Pakistan would carry out the Tashkent Declaration faithfully to expedite discussions on Kashmir at the highest level. He added: In this it will probably have the support of the Soviet Union since Moscow is anxious that nothing should detract from the Tashkent Declaration because its own prestige is tied to it. Discussing the Soviet position on Kashmir the correspondent posed the question: When it is said that there is no change in the Soviet policy towards Kashmir what exactly is meant? That the State of Jammu and Kashmir is a part of India the Soviet Union has never disputed and does not now. That the territory is a subject of international dispute it can no longer be seriously contested.

In other words the Soviets wanted the theoretical position of the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir being a part of India to be reconciled with the reality that Kashmir has been a bone of contention between India and Pakistan since 1947. India herself had tried in the past to make the two postures co-exist. Whenever Pakistan formally challenged India's title to Jammu and Kashmir the response was in legalistic terms that the accession of the State to India was final and not negotiable. At the same time whenever Pakistan showed an inclination for a political settlement India had been prepared to discuss Kashmir also subject of course to the basic requirement that peace and stability in India should not be disturbed. With the Soviet Union also subscribing to such a policy the temptation should be greater for Pakistan to seek a Kashmir settlement informally outside the UN and the framework of its past declarations.

As the date for the Tashkent Conference drew nearer there were however efforts by both India and Pakistan to reiterate their well known positions and to claim that the proposed summit meeting would be within the four corners of either

⁷ *The Indian Express* January 26 1966

country's policy. Thus the Indian press reported on December 1 1965 that in a communication to Shastri Kosygin indicated that the entire range of Indo Pakistan relations would be discussed at Tashkent and that Pakistan was agreeable to it. At the same time the Pakistanis went on insisting that Kashmir would be the major if not the only subject for discussion at Tashkent. A report in the *Dawn* of Karachi on December 31 1965 quoted diplomatic sources in Rawalpindi as firmly believing that Kashmir will take precedence over all other issues at Tashkent simply because it is the principal source of tension between the two countries. Once the Kashmir issue is settled all other disputes which undoubtedly are of a comparatively insignificant nature will be resolved amicably. The report went on to say. The diplomats here believe that the Russian Premier Kosygin and Foreign Minister Gromyko frankly told Swaran Singh during his recent hurried sojourn to Moscow that the Tashkent Conference was essentially designed to find a mutually acceptable settlement of the Kashmir dispute and that as such the main attention at Tashkent should be focussed on the Kashmir issue alone. After reiterating the well worn Pakistani stand that there should be a plebiscite in Kashmir the report significantly added a proviso namely that if the Russians or Indians have some other just and reasonable solution to offer it could be considered.

These differences apart the two countries realized that the Super Powers were one in seeking peaceful settlement of all India Pakistan disputes including Kashmir. Pakistan which had in the past made use of the cold war to maintain tension in the subcontinent now expected the Soviet Union to settle the Kashmir dispute for it. In a broadcast from Pakistan radio on the eve of his departure for Tashkent Field Marshal Ayub Khan said that if the Soviet Prime Minister succeeded in cutting the Gordian knot of the problem of Jammu and Kashmir he will have earned the gratitude of millions of people of the Indo Pakistan subcontinent. Declaring that a Kashmir settlement would strengthen

equal in number for each country. *Pravda* published equal sized photographs of Lal Bahadur Shastri and Field Marshal Ayub Khan. The brief biographies of the two leaders carried by the newspaper were also exactly of identical length. The villas placed at the disposal of the two leaders in Tashkent were similarly comparable in all respects. All this was apparently an indication to Pakistan that normalization of relations with India would entitle that country to equality of treatment with India at the hands of the Soviet Union.

Though the Soviet offer of good offices was instrumental in getting the Tashkent Conference off the ground, Soviet spokesmen made it abundantly clear that the talks were essentially bilateral between India and Pakistan and that the Soviet Prime Minister was merely there as a host. It was emphatically denied that the Soviet Union had any compromise proposal or that it would join the negotiations to bridge the gulf between India and Pakistan. Welcoming the leaders of India and Pakistan to Tashkent, Kosygin said he regarded the meeting as one which may mark a turning point in the relations between India and Pakistan.¹¹ He added, "Naturally during one meeting it may prove to be difficult to find solutions for all the existing problems. What is important is to chart the path leading towards their settlement, to create a climate of trust and mutual understanding and simultaneously to solve these questions which today constitute an obstacle to normalising the relations."

Shastri's emphasis was naturally on the need to avoid the use of force as a means of settling disputes. He told the plenary session that the basic question for decision is whether we should think of force as a method of solving differences or whether we should decide and declare that force will never be used. Assuring Pakistan that India unreservedly accepted Pakistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity, he said India would similarly like to preserve its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

11 Quoted by Dev Sharma in *Tashkent: a Study in Foreign Relations* Gandhian Institute of Studies Varanasi 1966

Field Marshal Ayub Khan recalled his speech earlier in the UN General Assembly and said Pakistan was prepared to enter into a no war pact with India once the basic problem confronting us was resolved according to principles already accepted by both. He pointed out that a no war agreement to be workable should follow settlement of disputes between the two countries and urged concrete steps for that purpose.

The subsequent seven days of negotiations however brought out the basic difference in the approaches of the two countries. For Pakistan Kashmir was the crux of the matter the root cause of the trouble and so the success of the Tashkent Conference would depend on the measure of agreement reached on Kashmir. Other questions like an effective ceasefire and disengagement of troops withdrawal from territories in adverse possession stoppage of hostile propaganda through press and radio and restoration of diplomatic commercial cultural and other relations were consequential or peripheral matters for Pakistan. India on the other hand insisted that without a proper atmosphere of peace and co existence it would be futile to discuss Kashmir.

Why did Pakistan which was earlier responsive to the Soviet advice that substantive political issues should not be taken up at the first meeting suddenly change its stance at Tashkent? It first wanted Kashmir to be formally included in the agenda and later when to obviate the controversy it was decided to do away with the agenda altogether insisted on the inclusion of Kashmir in any final joint statement to be issued. One explanation was that the Pakistan President succumbed to the pressure of hawks in his entourage.¹² The rider to the

12 According to Girish Mathur it was not Bhutto but civil servant Aziz Ahmed who is the real evil genius. Representing the well entrenched civil services who played a leading part in making Pakistan a US satellite by signing military pacts and with whom Ayub Khan's military regime had to reach a compromise in the past Aziz Ahmed cannot be brushed aside by the President. (*Patriot* January 16 1966). Interestingly enough after the 1972 Simla Conference also leftist commentators like Girish Mathur blamed Aziz Ahmed for stalling and even trying to sabotage an agreement. This time the generation gap was in the focus with the theory that younger civil servants like Rafi Raza were more amenable.

theory that being pro US they plugged a tough line was not tenable because it was obvious that the Super Powers were acting in concert in the matter of bringing about an Indo Pakistan rapprochement. The US President Lyndon Johnson formally welcomed the Tashkent Declaration and expressed the hope it will lead to peace between the two countries which are friends of the US. Earlier during Field Marshal Ayub Khan's visit to the US in mid December 1965 he was reportedly told that resumption of US economic aid would be dependent on restoration of peace in the subcontinent¹¹ (Washington adopted the same attitude towards India too though this country was the victim of aggression but that was a different matter). Chester Bowles who was US Ambassador to India then had also hailed the Tashkent Declaration and pro US elements in India like the Swatantra Party were extremely enthusiastic in endorsing it. So except as a propaganda gambit the charge of US opposition to or sabotage of the Tashkent Declaration would not stand.

Moreover classification of Pakistan leadership into hawks and doves is nothing but wishful thinking. There was no compulsion for Ayub Khan to include Aziz Ahmed in his Government's delegation if he were really a stumbling block to peace and if Ayub Khan was so keen on settling disputes with India. If as was argued Ayub Khan could not afford to displease Aziz Ahmed by excluding him from the official team it meant the atmosphere in Pakistan was hardly conducive to a negotiated peace with India. The same argument would apply to Bhutto's delegation to the 1972 Simla Conference. Most of the members were handpicked by the Pakistan President obviously with a purpose. In fact Bhutto had recalled Aziz Ahmed from retirement and reappointed him Foreign Secretary.

A more plausible explanation would be that Pakistan wanted to commit both India and the Soviet Union to the principle of formal negotiations on Kashmir and realized that the Tashkent Conference was the best occasion to do so. Not

11 Bhutto fared better in 1972 because US economic aid to Pakistan remained unaffected by the December 1971 hostilities.

withstanding assertions to the contrary by Swaran Singh and others Pakistan in 1965 had not broken loose from the tradition of raking up Indo Pakistan issues at international forums especially the United Nations. The reasons for such an attitude of unabating hostility for India have been already discussed earlier. Bilateralism even in a limited sense would not therefore suit Pakistan's book. This would be crystal clear from the assessment of the Tashkent Declaration by a Pakistan's Government spokesman at a time when his Indian counterparts were extolling its virtues with all the eloquence at their command. The Pakistan spokesman listed three avenues for a peaceful solution of the Kashmir dispute.¹⁴ The first of these was the implementation of Clause 4 of the UN Security Council resolution of September 20, 1965 'promising consideration of steps to solve the underlying political problem'. The second was direct negotiations provided under paragraph 9 of the Tashkent Declaration and the third was the continuing good offices of the Soviet Union which emerged as the key factor in the success of the Tashkent Conference.

Dawn of Karachi was even more explicit when it pointed out that the virtue of the Tashkent Declaration lay in setting a deadline for military disengagement. Thereby it endorses as well as opens the way for the Security Council to begin as soon as the withdrawal of forces is completed to discharge the obligations it assumed under the September 20 resolution.¹⁵ How the differing interpretations of the same document by the two Governments made the Tashkent Declaration a dead letter we shall see in the following chapter.

14 *Dawn* January 12, 1966

15 January 11, 1966

Chapter IV

Bhutto's Worst

TOLSTOY'S description of marriages that all happy ones are similar but each unhappy one is unhappy in a different way does not seem to be true in the case of India Pakistan agreements. While a successful agreement like the Indus Waters Treaty has been distinct the others have a common pattern of rising expectations followed by dashed hopes. Unfortunately so far Pakistan's attitude to its obligations under the Simla Agreement has been strikingly similar to the way the Tashkent Declaration was subverted after its immediate objectives of recovery of territory occupied by India in the 1965 war and resumption of military overflights to what was then East Bengal had been fulfilled.

As the record of India Pakistan relations since 1949 shows despite the generally continuing tension a no war no peace situation prevailed until 1965 when first in Kutch and then in Kashmir Pakistan sought a military solution of disputes. The provision in the Tashkent Declaration of 1966

committing the two countries to renunciation of force in settlement of disputes was therefore significant. It was rightly regarded by observers in India as a limited gain in the sense that though peace might not reign in the subcontinent the pre 1965 no war situation had been restored. In the earlier chapter we have seen how some Pakistani spokesmen put a different construction on the article about renunciation of force. Stressing the reference in the Tashkent Declaration to the UN Charter they argued that reaffirmation by Pakistan of its obligation under the Charter did not apply to Kashmir as it was disputed territory. Secondly they contended that the provision for continuance of meetings both at the highest and other levels on matters of direct concern to both countries' (Article 9) required immediate reopening of negotiations on Kashmir failing which Pakistan was free to activate the Security Council in the matter.

While the war of words between representatives of the two Governments was going on the other non controversial articles of the Declaration began to be implemented. Pakistan's High Commissioner Arshad Hussain who was one of the representatives of his Government at Lal Bahadur Shastri's funeral stayed on in New Delhi and resumed his duties with effect from January 12 1966.¹ His Indian counterpart Kewal Singh returned to Karachi five days later and re started functioning as High Commissioner. Thus Article 5 of the Declaration became operative. Similarly withdrawal of troops from territories in adverse possession of either country was completed by February 25 as stipulated in Article 2 of the Declaration. Pakistan made an issue of an alleged Indian failure to vacate three villages in the Sialkot area. The villages were under Pakistani occupation before August 5 1965 though the Radcliffe Award had given them to India. Bhutto who was Foreign Minister then argued that restoration of the *status quo* required India to return the villages. He had even lodged a complaint with the United Nations alleging continued Indian

1 Unlike in 1971 diplomatic relations between the two countries were not ruptured in 1965

occupation of strategic areas.² Ultimately India had to give up the villages. The choice of August 5 1965 for restoration of the military *status quo* was to ensure the inclusion of Pakistani infiltrators in the armed personnel to be withdrawn.³ That objective also was fulfilled and the External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh informed the Lok Sabha on April 4 1966 that Pakistan had called upon the infiltrators to return and that except for a handful all of them had returned. Exchange of prisoners of war and civilian internees had also taken place as provided by Article 7 of the Declaration. The last batch of repatriated civilian internees told newsmen on February 17 that the Tashkent Declaration had brought about a sudden change in the attitude of Pakistan camp officers towards them.⁴ Non internee civilians were also allowed to return to their respective countries by the Ferozepur Hussainiwala Kasur land route.

Following a series of talks between Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh and his Pakistani opposite number Air Marshal Nur Khan agreement was reached by March 15 on overflights by military combatant and transport aircraft. Liaison had also been established between the two air headquarters on avoidance of violation of air space of either country. Article 4 of the Declaration enjoined on the two Governments to discourage propaganda directed against each other and encourage propaganda which promotes the development of friendly relations between the two countries. India took the first step in that direction when its Embassy in Washington stopped circulation of material critical of Pakistan.⁵ G. P. Sippy President of the Indian Motion Picture Producers Association disclosed on January 30 that the screening of 30 films had been discontinued in pursuance of the Tashkent Declaration.

■ *United News of India* report March 2 1966

3 A report from General Nimmo to the UN Secretary General said that the series of violations had begun on August 5 in the form of armed men generally not in uniform crossing the ceasefire line from the Pakistan side.

4 *Press Trust of India* report

5 *The Hindustan Times* January 19 1966

provision against hostile propaganda ⁶. But seven weeks later Swaran Singh told the Lok Sabha ⁷ that India had drawn the attention of the Soviet Union to resumption by Pakistan in the past few weeks of anti Indian propaganda and added that under the circumstances it would be difficult for India to adopt unilaterally an attitude of restraint. Pakistan returned the compliment when *Dawn* reported on March 18 that for the first time in two months the Indian Press today resumed its attacks on Pakistan the principal target being Foreign Minister Z A Bhutto ⁸. However according to a *PTI* despatch from Moscow the Soviet Union advised India to observe restraint and not retaliate against Pakistan's unfavourable propaganda against India.

The Tashkent Declaration (Article 6) also provided for restoration of trade and economic relations and telecommunication links as a means of facilitating return to normalcy. Commercial ties between India and Pakistan had been tenuous even before the 1965 fighting but telephone telegraph and postal links had been there even if erratically and had been snapped as a result of the outbreak of hostilities. Now not only was the *status quo* restored but proposals were also mooted for economic cooperation between the two countries. An agreement to exchange cargoes seized during the conflict removed an irritant in that connection. In an interview with an American television company Mrs Gandhi said economic collaboration between the two countries would be a sort of surety for peace and continued cooperation. The Planning Minister Asoka Mehta said in Washington India was ready for talks with Pakistan on joint economic development projects. Two days later *The Financial Times* of London reported that India had approved an American proposal for joint ventures and common development programmes between India and Pakistan. There was also speculation in the Indian Press about negotia-

6 *Ibid*

7 Lok Sabha Proceedings March 23

8 March 24 1966

9 *The Times of India* April 25 1966

tions between the two countries for exchange of Pakistani rice for Indian coal ¹⁰

At the cultural and other levels also there was a spirit of *bon homie*. An India Pakistan Friendship Association was launched in New Delhi. An Indo Pakistan *mushaira* was proposed. A national convention for the promotion of the spirit of Tashkent was held in New Delhi in the first week of March with progressives like Bhupesh Gupta, Dewan Chamanlal and K. D. Malaviya taking a lead part. It decided to convene in New Delhi a world conference against military pacts and foreign bases. It also condemned reactionary communal groups for trying to destroy the Tashkent spirit. ¹¹ Nor was there a dearth of gestures by either country like that of Bhutto when just a week after the Simla Agreement he allowed President V. V. Giri's plane returning from Kabul to overfly Pakistan. Long before the agreement on overflights was reached India allowed on January 21, 1966 a Pakistan plane from Lahore to refuel at Dum Dum on its way to Dacca. While as in the case of the Simla Agreement there was acclamation for the Tashkent Declaration from several countries especially Nepal, Burma, Ceylon and Mongolia, the Soviet support for it took the shape of forging new links with Pakistan. *The Press Trust of India* correspondent in the Soviet Union reported that there is hardly a day in Moscow when some leading daily or journal does not publish an analytical commentary on the beneficial results of Tashkent Declaration. The Soviet Press is critical of the Western Press which according to it pours oil on extinguished flames. Opposition to Tashkent in India and Pakistan comes from individual extremist chauvinist quarters. ¹²

10 *United News of India*

11 *Patriot* March 3, 1966

12 A commentary in *Pravda* said: "Some circles were criticising the Tashkent Declaration in both India and Pakistan. These critics were getting their inspiration from forces abroad which wanted to hinder the peaceful progress of Pakistan and India. Those who hoped to sabotage the Tashkent agreement were doomed to disappointment. The people of both countries have welcomed the Tashkent outcome and have paid a tribute to the role played by the Soviet Union."

The National Council of the ~~Communist Party of India~~ hailed the Declaration as an event of great historic significance not only for the peoples of India and Pakistan but for all peace loving mankind¹³. More significantly the Soviet Press gave more attention this year (1966) to Pakistan's National Day (March 23)¹⁴. *Izvestia* stressed growing co operation between the USSR and Pakistan in many fields. A Soviet Pakistan cultural society was also formed in Moscow. This was no ordinary development because not only was the Communist party banned in Pakistan soon after Ayub Khan's take over in 1958, front organisations also were not allowed to be formed. This was thus an indication that it would have been only a matter of time before a similar cultural society was launched in Pakistan.

The Soviet interest in promoting the declaration manifested itself in other forms also. Moscow began to vouch for Pakistan's sincerity in implementing the declaration. A team of 12 Soviet tourists who were as much representative of Soviet opinion as Kremlin officials said in New Delhi after a tour of Pakistan that Pakistan is as earnest as India to implement the declaration¹⁵. Even when some official and quasi official statements from Pakistan caused doubts about that country's commitment to the spirit of the Tashkent Declaration the Soviets were forthcoming with assurances and advice to India not to doubt Pakistan's intentions. The alibi that Pakistani efforts to read into the Tashkent Declaration meanings it did not have was purely for domestic consumption—which is the stock in trade of apologists for Pakistan today—was first made in Moscow in extenuation of the Ayub Khan regime. For instance Inder Malhotra writing in *The Statesman*¹⁶ pointed out that the Russian argument was that whatever the phraseology used the Pakistani commitment to rule out war as an instrument of policy and to observe the terms of the ceasefire

13 *Patriot* January 14 1966

14 Press Trust of India report

15 *Patriot* February 8 1966

16 January 28 1966

in Kashmir was clear. What is more the Russians have virtually underwritten this understanding of the declarations. An editorial in the newspaper on the same day was even more explicit. It said: The twists and turns in the Pakistani postures need not be taken too seriously. They can be seen as part of the regime's total endeavour to sell Tashkent to an unprepared public by blowing suitably hot and cold as the popular mood warrants. The point to remember is that Pakistan needs peace as much as India does: this provides the hope that the accord reached at Tashkent will endure. But it would be naive to expect popular sentiment in West Pakistan to change overnight. The change can be accelerated by a demonstration of India's willingness to be fair and even generous (as Mr Shastri had put it) once Pakistan returned to the ways of peace.

Though Pakistan was then under a military ruler masquerading as an elected President dissent was not so totally smothered as in the post Simla agreement period with a different kind of masquerade on ¹⁷. Thus opposition to the Tashkent Declaration not only found expression but had even made itself felt. Students in Lahore and Lyalpur were the first to rise against the accord. They went on strike and staged demonstrations shouting 'we want Kashmir not ceasefire'. The police had to use their batons to deal with them on more than one occasion. The Lahore agitation continued for three days periodically erupting into violence. The High Court Bar Association lent a hand by adopting a resolution criticising the declaration on the ground that it did not provide for a plebiscite in Kashmir. Elsewhere too lawyers were its most vocal critics for two reasons. They constituted the

17 In a report on the state of human rights in Pakistan sent by the Pakistan Government to the UN it was admitted that the following fundamental rights had been abrogated: (a) safeguard against arrest and detention (b) protection against retrospective punishment (c) freedom of movement association trade business or profession (d) freedom of speech (e) right to acquire hold and dispose of property of equality before law and equal protection of law and non discrimination against citizens in respect of appointments in the service of Pakistan. The report was dated April 28 1972 (Press Trust of India)

intellectual elite nurtured on an anti-Indian diet practically since partition. Secondly they were chafing at the denial of opportunities for participation in politics under Ayub Khan's system of basic democracy. They found in the situation created by the Tashkent Declaration such an opportunity without necessarily inviting the wrath of the regime. Even if they fell foul of the Government it would be in a larger patriotic cause. Thus the Pakistan Bar Association formally passed a resolution rejecting the Tashkent Declaration. Among the political parties the Council Muslim League was in the forefront of the anti-Tashkent agitation in the West Wing. In the East the public opinion was generally indifferent to the declaration though the Awami League initially joined the Council Muslim League campaign against it. But Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani toed the official line. He said the common people of both Pakistan and India always wanted to live in peace but he added peace could never be lasting as long as the basic cause of conflict between the two nations was not removed. Bhashani was also perhaps reflecting Chinese resentment at the Soviet success in pulling off the Tashkent accord.

The East Bengalis by and large desired peace with India and the Awami League representing the bulk of the people there would have normally welcomed the Tashkent Declaration. If Ayub Khan had been forthright in acting up to it he would have perhaps won the support of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the Awami League. But he dithered making it difficult for the Awami League to stand by the regime in the matter. He also made it a party issue. The situation was further complicated by Bhutto's handling of it. It was a popular debating point in East Bengal to highlight the regime's inability to defend the province during the 1965 hostilities with India. Ayub Khan's response was that India dared not attack East Bengal. He boasted that if India tried to invade East Bengal the Pakistan army would have marched into Delhi through its exposed western flank. But Bhutto thought he was more clever and declared in the National Assembly that East Bengal

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had been properly taken care of by China. According to him at the ambassador level talks in Warsaw the Chinese plenipotentiary had asked his American counterpart to convey to India a warning that if it attacked East Bengal Peking would retaliate. The revelation boomeranged with East Bengalis asking what was the point in remaining with West Pakistan if we are to be defended by China? ¹⁹

Meanwhile Ayub Khan succeeded in neutralising the opposition to the Tashkent Declaration. Two of the opposition parties—the Awami League and the Council Muslim League led by Mian Mumtaz Daultana—suspended their agitation on January 28. The agitating student groups in West Pakistan also followed suit. Only Chaudhary Mohammed Ali and Lieutenant General Mohammed Azam Khan kept up the opposition with Lahore as their epicentre. They held a conference in the West Punjab capital the proceedings of which were banned from publication by the Government. Rumour had it that Bhutto sensing the depth of public sentiment against the declaration especially in Punjab was secretly encouraging anti Ayub politicians. The younger elements in the army began to feel that because of secret US pressure Ayub Khan had sabotaged the military campaign and that otherwise India could have been dislodged from Kashmir even if it meant a longer war. They were especially critical of Ayub Khan's acceptance of the UN proposed ceasefire. Bhutto was with this group though clandestinely. He also spread the theory that the Super Powers pressurised India and Pakistan to cease fighting to pre-empt China from entering the fray and clinching the issue in favour of Pakistan. In fact Ayub Khan during a visit to Larkana on February 8, 1966 was believed to have warned Bhutto against playing such a double game. Apparently it had some effect because on the following day Bhutto issued statement defending the Tashkent Declaration. Delinking it from the Kashmir question he asked the opposition parties not to bring Kashmir into the controversy. Pointing out that Kashmir was not a

19 Shabbir Hussain *Lengthening Shadow* quoted by Dilip Mukerjee *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto* Vikas 1972

party issue the statement added 'If today we have agreed with India under the auspices of the Soviet Union to make fresh efforts towards seeking a peaceful solution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute this constitutes not a departure from our traditional policy on Kashmir

Almost simultaneously Pakistan proposed an Indo Pakistan ministerial meeting to consider further steps for the implementation of the Tashkent Declaration. In the agenda for the proposed meeting Pakistan wanted Kashmir to be listed on the top. According to Pakistan's Information Minister Khwaja Shababuddin the proposed talks on Kashmir were to be within the framework of the September 1965 resolution of the UN Security Council. Still India took it in its unruffled stride and agreed to the inclusion of Kashmir also in the agenda. A spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry said Pakistan's proposal for talks on Kashmir was not a precondition for the meeting but was only an additional item for discussion. To avoid controversy on the subject India did not also propose any formal agenda but suggested that subjects like trade and evacuee property be considered. That was another indication that India did not mind priority being given to Kashmir at the ministerial meeting but only felt that without a proper atmosphere such discussions would not be fruitful.

Still Bhutto insisted on talks on Kashmir. In the context of the inflamed public opinion in West Pakistan Ayub Khan could not even if he wanted to say that the Kashmir discussions should wait until a more opportune moment. He would also have no reason to let go of an opportunity when Soviet pressure might induce India to reopen formal negotiations on Kashmir. Further Bhutto rejected an Indian proposal that the Tashkent Declaration be jointly registered with the United Nations. India had to do it unilaterally on March 22 1966.

By April Pakistan's immediate objectives of getting back territory under Indian occupation and securing resumption of civil and military overflights to East Bengal had been secured. American opinion which was earlier agitated by Pakistan's tactics of first fomenting a military conflict in the subcontinent

and secondly using American gifted equipment against India had been allayed by the Tashkent Declaration. The embargo on the sale of US arms to Pakistan had also been lifted. Revival of the Kashmir question at that stage would not therefore displease the Americans. On the other hand it might induce Washington to go along with Pakistan and advise India to reach a negotiated settlement on Kashmir. The Soviet Union also was said to be doing the same. The only question was the timing of such talks.

By then Bhutto had realised the potentiality of the Tashkent Declaration as a political weapon against Ayub Khan. In the words of Dilip Mukerjee²⁰ he foresaw that the end of the Ayub era would not be long in coming. But he wanted to dissociate himself from the President in a manner that would gain him the greatest kudos. The obvious line to take was to voice reservations about the Tashkent Declaration. It is also plausible that he wanted to put Ayub Khan in a position from which he could not easily wriggle himself out. Kashmir was one such because both the US and the USSR had veered round to the position that the 1949 ceasefire line be formalised as an international boundary. India too was prepared for it. If Ayub Khan had agreed to it in the context of the situation then created in Pakistan he would have signed his political death warrant. Otherwise the stalemate would continue. After he was removed from Government in June 1966 Bhutto began to charge Ayub Khan with having reached a secret agreement with India on Kashmir.

Chapter V

Simla Summit

RICHARD Nixon's political pilgrimage to Peking in February 1972 set the style for summits including the June/July one between Mrs Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The brunt of the technological revolution in communications and mass media was brought to bear on the U.S. President's China visit. Nothing was too insignificant for the camera to pick up or the radio to broadcast. In fact, Voice of America regaled its listeners with biographical data of its commentators when it had exhausted all that could be said about the American visitors and their Chinese hosts. One does not know how the Chinese leaders took it but obviously they have not been unhappy.

As for the television viewers, radio listeners and newspaper readers, the bulk of them, especially in the US, were entertained by an insight into a country and of a people about whom there was earlier only a distorted impression. Maybe the fanfare of publicity helped overcome the earlier prejudice at the popular level. That there were no spectacular results from the first meeting in more than two decades of the leaders of the world's most populous nation and the most powerful country

In contrast to the relative paucity of insight into the Simla proceedings in the Indian Press there was a plethora of explanation and comment in the days following the Simla Agreement. In fact some of the enterprising correspondents present at Simla had given an almost blow by blow account of how an agreement was reached at the last minute. Officials who ought to know have also confirmed such reports. The pre-summit setting with Mrs. Gandhi playing it in a low key and Bhutto blowing hot and cold alternately added to the dramatic effect of the outcome. While it was well known that the conference would be based on the agenda hammered out at Murree and Rawalpindi between Pakistan officials and D. P. Dhar who visited Pakistan in April as the Prime Minister's special emissary it was not known what that agenda was. Indian sources said Kashmir would be an important subject of discussion and there was also speculation that India would seek the conversion of the December 17 line of control in Kashmir into an international boundary but it was not clear how firm India would be in pressing that demand. On the other hand Bhutto went on record reiterating Pakistan's policy of securing for the people of Kashmir the right of self-determination at an early date. Addressing separate meetings at Murree on June 17 of parliamentary and political leaders he confirmed that Kashmir would figure prominently at the Simla talks¹.

That the Pakistani and Indian approaches to the summit were divergent was clear enough. Bhutto's speeches and statements and writings in the Pakistani Press had listed the objectives of the summit as recovery of Pakistani territory under Indian occupation and release of Pakistani war prisoners in Indian custody. The Indian aim was an intangible package described as durable peace. While India included in it restoration of stable and peaceful frontiers by converting the line of control in Kashmir into an international boundary coupled with resumption of trade, cultural and diplomatic relations between the two countries, the Pakistanis viewed durable peace

1 Pakistan radio report quoted by Press Trust of India

out at the United Nations ⁴ He added that Bangla Desh was sure to become a member of the UN at the next General Assembly session (starting on September 15) and he did not want Pakistan to be the odd man out. It was apparently in that context that Bhutto might have indicated to Mrs Gandhi at Simla that Pakistan would recognise Bangla Desh after the National Assembly session due in mid August so that the prisoners issue could be taken up at the next summit. Thus the agenda for Simla boiled down to two broad issues (a) determination of elements of a durable peace covering among others a Kashmir settlement and (b) normalisation of relations including return of territories under adverse occupation. At the official level talks India proposed discussions on a draft treaty of friendship and peace prepared by it in accordance with its basic approach to India Pakistan problems. It consisted of acceptance of the new ceasefire line in Kashmir ■ a stable frontier ■ mutual commitment to renunciation of force to resolve disputes and willingness to seek a bilateral settlement of mutual problems without third party or UN intervention. The draft treaty also provided for resumption of diplomatic ties and restoration of trade cultural and other relations.

Though the Pakistani reaction to the draft was said to be uncompromisingly sharp it was more tactical than otherwise. There was much meeting ground between the Indian and Pakistani stands especially as professed by Bhutto and his officials. It is a different matter if it is partly veneer to hide Bhutto's real long term interests. For instance he was prepared to reiterate Pakistan's adherence to the UN Charter provision that international disputes should be settled without recourse to or threat of force. Nor was Pakistan totally averse to the idea of bilateral settlement of disputes but it would not have the United Nations specifically ruled out as a third party for purposes of mediation or arbitration. This again is a UN provision which Bhutto is never tired of quoting. In fact Pakistan had accepted these two points when it subscribed to the Tashkent

4 Associated Press report *ibid*

as no more than restoration of the *status quo* as it existed before December 6 1971

In the past especially after the 1966 Tashkent Declaration Pakistan wanted a Kashmir settlement to precede resolution of other differences between India and Pakistan. It would not accept the then Indian position that a step by step settlement of mutual disputes would create a congenial atmosphere for discussions on Kashmir. Now at Simla the positions seemed to be reversed. India was keen that Kashmir should form part of a larger package while Pakistan favoured a step by step approach. Their immediate requirement being return of occupied territory the Pakistanis were not keen on settling Kashmir and other issues. When the talks were thus deadlocked Bhutto yielded ground by agreeing that there could be negotiations on long term problems also keeping in mind the need for a gradual normalisation of relations between the two countries.

Release of its war prisoners in India was naturally high in Pakistan's thinking. But India took the consistent stand that since the Pakistan troops had surrendered to a joint command of Indian and Bangla Desh forces represented then by the Mukti Bahini they were the joint responsibility of the two countries. So it would not be tackled without the association of Bangla Desh. Bhutto went through the motions of meeting the requirement. Abandoning his original stand that he would never allow the issue of Muslim Bengal to be raised on Indian soil he veered round to the position of a tripartite summit among Mrs Gandhi Sheikh Mujib and himself on the subject. The Bangla Desh Premier said the question of his attending the (Simla) summit did not arise until the recognition of Bangla Desh by Pakistan.² Almost simultaneously Bhutto told a meeting of Pakistan editors at Murree that Pakistan must recognise Bangla Desh by September or become the odd man

2 According to a Reuter report from Ankara published in *The Times of India* (June 9 1972) Bhutto advised the Turkish leaders that he had sent a message to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman offering to meet him in Turkey Pakistan India or any neutral country.

3 Reuter report published in *Patriot* (June 21 1972).

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4 Associated Press report *ibid*

Declaration six years earlier subject of course to its well known reservations

On Kashmir however Pakistan would not agree to the conversion of the ceasefire line into a mutually acceptable international boundary Bhutto stuck to the position throughout and there would have been no agreement at Simla if India had not modified its stand As a political commentator put it ⁵ in order to accommodate the Pakistan point of view the clause was rephrased to read in Jammu and Kashmir the lines of control resulting from the ceasefire of December 17 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side According to Indian officials the compromise preserved the concept of bilateralism and ensured that our defence forces in Kashmir remained where they were on the night of December 17 1971 It is also privately asserted in the External Affairs Ministry that Bhutto had assured Mrs Gandhi that there was no question of disturbance of the *status quo* in Kashmir and that he would gradually accept the *de facto* position It is not inconceivable that he thus got India to be generous on other issues

What made Bhutto amenable to proposals which he would not countenance a few days earlier ? The Indian explanation repeatedly mentioned by editorial writers and political commentators was that Bhutto could not afford to go back empty handed from Simla because it would endanger or at least weaken his political position within Pakistan So he was in desperate need to get some kind of a settlement : Secondly to sugar the pill for him Mrs Gandhi had agreed on an immediate and unconditional exchange of territories in adverse possession except in Jammu and Kashmir and that would have got Bhutto nearly a hundred times the area Pakistan would have to vacate Nearly a million Pakistanis displaced from the Shakargarh and Tharparkar areas were waiting to go back Further still Pakistan would continue to occupy the Chhamb area it had overrun

5 S Viswam in *The Statesman* July 7 1972 (see also chapter 2) Pakistan also wanted the recognised position to be qualified by the word internationally but India would not have it

though it meant suffering for tens of thousands of Indians uprooted from there. This is no doubt a tricky argument because if Bhutto could lay stress on the territorial gains from the accord (more than 5 000 square miles of territory in return for an area of about 60 square miles) it would be difficult to convince the Indian people that territory did not matter because India was never after real estate. What about the argument that without coveting territory one could use it to drive a favourable bargain which is the practice in all international dealings. If India had anyhow to give up the territory and had only done it formally at Simla the territorial argument would lose its validity for Bhutto also. As it is while Bhutto is making much of the territorial gain we in India are being reminded of our well known position—reiterated by the Prime Minister on December 3 itself when Pakistan thrust the war on us—that India had no designs on Pakistani territory.

Even in the case of Kashmir the compromise formulation included in the agreement is not as favourable to India as is made out by Swaran Singh and others. It is their contention that by sticking to the December 17 line of control and not the 1949 ceasefire line India has paved the way for an ultimate bilateral acceptance of the line as international boundary without UN or other intervention. This has already been discussed earlier in the book. Suffice it to say that the crux of the matter is Pakistan's sincerity in implementing the agreement. If Indian leaders are convinced that because of the changed circumstances Bhutto can be depended upon to live up to the provisions of the Simla Agreement in spirit as well as in letter then the safeguards to ensure his good behaviour such as linking the troop withdrawals to agreed delineation of the line of control in Kashmir are unnecessary. Either Bhutto is dependable or undependable he cannot be both at the same time.

Restoration of diplomatic relations had a high priority in the Pakistani approach to normalisation of relations. India however was lukewarm and according to an official spokesman the reason was it would provide an opening for Pakistani

espionage activities. It went down well with critics of the agreement like the Jan Sangh. But a deeper aspect of the matter has been overlooked. When India and Pakistan agree to exchange diplomats the question of finding a substitute location for the former Indian Deputy High Commission in Dacca will arise. India having recognised Bangla Desh Bhutto has formally to give up his legend of the possibility of special relations with Muslim Bengal. By not agreeing to resume diplomatic relations immediately India has indirectly saved Bhutto from an embarrassing situation. I would not put it beyond the bureaucrats in South Block to have contrived the argument to help Bhutto while keeping the Jan Sangh at home happy. The folly of agreeing to the summit with Bhutto before he formally and fully recognised Bangla Desh is discussed in the last chapter. The provisions regarding trade, travel, cultural and other relations are almost a replica of the Tashkent Declaration articles which have been already examined at length.

The subject of defence expenditure was also said to have figured in the Simla discussions. One of the overworked themes about India-Pakistan amity is that it will enable the two countries to divert scarce resources from defence to development. In absolute terms there can be no two opinions that development is more important and desirable than even defence. Who does not want swords to be beaten into ploughshares? But in practice it is a long drawn out process requiring a series of preliminary steps. To expect force reductions and cut in military expenditures automatically is nothing short of starry-eyed idealism. At Simla the Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister P. N. Dhar was believed to have analysed the implications of a heavy budgetary allotment for defence.⁷ The idea

■ At a symposium organised by the Indian Council of World Affairs in New Delhi on June 27 Prof. Balraj Madhok acclaimed a statement by a Government spokesman that restoration of diplomatic relations would enable Pakistan to resume spying in India.

7 S. Viswam *ibid.* India spent 3.6% of her Gross National Product on defence but felt this was a heavy burden despite India's size and her larger defence responsibilities. But Pakistan supposedly peaceful was

was said to be to wean the younger elements in the Pakistani civil service from militarist mentality. If so it is a tall order considering the entrenched interests in the Pakistani system and the real power behind the throne in the case of Bhutto. Secondly the progressivism of the younger elements in the Pakistani civil service is more in the eyes of the beholders in South Block in New Delhi. Bringing out the urge of the common people of Pakistan for a better lot in preference to wasteful military expenditure is a gigantic task which takes years to accomplish.

For instance military expenditure accounts for 64.5 per cent of Pakistan's revenue receipts according to the budget for 1972-73 published on June 16, 1972.⁸ The military expenditures during the last ten years were

1962-63	Rs. 95.43	crores
1963-64	115.65	
1964-65	126.23	
1965-66	285.50	
1966-67	229.35	
1967-68	218.65	
1968-69	242.68	
1969-70	276.00	
1970-71	320.00	
1971-72	444.00	
1972-73	446.00	

alloting as much as 9% of its GNP to defence. Aziz Ahmed's reaction was that this was a matter for technical experts in Pakistan to decide. He was obviously surprised when informed that in India civilian supremacy extended even to such matters as defence expenditure. This left Aziz Ahmed unimpressed but one of the younger members of the delegation complimented Dhar and expressed regret that he had not elaborated this point for the benefit of the older generation.

- 8 Unlike in India and other democratic countries the budget was not presented to the National Assembly but broadcast over the radio. This was despite the lifting of martial law and the convening of the National Assembly.

There was besides military aid from the US which was until 1965-66 of the order of Rs 77 crores in terms of the present exchange value of the Pakistani rupee. In 1971-72 as revealed by the US General Accounting Office Pakistan had misused aid for refugee relief in Bangla Desh for construction of military works. After he took over from General Yahya Khan as President and Chief Martial Law Administrator Bhutto raised the salaries of all ranks of military personnel. According to Bhutto's supporters it was to preempt any attempt by the Generals to stage a political comeback by isolating them from the ranks. If so it does not mean strengthening popular forces against the vested interests in the military but pitting one group of them against another.

What are the factors contributing to the increase in Pakistan's military expenditure? Let K. Subrahmanyam Director Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses explain.⁹ The increase in pay and the raising of two more divisions cannot account for Rs 126 crores over 1970-71 estimates. Cost of imports for Pakistan will now be higher because of devaluation but equipment from China is likely to be free of cost as before. The loss of some ships and reduction in the maintenance cost of cantonments and garrisons in Bangla Desh their naval facilities there are offsetting savings. One is therefore compelled to draw the conclusion that this budget provides for a substantial amount for import of weapons and equipment over and above the Chinese equipment. The order on France for 30 Mirages Vs remains unfulfilled and whether the French Government will continue its embargo has to be watched carefully in this country. Subrahmanyam rightly concludes. One of the ideas now canvassed is whether there can be an agreed freeze on forces for the two countries. This idea is not new but only the old neo colonialist idea of equating India and Pakistan in a new garb. While Pakistan treats only India as its adversary India's security responsibilities and obligations are far wider. Consequently it will be totally unrealistic for this country to limit its forces with reference to Pakistan only.

Last year it took India many months of response time to prepare himself to deal with a security threat posed by Pakistan. President Bhutto still talks of equilibrium in the subcontinent and now his defence budget reveals that his actions do not correlate with his public statements on living in peace with this country. The best proof of his intentions is not his statements—public or semi public—but whether he is prepared to progressively trim his defence budget. So long as it remains at its current levels India will be taking uncalculated risks in letting its guard down and accepting President Bhutto at his words.

Chapter VI

India's Case

THE first authoritative exposition of Indian assessment of the Simla Agreement was provided by the External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh at the Parliamentary Consultative Committee of his ministry. He was at pains to convince members that the Simla Agreement was very much unlike the Tashkent Declaration and was in fact better than the latter from India's point of view.¹ Explaining the essential differences between the Tashkent Declaration and the Simla Agreement Swaran Singh pointed out that the Tashkent accord had been achieved through the good offices of a third country—the Soviet Union—while the Simla Agreement was the result of bilateral negotiations without third party interference. Secondly under the Tashkent Declaration the two countries had agreed to withdraw their forces to the 1949 ceasefire line in Kashmir whereas now the Indian forces would hold the actual line of control.² One of the clauses of the Tashkent Declaration was

1 July 3 1972

2 See also chapter 2

interpreted by Pakistan to mean the use of some sort of UN machinery for consultation but there was no such provision in the Simla Agreement

Swaran Singh claimed that in respect of Kashmir Pakistan had under the Simla Agreement for the first time agreed to find a final settlement through bilateral discussions. Representing it as a great advance from India's point of view, Swaran Singh reminded members that hitherto Pakistan had been insisting on a solution of the Kashmir problem on the basis of earlier UN resolutions. Swaran Singh further pointed out that the Simla Agreement precluded Pakistan from sending infiltrators or saboteurs into Kashmir.

These and other points in favour of the Simla Agreement were brought out in sharper relief when the two Houses of Parliament discussed and approved the Simla Agreement in the first week of August. The discussions were based on identical written statements made by Swaran Singh in the two Houses. Unlike extempore pronouncements by Government spokesmen including the Prime Minister on the subject, this was a cogent presentation of the official point of view and therefore deserved to be studied in depth. The statement modestly described the Simla Agreement as 'the first step towards establishing durable peace on the subcontinent'. Another indication of the Government's relatively cautious approach was provided by the observation that 'if faithfully worked out, the agreement provided a framework for bringing about an altogether new relationship between India and Pakistan'. Like Swaran Singh's first formal statement at the consultative committee meeting, this one also emphasised the bilateral nature of the agreement, marking a departure from the experience of the past 25 years when outside agencies and third party involvement made the solution of problems between India and Pakistan extremely difficult. It was also emphasised that the idea of providing for a self-executing machinery which would automatically result in involvement by third parties or outside agencies had been given up. Another important feature of the agreement, according to the statement, was that both sides had agreed

that the basic issues and causes of conflict between the two countries shall be resolved by peaceful means by refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of each other

When Parliament took up consideration of the Simla Agreement the atmosphere was somewhat vitiated by the Jana Sangh charge of Soviet pressure on India to enter into the agreement. The inequity of the territorial exchange³ involved in the agreement was also made much of by the critics. Their third point was that Bhutto could not be depended upon to implement the agreement faithfully and that it was a ploy on the part of the Pakistan President to secure Indian withdrawal from territories occupied during the December war and also to get back Pakistani prisoners of war. In fact Atal Bihari Vajpayee who spearheaded his party's attack on the agreement contended that Bhutto had achieved at Simla all the three objectives he had set himself namely getting back the territory under Indian occupation securing the release of the prisoners of war and re opening the Kashmir issue. He also pointed out that the Prime Minister's earlier assurance to the country that she would seek a package agreement and not piecemeal solutions to India Pakistan differences had not been kept because Government itself now described the agreement as the first step and not the final step.

The Prime Minister's defence of the agreement fell mainly into two parts first that there was realisation in Pakistan of the complementary nature of the interests of the two countries and secondly that the agreement should not be weighed in the scales of territories exchanged. She told her critics that they were putting too much emphasis on the dependability or other wise of Bhutto. She said 'I am not concerned whether we can trust the Pakistan President or not. But I am concerned whether we can trust ourselves or not'. It was in the same vein that the Prime Minister drew the line between the Tashkent Declaration and the present agreement. She pointed out that

3 See chapter 3

4 Lok Sabha proceedings unofficial text

the situation obtaining in the country today was entirely different from that at the time of the Tashkent Declaration or the earlier India Pakistan agreements. Today India was united in many things and it was united in guarding its interest. She added: I do not think it is possible to do something that goes against the interest of the country.

Having got over the controversy about Bhutto's sincerity of purpose by posing the issue in the perspective of Indian unity, strength and self confidence Mrs Gandhi told members that the first thing she had impressed on Bhutto was that the two countries would have to decide whether their interests were complementary or conflicting. Allaying members' apprehensions about some of Bhutto's pronouncements Mrs Gandhi pointed out that while it was easy for India to forget the past and look to the future because it never preached hatred of Pakistan it would take some time for that country to overcome its hostility for India.

The debate in the Rajya Sabha was more businesslike though there was much reiteration of the points made earlier in the other House. S D Misra of the Organisation Congress while generally supporting the Simla Agreement said there was disappointment because the promised package deal had not been accomplished. He wanted the speedy convening of a second summit meeting so that other problems could be sorted out. Among the tasks still to be accomplished he mentioned a no war pact, reduction in the armed strengths of the two countries and a real solution to the Kashmir problem. From the Congress benches Bipinpal Das was so much carried away by the merits of the agreement that he practically exhausted the adjectives in the language in praise of it. He called it a sound and excellent beginning, a right step in the right direction, ■ herald of ■ new era, an era of peace, progress and prosperity not only for India and Pakistan but for the whole of Asia and perhaps ■ shining lighthouse in the entire world. He listed four major achievements of the Simla Agreement. First President Bhutto has put his signature to a firm commitment that there will be no threat or use of force for settlement of

disputes This in my opinion almost amounts to or comes very near to a no war declaration Secondly 'for the first time both countries have agreed to settle all disputes by bilateral negotiations Thirdly Pakistan has committed itself against organisation assistance or engagement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and friendly relations Finally there has been a de internationalisation of the Kashmir ceasefire and denial of any further role for the UN in the matter

Voicing the Jana Sangh criticism of the agreement Dr Bhai Mahavir *interpreted the reference in the Simla Agreement to a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir as reopening negotiations with Pakistan on the future of a part of Indian territory* The Jana Sangh M P quoted extensively from Bhutto's speech in the Pakistan National Assembly to disprove the Government's claim of de internationalisation of the ceasefire in Kashmir He pointed out that Bhutto had very categorically stated that by bifurcating and delinking the international boundary from the ceasefire line in Kashmir Kashmir had been acknowledged as a disputed issue Another quotation from Bhutto's speech contained the claim that he had rejected Mrs Gandhi's suggestion of a package deal because he did not want to surrender Kashmir⁵

Dr Bhai Mahavir also recalled that the Simla Agreement in its reference to Kashmir specifically stated that it would be without prejudice to the recognised positions of India and Pakistan In that connection he again quoted Bhutto to the effect that Pakistan's position of self determination was an internationally recognised position while that of India was one of *usurpation which is not recognised by international law* the UN and the world True to his wont the Jana Sangh spokesman criticised the decision to withdraw from the occupied territories saying that of the two levers to ensure good behavi

5 As read out by Dr Bhai Mahavir the quotation said if I want to *surrender Kashmir I would have said let us go about it the way Ayub Khan did Mrs Indira Gandhi has originally said it must be a package deal and a basket deal Mr Dhar said to me it must be a bouquet of roses all in one I said no one rose at a time*

our by Pakistan troop withdrawal was more effective. He again quoted Bhutto that having won from India the more difficult concession of troop withdrawal he was confident of securing the early return of the prisoners of war because 'prisoners can not be kept indefinitely'.

An interesting sidelight to the Rajya Sabha debate was the rationalisation of Bhutto's speeches by supporters of the Government. Pranab Kumar Mukerjee said in extenuation of the Pakistan President that since he had spoken for three hours at a stretch he had to say many things. Another alibi was that Bhutto had been quoted out of text. Swaran Singh went to the extent of arguing that since some of the statements quoted by Dr Bhai Mahavir were not included in the authorised text of Bhutto's speech they did not commit the Pakistan President.

Communist support for the Simla Agreement was voiced by S G Sardesai who expatiated on Imperialist intrigues with regard to India Pakistan relations. According to him it was not Jinnah and the Muslim League but it was the British Government which was primarily responsible for the creation of Pakistan. He therefore joined issue with the Jana Sangh for not uttering a single word of condemnation of the Americans and the British and accusing only the leaders of Pakistan.

Vidya Prakash Dutt viewed the Simla Agreement against the background of the atmosphere of detente emerging in the world. He referred particularly to the US Soviet and Sino US summits as well as the West East German detente. He added that it was in India's interest to follow the direction in which the world was moving and in that context the Simla Agreement was a correct step. He claimed that 'some realisation is seeping down' among the people of Pakistan that foreign intervention had got them nowhere and that it was in their interest to resolve problems with India directly. Should not this trend be encouraged, he asked.

Dutt wanted Parliament not to pay much attention to the question of Bhutto's sincerity. The question is not one of

sincerity or insincerity in international relations. The question is what is actually the objective situation to which you are reacting." Since as a result of the December 1971 war India had emerged as a more viable and stronger power while Pakistan had been cut to size by the emergence of Bangla Desh as an independent country, he thought it would be futile to look in to the other person's motives.

The Prime Minister's intervention brought out the assertion that the Simla Agreement was in pursuance of the domestic and international policies followed by India all these years. She further claimed that there was great change in Pakistan regardless of whether its leaders wanted it or not. There are vast forces at work in India, in Pakistan and all over the world. The question before us is do we encourage these forces or do we put a spoke in the wheel? The Prime Minister displayed cautious optimism when she described the Simla Agreement as India's success in taking the first step. I do not know whether at the second step we could go very much further or not. But I know that a beginning has been made from which it will be very difficult for anybody to go back. If something does happen if there is war we are ready. Then we don't say No we have accepted peace and therefore we are not ready for this war.

The Prime Minister dwelt at length on the difference between the Tashkent Declaration and the Simla Agreement saying that the circumstances in both the countries, the attitudes of the people, everything was entirely different. To substantiate her argument Mrs Gandhi said while Bhutto had not accepted the Tashkent Declaration he was a party to the Simla Agreement which had been accepted by other parties⁶ as well. Whether the Prime Minister used it as a debating point against the critics of the agreement or has been misled by Bhutto about

6 Mrs Gandhi said, "He (Bhutto) did not accept it (agreement) while he was in Tashkent. He went back and told his country that he did not accept it and according to him the country did not accept. Well whether it was so or not I do not know. The only thing was he said the very same thing. But this agreement he has accepted today and other parties have accepted it."

his initial attitude to the Tashkent Declaration the facts are different. While one does not know what Bhutto's honest opinion was at Tashkent, overtly he continued to be a supporter of the Declaration as long as he remained in the Government.⁷ His interpretation of the Tashkent Declaration was no doubt totally at variance with that of the Indian spokesmen but in that respect Ayub Khan and other representatives of the Pakistan Government also were depicting the Tashkent Declaration as a prelude to reopening the Kashmir dispute. Bhutto's position was therefore indistinguishable from that of Ayub Khan and others. Only after he had been eased out of the Government did Bhutto use the Tashkent Declaration to mount a personal attack on Ayub Khan, charging him with having secretly bartered away Kashmir to India.

The other point made by Mrs Gandhi in favour of accepting Bhutto at his face value is no more tenable. The facts that Bhutto's party has a majority in the Pakistan National Assembly and that he was elected to the assembly with a fairly big majority do not add to and detract from his reliability. If, as claimed by Mrs Gandhi, Bhutto is trying with success to get the people of Pakistan accept the Simla Agreement the way he is going about it is not very reassuring. Mrs Gandhi drew a parallel between the opponents of the Simla Agreement in India and their counterparts in Pakistan but she did not juxtapose the position of herself and her supporters with that of Bhutto and his entourage. In the name of selling the Simla Agreement to the people, Government spokesmen in India have not been maintaining an anti-Pakistan posture or interpreting the agreement as a fulfilment of India's earlier expectations on the subject. Even the official statements reiterating India's title to the Pakistan occupied part of Kashmir and ruling out negotiations on the political status of the State were

7 His first comment for instance was: 'What is important is the spirit and determination with which the objectives set out in the Tashkent Declaration are achieved. Pakistan would make a sincere effort to achieve the objective of true, lasting and honourable peace in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent.' (*Dawn*, January 13 1966)

in reaction to Pakistan's claims to the contrary. In Pakistan however Bhutto's method of finding support for the agreement has been to harp on India's aggression in Kashmir and to claim that by entering into the agreement Pakistan has found a more effective way of acquiring Kashmir than those pursued by his predecessors during the last 25 years. It is difficult to see how such tactics will facilitate durable Indo-Pakistan friendship unless it is claimed that Bhutto is deceiving his people by playing on their hostility for India while actually working for a *modus vivendi* with India. If that were so it would not be flattering to India's reliance on the basic urge of the people of the two countries for peace in the subcontinent. In other words even Mrs. Gandhi cannot sell Bhutto to the people of India however prone a section of the Indian elite is to find in the Pakistan President virtues he does not possess.

The only saving grace is that instead of a military regime as in 1966 there is now an elected government in Pakistan and that it has a stake in normalising relations with India but this is diluted to a large extent by the calibre of politician Bhutto in his skin-deep commitment to the principles of democracy and representative government and the circumstances in which he became the President of Pakistan at the instance of a section of the military top brass whom he cannot afford to displease.

Swaran Singh's reply to the debate highlighted the support which the Simla Agreement had received all over the world. To show that it had been universally hailed the External Affairs Minister waxed rhetorical and said: 'It is not only the Governments of those countries but even those who are opposed to Governments in other countries that have hailed this agreement. It is really no point in favour of the agreement nor is it a guarantee of its success. That the international community desires peace and normalcy in South Asia as elsewhere is never denied just as we in India want amicable settlements in West Asia and Vietnam. The Tashkent Declaration too was widely welcomed both in the East and the West but that did not save it from the fate which overtook it. As Swaran Singh presented it there could be no objection at all in principle to any of the clauses written into the Simla Agree-

Chapter VII

Pakistan's Ploy

IT was Tashkent all over again. Just as in the first public pronouncement on his return to Pakistan after subscribing to the Tashkent Declaration Field Marshal Ayub Khan had described it as a victory for neither India nor Pakistan but for commonsense ¹ Bhutto speaking at Chaklala airport at Rawalpindi on his return from Simla said the Simla Agreement was a victory for both countries and for the principles of justice and fair play ² He called it a step in the direction of durable peace between Pakistan and India and said the summit at Simla was the first in a series aimed at achieving durable peace. He added "Negotiations are continuing and more such meetings will take place. The complex problems between the two countries cannot be solved in one day. There can be no quarrel with such an assessment because the package deal India expected from the Simla talks did not materialise and the Simla Agreement itself envisaged further negotiations."

1 *Dawn* January 11 1966

2 Press Trust of India report quoting Pakistan radio

But on some other aspects of the agreement, such as its bilateral character and its promise of keeping third parties out of the disputes between the two countries Bhutto's views did not tally with those of the Indian leaders

As if to balance the Indian Government spokesmen's accent on the bilateral nature of the Simla Agreement, Bhutto thanked the United States and the Soviet Union for showing interest in the negotiations and for wishing them success. He also utilised the occasion to reiterate Pakistan's gratitude to China saying that China has always stood by Pakistan and we are grateful to her. I want to make it absolutely clear that Pakistan's friendly relations with China will not be affected by the agreement.

The endorsement of the Simla Agreement by Bhutto's People's Party five days later was equally equivocal in the way it was done. The central working committee of the party while endorsing the agreement expressed its appreciation of Bhutto's adherence to the basic principles enunciated by him before his departure for India in the summit talks.³ On

3 In a series of speeches and interviews during June Bhutto indicated his Government's stand at the summit talks he would hold with Mrs Gandhi. He said on June 21 that Pakistan will not waver in its commitment to the right of self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. He made the observation during an exchange of views at Murree with a group of educationists in the course of which according to Radio Pakistan he explicitly stated his position on the fundamental questions expected to come up during the forthcoming talks with India. Asked about Bangla Desh he said: 'It is a question I will not raise or allow to be raised on Indian soil'. He said it was an issue between the people and leaders of East Pakistan and those of West Pakistan. On June 12 President Bhutto won a vote of confidence from his People's Party over the proposed summit talks with Mrs Gandhi. At a meeting of editors on June 20 Bhutto was quoted by Radio Pakistan as saying that he would not sign on the dotted line when he went to Simla. He reiterated his stand that Kashmir involved the right of self-determination which Pakistan has always supported. Whatever moves are made will be within this basic framework, he said. The Pakistan President told the editors who pledged him support that he would not discuss Muslim Bengal with Indian leaders. It is for us and the leaders of

the question of Pakistan's recognition of Bangla Desh which Bhutto was reported to have assured Mrs Gandhi at Simla was only a matter of time the committee authorised Bhutto to take a decision at an appropriate time. Whatever might have been the real intent of this exercise in equivocation the committee's decision gave the impression that the decks were being cleared in Pakistan for a faithful implementation of the Simla Agreement.

When on July 10 the Pakistan National Assembly took up the Simla Agreement for consideration and ratification Kashmir was the main item round which the debate revolved. The other questions which figured in the discussion were recognition of Bangla Desh, repatriation of the Pakistan prisoners of war held in India and exclusion of the line of control in Kashmir from the agreement to withdraw troops. The Law Minister Mahmud Ali Kasuri who moved the resolution seeking approval of the Simla Agreement denied the charge of the critics that the Government had abandoned Kashmir or had agreed to withdrawing it from the UN. He said talks would be held to resolve the Kashmir dispute which is still on the UN agenda.⁴ He added that there was no

East Bengal to settle these matters, he said. In an interview with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation on June 11 Bhutto said an early restoration of equilibrium in the subcontinent was one of his summit aims (Press Trust of India, United News of India and United Press International).

- 4 Dilip Mukerjee reporting from Rawalpindi said: This suggests that he (Bhutto) may use the Assembly session commencing tomorrow (July 10) to broach the issue of recognition even though he may not ask for a formal decision on this till the next session in mid August. (*The Times of India* July 10 1972)
- 5 In a letter to the UN Secretary General Dr Kurt Waldheim Pakistan's Permanent Representative at the UN I A Akhund reiterated on June 7 that the machinery of the UN Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) on the Indian side of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir should be activated to prevent incidents along the line. Akhund admitted that flag meetings had been held between local commanders but said they were intended only to look into incidents along the international border between India and Pakistan. Earlier on May 26 Akhund conveyed to the United Nations

question of Pakistan taking away from the people of Kashmir the right of self determination as 'Pakistan has not given them this right'. Turning to the prisoners of war issue Kasuri said the international law on the subject was very clear and India's position ■ weak.

The second Minister to defend the agreement Khurshid Hussain Mir went a step further and said the agreement did not bar support by Pakistan to freedom fighters in Kashmir. He emphasised that the provision of the Simla Agreement ruling out interference in the internal affairs of one another did not apply to Kashmir because it was a disputed territory.⁶ The Information Minister Maulana Kausar Niazi claimed that as a result of the Simla Agreement Kashmir has been acknowledged as a disputed area. He further emphasised that the doors of the United Nations to revival of the Kashmir issue have not closed. Justifying the failure to get back prisoners of war ■ a part of the Simla Agreement the Information Minister remarked if President Bhutto had agreed to talks about the so called Bangla Desh at Simla the prisoners of war issue could have been resolved.

The Fourth Minister to intervene in the debate was Dr Mubashir Hasan who was in charge of the Finance portfolio. His speech followed by a day Mrs Gandhi's press conference in New Delhi in the course of which she reaffirmed India's position that Kashmir was an integral part of the country and that there was no basis for any compromise on that position. Provoked by opposition criticism that the Simla Agreement had written off Pakistan's claim to Kashmir Dr Hasan said

Pakistan's view that the ceasefire between India and Pakistan could be observed effectively only through the UN military observer group stationed in the area. Radio Pakistan reported Akhund said the Pakistan Government shared the views of the Secretary General that strict observance of the ceasefire would create the right atmosphere for the success of the efforts for a lasting settlement between India and Pakistan. The radio added (*The Hindustan Times and Motherland* May 27 and June 8 1972).

- 6 Dilip Mukerjee interpreted it as a personal formulation of the Minister who is a Kashmiri by birth (*The Times of India* July 13).

the agreement should be considered on the basis of the text signed by the two sides rather than any views expressed at a press conference. Like his other colleagues he was emphatic that Kashmir was a disputed territory and that we do not accept the ceasefire line as international boundary.

Crowning these came Bhutto's own speech lasting more than three hours which figured prominently in the discussion on the Simla Agreement in the two Houses of Indian Parliament. Bhutto was one with his colleagues who preceded him that the Simla Agreement did not mark any change in Pakistan's attitude to Kashmir. While ruling out another war within the next five ten or 15 years, he said Pakistan would never surrender its right vis a vis Kashmir notwithstanding the odds. Bhutto also disputed the Indian stand that the Simla Agreement by advocating bilateral settlement of disputes precluded UN or other outside intervention. He quoted from the UN Charter to say that the Simla Agreement concluded within its framework could not exclude resort to UN mediation. Article 103 of the Charter specifically laid down that no agreement between countries could supersede it. In case of any inconsistency the Charter and not the agreement would prevail.

Being a clever tactician Bhutto sidetracked the issue and said Ayub Khan was responsible for not having secured Kashmir for Pakistan at the time of the Tashkent Declaration. He claimed that as a result of the 1965 war we were in a much better position than as compared with the Simla summit, but the Field Marshal was shivering in his pants. If Kashmir has become an insurmountable problem for us it is because of the complete capitulation at Tashkent. He also defended the acceptance in the Simla Agreement of the actual line of control in Kashmir saying that he had consulted in advance the present as well as former Chiefs of Army Staff and decided that Pakistan stood to gain by holding on to the area it had captured in Chhamb last December because of the protection it afforded to Sialkot.

Much satisfaction was derived in India from Bhutto's criticism of the United Nations for its failure to bring about a Kashmir settlement. Referring particularly to 1965 he said that though Pakistan was at that time in a strong position after the September war the Security Council did not agree even to mention Kashmir in its resolution but preferred to speak only of the problems underlying the conflict. In the context of his simultaneous assertion that the concept of bilateral settlement incorporated in the Simla Agreement did not exclude resort to UN mediation it was clear that Bhutto was prepared to go along with bilateral effort only if he was assured of a settlement satisfactory to him and that otherwise he would go back to the United Nations despite its past record of dithering and failure. Fuller versions of Bhutto's marathon speech which were subsequently published brought out this point vividly.

The thrust of Bhutto's speech was to blame Ayub Khan for what happened three years after the Field Marshal stepped down from the Presidentship of Pakistan and to project himself as the lone upholder of the concept of undivided Pakistan. According to Bhutto Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had all along been a secessionist and General Yahya Khan a damn *sharabi*.⁷ The real villain of the piece was Ayub Khan while the saviour with a shining armour was himself. Even a cursory reading of Bhutto's speech will convince everybody that its main purpose was to bolster his position at home and decry his past present and potential opponents as unpatriotic power seekers.⁸ This aspect of Bhutto's policy is relevant in judging his motives in agreeing to enter into direct

7 drunkard

8 The Pakistan President was so much carried away by his urge for self-perpetuation that he used in the National Assembly expressions which even court reports avoid in Indian newspapers. For instance one of Bhutto's purple patches charging Sheikh Mujibur Rahman with being an Indian agent and holding Ayub Khan responsible for the emergence of Bangla Desh read: 'I have seen the papers as the President. He (Sheikh Mujib) was in league with the Indians but how they (Ayub Khan, Manzoor Qadir and others) conducted the trial (the so-called Agartala Conspiracy Case) they made a hero out of him. So if you want to say Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is to blame to get some orgasm out of it I will be happy but if you want to put it correctly and solidly it is Ayub Khan.'

negotiation with India. Indirectly it also establishes that one of the most tangible even if unintended results of India's role at the Simla talks has been to reinforce Bhutto's position at home vis-à-vis more balanced and less self-centred politicians.

Dilip Mukerjee who covered the National Assembly debate on the ratification of the Simla Agreement came to the conclusion that the support to the agreement offered by both the ruling party and some of the opposition groups was in terms which amounted to a rejection of the spirit underlying the agreement.⁹ Khan Abdul Quayyum Khan who is Home and Kashmir Affairs Minister in Bhutto's Government warned India that if it tried to take advantage of Pakistan's plight it would be forgetting a lesson of history. A Council Muslim League leader Chowdhury Zahur Elahi describing the agreement as the best in the circumstances said we cannot forget the past of the party with which we have reached the agreement. Malik Mohammed Akhtar of the People's Party said the agreement was not a package deal and in its present form it is only a beginning which would help solve other problems step by step. Another People's Party member Abdul Hamid Jatoi said even the best of agreements could fail if not implemented faithfully. Turning to Mrs Gandhi's remarks at her press conference in New Delhi on July 12 he expressed doubts about the sincerity of India. He also opposed recognition of Bangla Desh as East Pakistan is still an essential part of Pakistan. Mian Mumtaz Daultana Council Muslim League leader and Ambassador designate to Britain warned members that if we give up the idea which Kashmir represents in the context of the two nation theory we would be less than men.

If anything some of the opinions expressed by the critics of the agreement in Pakistan should be more comforting to Indian Government spokesmen. Mahmud Azam Farooqi of the Jamaat-i-Islami described the Simla Agreement as a no war pact and said it was detrimental to the honour and dignity of Pakistan. According to him the agreement closed the door of the United Nations on us and we cannot now look to the

world body without India's consent. Professor Abdul Gafoor also of the Jamaat said the agreement should be ratified only if there was an assurance that India 'will release all prisoners of war and civilian internees settle the Kashmir problem according to the wishes of the people and vacate aggression in East Pakistan'.

A rebel member of Bhutto's People's Party Rao Kurshid Ali opposing the agreement threatened to mobilise the country to tear it to shreds. He claimed that Pakistan had not been defeated in the December war and said that there was no question therefore of bowing to the so called realities. He added 'We can teach India a lesson the *dhotiwalas* can never win against us'. Ahmed Raza Kasuri another member of the ruling party delved into the history of Islam to claim that Muslims had never been defeated in war but only betrayed by traitors in their own camp.

The only breath of fresh air was provided by the leader of the National Awami Party and Governor of Baluchistan Mir Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo. He reminded members that unless there was a change of attitude the Simla Agreement by itself would not be able to solve any problems. The N.A.P. leader said Mrs Gandhi had showed large heartedness in signing the Simla Agreement and hoped she would prevail upon the Bangla Desh Prime Minister not to create obstacles to normalisation. Welcoming the decision to settle problems bilaterally he said Pakistan had suffered in the past on account of its participation in arms pacts. He also made an open plea for recognition of Bangla Desh and said it had become a reality because of the past attempt to suppress the voice of the majority.

Though there was no constitution in Pakistan and Bhutto as President enjoyed unquestioned power having fully inherited the authority of the earlier Martial Law Administrator of the country he made it a point to convene the National Assembly and seek its formal concurrence with his decision to enter into the Simla Agreement. As we have seen earlier the speeches of the supporters of the agreement whether they belonged to the ruling party or one of the opposition groups were well orches-

trated to highlight Pakistan's interpretation of the Simla Agreement. In the process the Indian understanding of the provisions of the agreement were totally out of focus. Except for the National Awami Party no other organised group viewed the agreement in the mature perspective of durable and friendly relations with India. For the others especially the Government spokesmen the agreement was only a means to get over the crisis facing Pakistan to gain time and then resume the policy of confrontation with India. Even Bhutto did not rule out war with India. He merely said Pakistan would not be able to wage another war within the next five or ten years. Secondly the effort was to present the agreement as a triumph of Bhutto's diplomacy and run down the other parties. It was in pursuance of this gimmuck that Bhutto made the National Assembly debate the agreement. That the Assembly ultimately ratified the agreement was only incidental.

Chapter VIII

The World Setting

By a happy coincidence India's years of destiny—1947 and 1971—have also been years of basic change in the international system as a whole. It was in 1947 that the post War tensions hardened into cold war which for more than two decades set the pattern for inter State relations. Even countries like India which kept aloof from cold war entanglements were not immune from its impact. In 1971 factors which had hitherto escaped reckoning in the formulation of foreign policies—technological revolution leading to unprecedented economic growth and diffusion of power in large parts of the world—saw the fragmentation of the cold war and emergence of a new world wide concert of major powers. It was no doubt a gradual process the springs of which had been discerned by perspicacious observers of the world scene but its impact was none the less for it. In fact the dramatic manner in which it manifested itself when the U.S. President Richard Nixon announced on July 15, 1971 that he would end his Government's diplomatic boycott of China by visiting Chairman Mao early in 1972.

enhanced its significance¹ The conclusion a few weeks later of the Indo Soviet Treaty of Peace Friendship and Co operation and the more dramatic Sino Soviet clash in the UN Security Council at the time of the December Indo Pakistan war further highlighted the significance of the event It became clear that Asia at least could no longer be fitted into a scheme of bipolarity Following the Moscow visit of the US President in May 1972 the position further crystallised into a triangular relationship One facet of the new power structure is that the three great Powers continue to view regional problems in the light of the global balance on which the relationship is based Within the framework of the global balance the US the Soviet Union and China are trying to ensure that their individual national self interests are maximised

For South Asia this meant a shared interest on the part of the US and China in containing Soviet influence in the region It was especially so in the crisis months of 1971 which saw China siding with the US in its *debut* on the international scene as a permanent member of the Security Council The Chinese representative compared Bangla Desh to Manchukao and Indian assistance to the liberation struggle there to Japanese annexation of Manchuria He even drew a parallel between the flood of nearly ten million refugees into India from what was then East Bengal and the problem created by the Chinese suppression of Tibetan autonomy in 1959 when about 100 000 Tibetans crossed over into India Together with the US China advocated the stationing of UN observers on the India Pakistan border Though the ostensible purpose of the Chinese policy was preservation of the territorial integrity of a member State of the UN its thrust against India as a carrier of Soviet influence was apparent The US President was even more

1 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who claims credit for foreseeing the Sino-US thaw was talking only of new initiatives in Sino American relations in August 1971 (*Ide* Appendix 2) while Nixon in his foreign policy report to the US Congress on February 9 1972 disclosed that the rapprochement between the most populous nation and the most powerful nation of the world was the fruit of almost three years of the most painstaking meticulous and necessarily discreet preparation

explicit in his justification of the pro Pakistan tilt in his South Asia policy. In his 1972 foreign policy report to the US Congress² Nixon said: 'It would be dangerous for world peace if our efforts to promote a *detente* between the Super Powers were interpreted as an opportunity for the strategic expansion of Soviet power. If we had failed to take a stand such an interpretation could only have been encouraged and the genuine relaxation of tensions we have been seeking could have been jeopardised. The war in South Asia was bound to have serious implications for the evolution of the policy of the People's Republic of China. That country's attitude toward the global system was certain to be profoundly influenced by its assessment of the principles by which this system was governed: whether force and threat ruled or whether restraint was the international standard.'

Subsequently, after exercising China's first veto as a permanent member of the Security Council against the admission of Bangla Desh to the United Nations, the Chinese representative Huang Hua delivered an unprovoked attack on India and the Soviet Union. 'The Soviet socialist imperialism', he said, 'is playing a most insidious role in South Asia and India when it concluded an aggressive military alliance with the Soviet Union had stripped (itself) of its own cloak of non alliance'.³ He further said: 'The sole purpose of Soviet socialist imperialism is to further control India and Bangla Desh, to expand the spheres of her influence and bully Pakistan at will'. Two days later the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan hua, heading a five member delegation to Pakistan, told newsmen in Islamabad⁴ that 'a big power is encouraging its stooge to create trouble for China and Pakistan'. In the Shanghai communique issued at the end of Richard Nixon's visit to China⁵ there was a direct and unambiguous reference

² *Op cit*

³ *The New York Times*, August 25, 1972 (There was apparently a change in the description of the Soviet Union which was earlier called social imperialism)

⁴ Pakistan radio report quoted by United News of India

⁵ Feb 27 1972 USIS Release

to Kashmir again at the instance of China. Compared with the relatively cautious behaviour of China during the December war the new Chinese bellicosity even if verbal demonstrated the growing complexity of the new international system as it operated in Asia.⁶ At the outbreak of the December hostilities the Chinese conduct followed the same contours as that of the Super Powers in dealing with local conflicts with a potential for wider confrontation. Even if the frozen Himalayan passes ruled out physical involvement in the fighting China if it wanted to could have repeated its 1965 behaviour of threatening India with menacing ultimatums and notes.

It was the US on the other hand which tried its hand at a crude display of gunboat diplomacy the purpose of which was differently interpreted. According to US Administration sources Washington put pressure on the Soviet Union which in turn persuaded India to cry halt to its military drive into West Pakistan. As for the despatch into the Bay of Bengal of a task force of the US Seventh fleet⁷ the Pentagon came up with a belated explanation on December 21 that the ships were meant to evacuate US nationals resident in East Pakistan. It was a strange way of rescuing civilians from an area of hostilities by sending in such a powerful armada without prior intimation to or consent of India the party directly concerned. Viewed against the background of the US attitude to the Bangla Desh crisis especially the pro Pakistan tilt which the US Administration was at pains to display Bhutto was perhaps nearer the truth when he said of all the countries the US was the most active in trying to halt Indian aggression against West Pakistan.

Deliberations of the Washington Special Action Group at its meeting on December 4 1971 as disclosed by the US columnist Jack Anderson⁸ provide an interesting insight into

6 *Time* December 26 1971

7 Headed by the nuclear powered aircraft carrier USS *Enterprise* the group comprising the helicopter carrier *Tripoli* seven destroyers and an oiler sailed from the Gulf of Tonkin and entered the Bay of Bengal on December 14

8 *The Indian Express* December 15 1971

US thinking on South Asia Henry Kissinger told the group that the President wanted some one in the bureaucracy to prepare a resolution for being tabled in the Security Council Kissinger added that everyone knew that India would ultimately occupy East Pakistan Therefore the only move left for them 'at the present time was to make clear their position relative to their greater strategy Military assessment of the Indo Pakistan situation was on the agenda when the group met again two days later Asked by Kissinger how long the Pakistanis might be able to hold out in the east General West moreland replied that it might be as much as three weeks He however added that there were no means of evacuating West Pakistan forces from the East Wing because of India's naval superiority Kissinger then wanted to know whether they (the US Government) could authorise Jordan or Saudi Arabia to transfer military hardware to Pakistan The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Van Hollen said that in view of the Congressional decision not to sell arms to Pakistan the US could not permit a third country to transfer lethal equipment to Pakistan The Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco added that such a transfer of US supplied arms to Pakistan would weaken Jordan but Kissinger provided an insight into Nixon's mind when he remarked that the US President might want to honour Pakistani requests for transfer of arms from Jordan He declared that the President was not inclined to let the Paks be defeated Sisco then agreed that it (transfer of arms) should be done very quietly He added that from the political point of view the efforts of the US should be directed at keeping the Indians from extinguishing West Pakistan

Extinguishing West Pakistan was never on the agenda even in the wildest dreams of Indians and nobody in the US Administration with an awareness of the military situation in the subcontinent had reason to be worried on that score What was perhaps nearer feasibility was an Indian bid to dislodge the Pakistanis from as much of Azad Kashmir as possible Some military observers had also thought in terms of an Indian

drive into Gilgit. Discussing the pros and cons of such a move K. Subrahmanyam, Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses wrote⁹ : "Unless a massive helicopter borne operation under an effective and adequate air cover had been launched it would have taken considerable time for the Indian forces to move forward in this difficult (Gilgit) terrain. In the area between (Pakistan) Punjab and the ceasefire line Pakistan would have offered very stiff resistance. There were believed to be two divisions (12 and 23 POK)¹⁰ divisions, besides the II Corps of which only one division was engaged in Chhamb. The loss of this territory would have exposed the Mangla Dam and Muzaffarabad and extended a direct threat to their heart land. This raises the issue whether the Indian Army had originally planned for it. Neither the disposition of the armed forces nor the allocation of air effort nor the subsequent developments suggest that such objectives were planned for."

By combining speed in military action with restraint in objectives Mrs. Gandhi very wisely ensured that there was no intervention by any Big Power in the December fighting. Soviet suspicions¹¹ of the extent and purpose of the Sino-US rapprochement then in the making might have also perhaps contributed to Moscow's acquiescence in the liberation of Bangla Desh. That it upset the Big Power equation in South Asia in favour of the Soviet Union was no doubt a source of worry to the US and China but the situation soon stabilised at a different level when India unilaterally ceased the hostilities in West Pakistan on December 17, 1971. The greatest virtue of the Simla Agreement was that it was conceived and accomplished within the framework of the new triangular relationship among the US, the USSR and China as it concerned South Asia. The durability and worthwhileness of the agreement will however depend on the extent to which India's own interests as a dominant power in this part of the world can be reconciled with the

9 *The Liberation War* ■ Chand & Co. New Delhi

10 Pakistan-occupied Kashmir

11 Only after the Moscow Summit between Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev five months later did Soviet fears on this score seem to have been allayed.

new global system. India has come into its own in the region acquiring a position denied to her since 1947 through an artificial balance of power created by the machinations of the western Powers especially the US. This was made possible not merely by Pakistan's military defeat in the December war but also by the positive outcome of the armed conflict. Bangla Desh has emerged as the world's eighth most populous State radically altering the balance in South Asia. What remains of Pakistan has only a tenth of India's population and about an equivalent portion of its diplomatic or military leverage.

What has India to do to make the three Great Powers accept its dominant role in South Asia unlike in 1947 when external factors propped up Pakistan to a position of artificial parity with India? As far as the Soviet Union is concerned there is no need for the new Indian position to be sold to it. In fact most Western observers have interpreted the 1971 developments including the Indo Soviet Treaty of August 9 1971 the Soviet military and diplomatic support to India and the emergence of Bangla Desh as an accretion of influence to the Soviet Union. How would the US and China react in the long run to the developments which made the Soviet Union a gainer? How durable is the parallelism noticed in the Chinese and US postures at the time of the December war? Even if the United States by virtue of its virtual disengagement from South Asia reconciles itself to the new Soviet position how will China take it with Soviet influence looming large on its south eastern flank? The answers to these and other related questions will prove the viability or otherwise of India's policy.

But this was broadly the pattern of international relation ship in which India set out to evolve a new and more rational power structure in South Asia. There were obviously two options before India. One was to realise the new dimension to its security problem as represented by the direct US involvement in the affairs of South Asia and take steps to neutralise a likely US threat without losing sight of China's role and while maintaining its identity vis a vis the Soviet Union. The second was to learn to live with the situation leaving the Big

Powers to shape the destiny of over 700 million peoples of the subcontinent

The extension of the jurisdiction of the US Seventh Fleet to the Indian Ocean coupled with the proclaimed US position that the three Great Powers and not a regional power like India had legitimate interests in the area was an ominous development. To make matters worse the pro Pakistan tilt in US Policy was sought to be rationalised as a concomitant of the US Administration's opening towards China. Notwithstanding the subsequent US recognition of Bangla Desh there was basically no change in the American thinking that the problem of peace and stability in South Asia was essentially one of management of Great Power relations rather than allowing the regional Powers to work out a natural equilibrium among themselves. Secondly the United States is notorious for its flair for resistance to the emergence of new centres of power as illustrated by its policy of non recognition of the People's Republic of China since 1950. It was only after China grew into a major Power and also gatecrashed its way into the nuclear club that Washington was prepared to deal with it. Further to heighten the irony the Sino US rapprochement has been accompanied by a combined aversion on the part of both the Powers to the flowering of a new and independent centre of power in South Asia. Though India's close association with the Soviet Union and the institutionalisation of Indo Soviet relations by the treaty of August 9 1971 have been used as alibis to thwart India's efforts to consolidate its hard won position the real reason is to deny India its legitimate role as a dominant power in South Asia. In the case of the US there is also a second string to its policy namely to exacerbate Sino Soviet rivalry in this part of the world. As for China it sees a national interest in containing Soviet influence in South Asia.

This does not mean that the Sino US detente is a curse and needs to be countered by India and Bangla Desh. By a strange concatenation of circumstances the coming closer of China and the US took place at a time when Power relations

in South East Asia were in a state of flux and the Bangla Desh crisis was at its height. The attitudes of both the US and China to the Yahya regime in Pakistan and its cold blooded repression of what was then an autonomy movement in East Bengal flowed from a common assessment that disturbance of the status quo in South Asia was a threat to the developing detente. The security threat posed to India by the Pakistan military action in what was then East Bengal and the resultant flood of 10 million refugees into India did not matter either to China or to the US because both of them subscribed to the doctrine of the balance of power in the region. Strangely enough the US interest in the subcontinent which was once regarded by Washington as central to its Asian policy has over the years become marginal. Even in 1966 Washington merely played a spectator's role when the Soviet Union was trying to bring about amity between India and Pakistan through the Tashkent Declaration. Unlike in 1971-72 the main US concern then was preempting Chinese ascendancy in the area which was what the Soviet Union also was aiming at. For instance Washington reacted sharply to the Chinese ultimatum to India in September 1965 and the menacing movement of Chinese troops along the Himalayan border. At an ambassadorial meeting in Warsaw on September 14 the US Ambassador John M. Cabot was reported to have told his Chinese counterpart that China should stay out of the Indo Pakistan conflict. The then US Secretary of State Dean Rusk also administered a public admonition to Peking for dangerously meddling in the 1965 Indo Pakistan conflict. Yet the US remained on the sidelines and was content to play the second fiddle when the Soviet Union was engaged in an actively mediating role in sub continental affairs. The US could not be oblivious of Soviet intentions to fortify its position in South Asia by gaining a foothold in Pakistan which was still a formal ally of the US. But by 1971 there was such a metamorphosis in US thinking that the any accretion to Soviet influence was regarded as detrimental to China's legitimate interests the safeguarding of which became a paramount consideration. Such a re evaluation of its policy by the US was however not a hot

house growth. The 1962 alarm of China overrunning the whole of Asia and establishing puppet regimes in the countries concerned had soon after given place to a realistic understanding that Peking merely wanted its position as a dominant power in the whole of Asia to be recognised and that its actions were motivated more by a desire to prevent Soviet encroachment of its territory than to build an Asian empire of its own. Thus in 1965 the US was not taken in by Indian fears of a simultaneous Chinese thrust through Sikkim while India was engaged in a war with Pakistan but still undertook deterrent action.

The change both in the situation and in the foreign policy requirements of the US was total in 1971. First there was ready acceptance of China's legitimate interests in South Asia. If they clashed with those of the Soviet Union it was for Moscow to sort out the conflict. The US would not pull Chinese chestnuts out of the fire for anybody. At the same time a new opening for a low level US diplomacy was found in the emergence of Sino-Soviet rivalry in South Asia. Thus Washington which had always evinced sympathetic interest in the Awami League's demand for autonomy and which in return enjoyed a large fund of goodwill in that part of Pakistan did not hesitate to squander it by a policy of tacit support to the military junta in Islamabad. Though the Indo-Soviet treaty was adduced as an alibi for the US joining forces with China the marginal interest which the US now evinced in South Asia was not at all affected by the growth of Soviet influence which the Indo-Soviet treaty undoubtedly reflected. In strategic terms West Asia and a dominant presence in the Indian Ocean are greater priorities for Washington. Looking ahead will the pattern of Sino-American detente continue to be directed against India's interest in the subcontinent or is it a passing phase peculiar to Chinese emergence as a Big Power? This in fact is the US rationale for its lopsided South Asia policy that is the price which the world community has to pay for winning China back from the isolationist outlook which past American attitude had lent it. To the extent that the efforts of the US to improve its relations with China pave the ground for a fundamental change in Peking's international posture

India has no reason to complain. However, it is possible to exaggerate the extent to which China is still outside the international system and offer it terms which will be detrimental to the interests of other Asian countries. This may help the improvement of Chinese relations with the US but will come in the way of normalisation of ties between China and the other countries of Asia especially India and Bangla Desh.

This does not mean that the interests of India and the Soviet Union in the Hindustan peninsula are totally and permanently identical and that New Delhi need have no apprehensions of the Soviet Union trying to circumscribe India's role as a dominant power in the region. In the words of Professor A B Shah¹ the USSR too would not like India to gain in importance beyond what is inevitable as a result of the Indo Pakistan war. There have already been indications of Russian attempts to underplay the significance of India's role in the liberation of Bangla Desh. For instance during Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's visit to the USSR hardly anything was said about this role. on the contrary a barely concealed effort was made to project the Soviet Union as having been the major if not the sole champion of liberation of Bangla Desh.²

Chapter IX

Chinese Shadow


WAY down in 1961 there was an American diplomat in Karachi deeply interested in settling India Pakistan disputes for ever. Of Jewish origin and married to a Muslim girl from Lebanon he was fully alive to the emotional and other underpinnings of problems like those between the Arabs and Israelis and Indians and Pakistanis. His effort therefore was to find a scientific solution to India Pakistan differences overcoming constraints of an emotional or religious nature. As he used to say cutting the Gordian knot of Kashmir was well worth the trouble even if it did not fetch one the Nobel Peace Prize. At his instance some Pakistani friends and I used to play periodically a game called 'settling the Kashmir question'. A series of combinations and permutations with *Kashmir as the basis of India Pakistan negotiations* was worked out. The result was an interesting revelation that the elite in Pakistan would never like to buy peace with India at the cost of that country's close relations with China. Among the Pakistanis with whom he was close enough to discuss the hypotheti-





President Ayb Khan and Prime Minister Lal Bahar Shastri at
Tashkent in January 1966





Pr. e M. i. s. i. J. a. n. a. l. a. r. i. a. l. V. e. l. r. u. a. n. d. M. r. s. I. n. d. i. r. a. G. a. n. d. i. w. i. t. h. P. r. i. e. M. i. s. t. e. r. L. i. a. q. a. t. A. l. i. s. f. P. o. l. i. t. i. c. i. a. n. a. n. d. B. e. r. i. n. L. i. a. q. a. t. A. l. i. n. D. e. l. l. i. n. 1950

cal formulations were middle rung military officers bureaucrats politicians of different hues intellectuals and journalists many of whom were known for their liberal outlook. Almost all of them impressed on him Pakistan's need to maintain and develop friendly relations with China. Some of them agreed that settlement of India Pakistan differences might facilitate Sino Indian thaw but if it did not they would not side with India against China even if the whole of Jammu and Kashmir were ceded to Pakistan. That was surprising because only one year earlier the then President of Pakistan Field Marshal Ayub Khan revived the idea of India Pakistan joint defence.¹

It is not my contention that Pakistan's thinking and attitude have not changed during the last decade nor has India China hostility remained at the 1962 pitch. Nevertheless it will be idle to expect that by being generous to Pakistan and settling its disputes with it India can wean Pakistan away from Peking or neutralise Chinese influence in Pakistan. In the context of the emerging triangular relationship among the USA the USSR and China a South Asian version of the Monroe Doctrine is a pipe dream. If the Simla Agreement or any other arrangement between India and Pakistan is viewed as a means of eroding or even lessening Soviet influence in India or Bangla Lesh or counteracting the Chinese or American positions in Pakistan the time is not ripe for it. As already pointed out² the limited success achieved at Simla was possible because the agreement was in basic conformity with the regional interests of all the three great Powers. The Tashkent Declaration of 1966 remained a dead letter not merely because Bhutto had found it a handy political weapon against Ayub Khan but

1 Talking to reporters in Rawalpindi on April 24 1959 Ayub Khan said that in the event of an external threat both Pakistan and India should defend the sub-continent in cooperation with each other. Though the proposal was not spelt out further pronouncements by Pakistani spokesmen at that time indicated an awareness of a threat to the sub continent from the Communist bloc including China. Mohammed Ali of Bogra was perhaps similarly prompted when as Prime Minister he first mooted the idea of joint defence in 1953.

2 See Chapter 8

because it conflicted with Chinese policy and interests at that time

Reverting to the US diplomat's peace making effort the Kennedy Administration was then engaged in evolving a pattern of Asian unity which could be a counter to China. The Cuban crisis had not yet erupted nor had the Super Power relationship crystallised into a concert of competing interests. The Sino Soviet conflict had not also come into the open though indications of an impending rift were already there. But the possibility still existed of a readjustment of relations between the two Communist giants. The American Administration was therefore toying with the idea of a grouping of Asian States under the de facto leadership of India primarily to contain Chinese influence but also to ensure speedy economic development of the countries of the region. Peaceful settlement of internecine quarrels like those between India and Pakistan was necessary for such a larger arrangement to be even thought of seriously. The effort therefore was to prevail upon Pakistan to bury the hatchet and think in terms of a larger Asian context in which both the security and the basic interests of Pakistan would be taken care of. Conversely the accent was on inducing India to settle with Pakistan even if it meant some territorial loss in Kashmir. Several American dignitaries including Lyndon B. Johnson who was Vice President then Dr Henry Kissinger and Averell Harriman were sent out by President Kennedy on delicate missions to New Delhi and Rawalpindi to prepare the basis for such an arrangement. When Pakistan-Afghanistan relations worsened to the point of a diplomatic rupture and breakdown of trade relations Chester Bowles who was under Secretary of State in charge of South Asian affairs was similarly despatched to Kabul and Rawalpindi to try to mend the fences. In other words the USA then regarded this part of Asia as its developing sphere of influence and was trying to fortify itself against intrusions by both China and the USSR.

Nehru was presumably in general agreement with the basic pattern of Asian co-operation as long as it did not

amount to ganging up against either China or the Soviet Union. He was also believed to be looking ahead in terms of a confederation of India and Pakistan in which East Bengal and Kashmir would be assured of a large measure of autonomy but Pakistan was not prepared for it. Kashmir was the minimum price that Pakistan demanded for peace with India and even then it was not enthusiastic about a grouping which could be construed as alignment with India against China. Even if India had reacted favourably to Ayub Khan's offer of joint defence it was doubtful that Pakistan would have stood by India in the event of a military crisis involving China. It would no doubt have had a deterrent effect on China. Also considering Pakistan's over dependence on US military supplies and the nature of Sino US relationship at that time it was doubtful that Pakistan would have opened a second front in Kashmir or Punjab when the Chinese troops marched into NEFA in 1962. Above all considering the limited nature of the Chinese military thrust it would not have made much difference even if India were able to transfer troops to the north eastern frontier from the India Pakistan boundary. It seems in retrospect that the purpose of the Chinese military action was apart from humiliating India to indicate to Pakistan the potentialities of a concerted military drive against India. Bhutto had taken the cue and wanted a simultaneous Pakistani attack on Kashmir but thanks to the American influence on Ayub Khan it was averted.

The subsequent tortuous negotiations between Swaran Singh and Bhutto fore doomed from the beginning were held against such a background in which India had no bargaining power at all. Their only tangible outcome was to introduce an element of suspicion into Indo Soviet relations because Moscow which had until then gone the whole hog with India that there was no Kashmir dispute at all to be settled with Pakistan and which had several times exercised its veto in the UN Security Council in favour of India now felt let down because India changed its policy without prior consultation with it.

As expected the American attempt with which Britain also was associated to bring about an India Pakistan rapprochement came to naught. It failed not merely because of intractable differences between India and Pakistan on Kashmir but also because it was an American effort in solo. The Soviets even if they were not hostile were suspicious of American intentions in this part of Asia. Indo Soviet relations also were not so well established then as to rule out misgivings on the part of Moscow. As for China it was openly hostile to what it regarded as a potential bloc against itself. Peking was just then establishing a foothold in Pakistan primarily taking advantage of Rawalpindi's hostility for India. So it viewed an Indo Pakistan thaw as directed at neutralising its influence there. The only gainer in such a dispensation would have been the United States. Both Moscow and Peking were thus jointly and severally directly and indirectly averse to the American efforts to bring about a new power relationship in South Asia.

Three years later it was the turn of the Soviet Union to act as a bridge between India and Pakistan as exemplified by Kosygin's role at the Tashkent Conference. It was attempted in an entirely different international setting. Sino Soviet relations had reached a point of no return though the border clashes in the Ussuri region had not yet taken place. The US Soviet equilibrium was crystallising itself and as the 1967 Israeli aggression against the Arab States demonstrated that the Super Powers were mutually agreed on avoiding a direct confrontation. In South Asia there was also no US Soviet competition for spheres of influence. Washington was by then reconciled to Soviet ascendancy in India. Further both the US and the USSR were interested in limiting Chinese influence in Pakistan. The Tashkent Conference was thus sponsored by the Soviet Union with the blessings of Washington though Communist propaganda in India was still using the traditional anti American idiom in support of the declaration. To the extent it was possible for Washington it had also tried to make Pakistan live up to the Tashkent Declaration. The way Ayub

khan was made to get rid of Bhutto as Foreign Minister and the promptness with which US military aid to Pakistan was resumed were instances in point. In fact the United States attitude towards the Tashkent Declaration was more positive than Soviet reaction had been to earlier American efforts to bring about India Pakistan amity. Even the Indus Waters Treaty which was the most tangible agreement between the two countries since 1947 did not evoke in the Soviet Union the kind of enthusiasm which the US showed for the Tashkent Declaration. The only Power squarely pitted against the declaration was China and notwithstanding US and Soviet inducements to Pakistan in the shape of military and other assistance Rawalpindi could not be weaned away from Chinese influence. China was able to defeat the Tashkent Declaration and save what it then regarded as its interests in this part of Asia.

It will be interesting to analyse against this background the Chinese veto in August 1972 in the Security Council against the admission of Bangla Desh to the world organisation. As Swaran Singh rightly feared³ when Peking earlier threatened to do so it impeded the progress of normalisation of relations in the sub continent envisaged in the Simla Agreement. Worse still in the long run it may deny or at least dilute the flexibility which India's foreign policy is expected to acquire following the implementation of the Simla Agreement. In this context it is worthwhile recapitulating the bilateral aspect of Sino Pakistan relations and recall their impact on the affairs of the sub continent. There was a qualitative difference in the approaches of India and Pakistan to China from the beginning itself. Nehru idealistically thought in terms of two ancient civilisations of Asia coming together and striving jointly for

3 Replying to a half-hour discussion in the Lok Sabha on the reported Chinese threat to exercise the veto against Bangla Desh Swaran Singh said: The veto is very sparingly used on issues of peace and war. To threaten to use the veto to keep out (of the UN) a country of 75 million people is not an encouraging feature which rules out the possibility of normalisation of relations of China with the countries of the subcontinent (*The Times of India* August 17 1972).

peace in the world and economic development of the continent. The idea of isolating Pakistan from China to pre-empt their collusion against India did not arise because there was no need for it. In those halcyon days of *bhai bhaiism*⁴ nobody in Government⁵ visualised the possibility of a Sino-Indian parting of the ways. Secondly, Pakistan had no opening at all toward China. Though Pakistan had recognised the People's Republic of China three months after the coming into being of the Peking regime, formal diplomatic relations between the two countries were not established until one year later, in January 1951. Pakistan's approach to China was thus mainly conditioned by its fear of and hostility to India.

There was a difference in the Chinese attitudes also to the two countries. Though initially Peking like Moscow condemned both India and Pakistan as 'running dogs of imperialism', there was by and by realisation of India's independent role in international affairs and consequent reciprocation of this country's desire for friendship with China. The Chinese however, were openly critical in those days of Western sponsored military alliances and Pakistan's participation in them. But China did not extend it to endorsement of India's position in Kashmir and thus left the door open for development of mutually profitable bilateral relations with Pakistan. For instance, in a joint statement issued with the late S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike of Ceylon on February 5, 1957, Chou En-lai expressed distress at the unfortunate situation that has arisen in the *dispute* between Pakistan and India in regard to Kashmir and appealed to the two countries in their own as well as in the wider interests of Asian-African solidarity to strive further for a peaceful settlement of the problem (emphasis added). This was despite the Chinese Premier's reported oral assurance

4. The allusion is to the slogan 'Hindi-Chini bhai bhai' or 'India and China are brothers' which was vigorously touted by Communists at that time.

5. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel who for-saw such a *dang* had passed away by then.

6. Quoted by Dr Vidya Prakash Dutt *International Studies* New Delhi July-October 1966.

to India that Peking accepted the position that the people of Kashmir had already decided the status of the State

The Chinese ambivalence was apparently prompted by the overtures made at Bandung by the then Pakistan Prime Minister Mohammed Ali of Bogra. Addressing the Political Committee of the Bandung Conference on April 23 1955 Chou En lai said 'The day before yesterday after lunch I paid a visit to the Prime Minister of Pakistan. He told me that although Pakistan was a party to a military treaty Pakistan was not against China. Pakistan had no fear (that) China would commit aggression against her. As a result of that we achieved a mutual understanding although we are still against military treaties'.⁷ Interestingly enough Sino Pakistan friendship was forged and promoted by pro American and reactionary Prime Ministers of Pakistan like Mohammed Ali and H S Suhrawardy while there was a serious setback to them in the early days of the Ayub regime with a progressive like Bhutto included as a Minister in it.⁸ In 1956-57 there was also an exchange of several cultural and other delegations between China and Pakistan. The advent of the Ayub era not only put a brake on the developing relations but even soured them until in 1960 deterioration of Sino Indian ties started a reverse process. Reference has already been made to Ayub Khan's cryptic suggestion of India Pakistan joint defence and the annotation of it by other Pakistani spokesmen. China for her part revised her Bandung posture of a sympathetic assessment of Pakistan's participation in military alliances and condemned it as blackmail against herself. Rejecting the Pakistani explanation that the US Pakistan Mutual Security Pact of 1959 did not specify 'Communist aggression' but was also directed against a threat from India the Communist party organ *Jen min Jih pao* commented on March 7 1959⁹

The US and its followers have also put forward a new idea

7 Quoted by B N Goswami *Pakistan and China* Allied Publishers New Delhi 1971

8 Bhutto has been boasting in his recent writings and speeches that he is the originator of the policy of friendship with China

9 Quoted by Dr Vidya Prakash Dutt *ibid*

that resistance to any direct or indirect aggression includes non Communist aggression. This clearly shows that these new pacts are directed not only against the socialist countries but are in the first place also a threat to such nationally independent neighbouring countries as India, Iraq and Afghanistan. These new military pacts will enable the US to intensify its suppression of the national liberation movements and threaten peace and security in Asia. The situation changed only when Sino Indian relations deteriorated and as a direct consequence of it. In other words the development of Sino Pakistan friendship has been basically a bilateral phenomenon though Peking subsequently brought to bear on it its ideological and other conflicts with Moscow and its antipathy for India.¹⁰ A high point in this relationship was the conclusion in March 1963 of a Sino Pakistan boundary agreement. The timing of the announcement of the agreement was equally significant. It coincided with the arrival in Rawalpindi of an Indian delegation headed by Swaran Singh for discussions with Bhutto and others on Kashmir. When Swaran Singh complained to Ayub Khan that it amounted to queering the pitch for the Indo Pakistan talks the then President of Pakistan reportedly told him that it was the work of Bhutto.¹¹

Reverting to the Chinese veto against the admission of Bangla Desh to the UN it is cold comfort to denounce the perfidy of Peking and charge it with standing in the way of

10 In the words of Ayub Khan the objective was to establish normal relations with the four major Powers (the US, the USSR, China and the UK) without antagonising any one of them. A simple strategy was evolved to achieve this objective. We should endeavour to set up bilateral equations with each of them with the clear understanding that the nature and complexion of the equation should be such as to promote our mutual interests without adversely affecting the legitimate interests of third parties. *Friends Not Masters* Oxford 1967.

11 A similar gimmick was staged on August 30 1972 when a high powered Chinese delegation headed by its Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan hua suddenly descended on Karachi when New Delhi talks between Indian and Pakistan officials to put the Simla Agreement back on the rails were in a crucial stage.

improvement of Indo Pakistan relations. Nor is it right to see it as a projection of the Chinese open hostility to the Tashkent Declaration.¹² China's policy even towards South Asia has changed drastically since then. In 1966 Peking was provoked by the Soviet allusion to the Tashkent Declaration as a bulwark against Chinese interference in India Pakistan affairs. Now China has even if cautiously welcomed¹³ the Simla Agreement. The *volte face* represented by the veto against Bangla Desh owes itself more to the slippery character of the signatory of the agreement on behalf of Pakistan than to any unilateral Chinese desire to keep the South Asian pot boiling.

As pointed out at the beginning of this chapter what ever be its character no regime in Pakistan can afford to give up the support of China which becomes even more crucial now with the emergence of Peking as a big Power and the new triangular pattern of international relationship. So it is not necessary for China to strive to retain its position in Pakistan by either undermining India Pakistan amity moves or keeping alive the tensions in the subcontinent. Attenuation of Pakistan by the separation of Bangla Desh if it has underlined India's position as the dominant power in the South Asian region has also rendered residuary Pakistan more dependable on China and the US. While the US is disengaging itself militarily and otherwise from the area China is asserting itself as the only counter to the Soviet Union. So the attraction of China for Pakistan has multiplied in recent months. Peking has also fortified itself

12 An article by Observer (believed to be a high ranking party functionary) in *Jen min Jih pao* (February 3 1966) attacked the Tashkent Declaration for the first time and charged the Soviet Union with co-operating with US imperialism in encircling China. (Reuter report)

13 Speaking at a dinner in Peking on July 9 1972 in honour of a Yemeni delegation the Chinese Premier Chou En lai expressed pleasure at the Indo Pakistan agreement in Simla describing it as one of the new factors which could lead to a detente in Asia. *The Statesman* July 10 1972)

further by maintaining military supplies to Pakistan and forging closer trade links ¹⁴

According to the BBC correspondent in Islamabad the visit of the Chinese trade delegation to Pakistan was of a political nature and lasted from June 23 to June 28 when Bhutto left for the Simla Conference. The Chinese Foreign Trade Minister Pai Hsiang kuo also met Bhutto at Murree on June 23. The circumstances in which Bhutto succeeded General Yahya Khan as head of the regime also strengthened China's position in Pakistan. It was no accident that a few weeks before the collapse of the Pakistan military machine (in the second week of November 1971) Bhutto had led a delicate mission to China. Its ostensible purpose was to get Chinese support in the military showdown with India which was then imminent. There were conflicting reports about Bhutto's role then. Knowledgeable Pakistanis say that Bhutto had misled Yahya Khan by assuring him that China had offered to intervene in an Indo Pakistan military confrontation, whereas actually the Chinese leaders had counselled caution and advised Pakistan to avoid a military showdown with India ¹⁵. Among the other members of the high powered delegation were Air Marshal Rahim Khan and Lieutenant General Gul Hassan both of whom are regarded as accomplices in Bhutto's quest for power. A Pakistani journalist who does not want to be quoted told me that Bhutto had already by then finalised his plan for

14 The fourth barter trade agreement between China and Pakistan for 1972-73 was signed at Islamabad on June 23 1972. Pakistan's exports to China during the period July 1971-March 1972 were valued at Rs 93 million while imports from China during the nine months were of the order of Rs 60 million according to official figures quoted by the *Hongkong Standard* June 25 1972.

15 According to Yahya's evidence before the Pakistan Inquiry Commission (the tribunal investigating the conduct of the December War) Bhutto assured Rawalpindi on his return that China would intervene directly (sic) in East Pakistan if war broke out with India. At the banquet given in Bhutto's honour (November 7) Che Peng fei then Chinese acting Foreign Minister appealed to India and Pakistan to hold consultations to reduce tension on their borders. (Kuldip Nayar *Distant Neighbours* Vikas 1972)

capture of power from Yahya Khan and got Peking's concurrence with it. He was also believed to have won US endorsement of the 'transfer of power' when he visited Washington during the last days of the Yahya Khan regime and met Richard Nixon on December 15 1972. The *quid pro quo* was said to be Bhutto's willingness to continue a generally pro US policy.

Whether this story is with or without foundation it is obvious that Bhutto has been able to secure the support of both the US and China for his emergence as Pakistan's President. Subsequently he also tried to sell himself to Moscow and brought back to a key position in Pakistan's External Affairs Ministry Aziz Ahmed who as Ayub Khan's Foreign Secretary developed rapport with the Soviet Union. In other words the policy of walking a triangular tightrope of Ayub Khan was revived vis a vis the US the USSR and China with the only difference that the accent now was on Bhutto's self preservation rather than promotion of Pakistan's national interest. It is a measure of Bhutto's diplomatic finesse that he was able to sell to Indian leaders like D P Dhar also the idea that his continuance in power was essential for a stable India Pakistan relationship¹⁶. Against the background the Chinese shadow on the Simla agreement is more the result of Bhutto's penchant for playing one Power against another than the product of any Chinese perfidy.

In a larger sense also China for its own compulsions needs to improve relations with India and encourage a bilateral arrangement in South Asia. The detente with the US and its cautious approach to the Vietnam conflict are obvious indications that Peking has turned a new leaf. During the December India Pakistan war also China was merely content with verbal pyrotechnics. It was more active in the Security Council than across the live Sino Indian frontier. China no doubt has its

16 D P (Dhar) asured Bhutto that India was anxious to hold negotiations with Pakistan without any loss of time because it had a stake in the continuance of Bhutto an elected leader in office and in the integrity of Pakistan. (Kuldip Nayar *op cit*)

own fear of the Soviet Union and its policy of encirclement and the Indo Soviet treaty has come to be interpreted in Peking as an effort to intensify Soviet influence on the Chinese southern flank. In this context India should have tried to allay Chinese apprehensions not merely in words. As Mira Sinha pointed out¹⁷ China is not prepared to sacrifice its toe hold in Pakistan without a concrete change in the Sino-Indian relationship. The same of course is true of India. The difference is that correct Indian management of China may guarantee that basic South Asian concerns remain invulnerable to outside influences for this is what we would demand of China. India's larger objectives were indicated at the time of the Simla Agreement and even earlier. And it is for India to create conditions that are conducive to the full implementation of this agreement and the validation of its larger goals. The attitude of China is also a condition that has to be created. It is from this perspective that any Indian initiatives should be viewed. A first step towards China (for which it may be too late now) and a deliberate postponement of Bangla Desh's application for membership of the UN could have been projected as tactical moves designed to ensure the attainment of several goals rather than as frightened concessions to China. There is still room and time for skilful rectification provided we take a more sophisticated and long term view of things.

Chapter X

Success or Surrender ?

AT a recent symposium at one of the Delhi colleges a young lady literally tore the Simla Agreement to pieces but concluded "Still I am in favour of it because I am a supporter of Mrs Gandhi". That might suggest that the critics of the agreement are invariably opponents of Mrs Gandhi. The effort of the Jana Sangh to reap a political reward from its resistance to the agreement coupled with some pathetic attempts by Congress party functionaries in Delhi to seek support for the agreement¹ in the name of countering communalism has reinforced the impression that a vote for the Simla Agreement is a vote for Mrs Gandhi. Far from it. Endorsement or rejection of the agreement should be on its merits which have been examined in the earlier chapters. To adopt any other criterion is dangerous and even detrimental to India's national interests.

¹ The walls of Delhi have been plastered with expensively printed posters claiming the Simla Agreement as an act of appreciation of the heroism and sacrifice of India's defence forces !

In Pakistan it is a different situation. Bhutto has openly used the agreement to fortify his shaky position and in the process provoked even sensible persons in opposition groups to run down the agreement. He can afford to do so for two reasons. First continuance in power is more important for him than establishment of durable peace in the subcontinent. Secondly it is the most effective way of telling India that Bhutto is its best bet in the present circumstances. There is no reason for Mrs. Gandhi and her party to emulate Bhutto. Mrs. Gandhi does not need the Simla Agreement to improve her political position. On the other hand she is trying to press into service her immense personal popularity to promote the agreement. For instance intervening in the Rajya Sabha discussion on the Simla Agreement the Prime Minister recalled how those who criticised her policies during the Bangla Desh crisis had been falsified by subsequent developments.²

The truth was however different. Her actions during November-December 1971 were in the nature of salvaging the policies which her bureaucratic advisers had been revelling in between April and November 1971. In May 1971 the then Foreign Secretary T. N. Kaul claimed that the number of refugees crossing over from Bangla Desh would not exceed the million mark and that within the next few months the regime in Islamabad would either collapse or be forced to come to terms with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman by the denial of Western economic aid. During his subsequent peripatations in the world capitals Swaran Singh, who because of his total dependence on briefs prepared by his officials invariably mirrors bureaucratic thinking, signed a series of joint statements favouring a political settlement in East Bengal. He had spelt it out at the Simla session of the All India Congress Committee

2. Air Marshal Asghar Khan charged Bhutto with agreeing in form a confederation of India and Pakistan following the Simla Agreement.
3. Some of the questions which are being put today: how do you know that this will not happen? Peace will not be peace etc. these same questions were posed at the time of Bangla Desh also. They did not think that Bangla Desh could be freed. But all those events did happen. (Rajya Sabha speech August 2, 1972)

(September 1971) as autonomy for East Bengal within one Pakistan. It was only after jettisoning those formulations and adopting a clear cut policy of helping Bangla Desh emerge as an independent country that Mrs Gandhi was able to tackle the security threat which the Bangla Desh developments posed to India. The argument that India's patience was ultimately rewarded with favourable world opinion is not also relevant because it made no difference to the Nixon Administration in Washington which had been the most stubborn supporter of the Yahya regime. The US President had even put on the posture of injured innocence charging India with precipitating a military crisis when he had nearly succeeded in inducing Islamabad to open negotiations with Awami League leaders.¹ As for the Soviet Union it was a case of impressing on that country India's determination of purpose and nine months of prevarication was not necessary for it. With the US and China solidly and vociferously backing Pakistan the Soviet Union's options in the matter were also limited, especially after the conclusion of the Indo Soviet treaty. Experts like K. Subrahmanyam⁴ have already exposed the fallacy of the claim that militarily India needed a response time of nine months to meet the Pakistani threat.

It is not my intention to question the wisdom of normalising relations with Pakistan. The point is that the Simla Agreement is ill timed and contrary to Mrs Gandhi's correct stand taken earlier. Mrs Gandhi has been hustled into holding the Simla Conference ahead of time without due preparation. At the international level if the idea was to prevent intrusion of Big Power rivalries into the picture India should have waited till China realised that subcontinental considerations rather than furtherance of Soviet interests in the region had prompted India to normalise relations with Pakistan. That would have obviated some of the Chinese moves, especially the barring of Bangla Desh from the United Nations. More important still the logic of a joint command with Bangla Desh in the December war was a joint peace effort by the two countries. By leaving Bangla

4 *The Liberation War op cit*

Desh by the wayside and entering into negotiations with Bhutto India had unwittingly eroded the factual position that the Pakistani garrison in East Bengal having surrendered to both Indian and Bangla Desh forces the prisoners of war were the joint responsibility of both the Governments. In that case Bhutto would not have been able to deploy the kind of pressure tactics he has been directing against both India and Bangla Desh on the prisoners issue and Sheikh Mujib would have been spared a lot of avoidable embarrassment.

Above all the campaign let loose by some Indian publicists against the Bangla Desh proposal to try some of the Pakistani troops for war crimes would have been short circuited. One can understand the potential for India Bangla Desh mis understanding involved in the prisoners issue by talking to any Bangla Desh representative or scanning the press comments from Dacca. The following lengthy extract from a non conformist Bangla Desh journal ⁵ speaks for itself.

One can realise the Bangabandhu's difficulty in going ahead with it (war crimes trial) even though he had the determination to do so. Mr Bhutto has already made the ill fated Bengalees in Pakistan the bargaining counter for securing the release of the POWs. India has obliquely expressed herself in favour of scrapping the trial both for the reason of getting closer to Pakistan and her pronounced objective to restore normality in the subcontinent. The Indian Press, especially those (newspapers) which have gained a certain amount of readership in Bangla Desh under Government patronage is now mounting a psychological offensive against the trial. Some Indian correspondents now visiting Pakistan are sending back home stories of what the stranded Bengalees think of the impending trial. The underlying idea is to strike at the tender chord of the Bengalees' heart in this country so that being alarmed with the thought of the potential torture to be meted out to their brethren in Pakistan they put pressure on the Bangla Desh Government to dispense with the trial to ensure the safe return of all the Bengalees from that land. And to cap it all

India has at long last asked for a list of *prima facie* cases against war criminals

The chorus in favour of dispensing with the trial has also been joined by the Soviet Union prompted by their so called innate desire to be friendly with Pakistan. The British Government has already warned (Dacca) of the repercussions in the world if such a trial is held though Sir Alec Douglas Home on his first visit to this country last month upheld the right of Bangla Desh as a sovereign country to do whatever it deemed proper. Similar advice was given by John Connally President Nixon's representative to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

Even more embarrassing is the campaign mounted in India in favour of Sheikh Mujib meeting Bhutto without prior recognition of Bangla Desh by Pakistan. Bhutto has cleverly drawn Indonesia into the matter and its Foreign Minister Adam Malik has reportedly evolved a formula providing for simultaneous talks and recognition. According to Kuldip Nayar⁶ Bhutto also made a dramatic proposal to the effect that he would hand over to Bangla Desh a draft announcement about recognition on the condition that it would be made public only after Mujib and Bhutto met. Nayar's source was a US diplomat in Islamabad. More recently Bhutto directly repeated it to R K Karanjia a pro Soviet Indian editor. Even such a respected personality as Jayaprakash Narayan has thought it fit though not without hesitation to appeal to Sheikh Mujib not to persist in taking such an inflexible attitude towards Bhutto's request. Jayaprakashji has mostly repeated what has been already said more than once by the lobbyists⁷ in India but because he has chosen to lend weight to the arguments by putting them in a formal statement I am quoting here at length from it⁸.

6 *Distant Neighbours op cit*

7 In the words of V Balasubramanian editor of the *Eastern Economist* unfortunately there is not one Pakistan lobby but many Pakistan lobbies in our country. Each has its motive or a mixture of motives some of the ingredients being less respectable than the others (*The Motherland* June 29 1972)

8 *The Times of India* September 20 1972

India Bangladesh and Pakistan must learn to live together in peace mutual goodwill and co operation . Our quarrels are only helping the Great Powers to interfere in our internal affairs not out of any concern for our interests but in the pursuit of their own global objects . As I see it the ball is now in Sheikh Mujibur Rahman s court . It is for him to make a magnanimous gesture if for nothing else for two very important reasons one to return Mr Bhutto s magnanimity in saving the Sheikh s life and two in order to unfreeze the situation in the subcontinent which is causing so much suffering to the millions of its inhabitants

It is true that Mr Bhutto wants urgently to see the 90 000 and odd POWs back in their homes but Sheikh Mujibur Rahman also wants no less urgently to get back the four to five lakhs of Bengalis who are suffering in Pakistan

Furthermore it appears from all accounts that there are also lakhs of non Bengali Muslims in Bangla Desh whose allegiance to Pakistan overrides their duties as citizens of their new country

These are particularly the Muslims of the older generation who according to their light have sacrificed their all to build a Muslim homeland in the subcontinent . The younger generation of non Bengali Muslim in Bangla Desh will probably be able to adjust itself to the new realities of life . It will be to the interest of everyone concerned and most of all to the interest of Bangla Desh itself if the so called *Behari* Muslims who cannot give their loyalty to Bangla Desh were enabled to emigrate to Pakistan

All this is not possible without a personal meeting between the two leaders of Bangla Desh and Pakistan . It is possible that President Bhutto may go back on his word but that is a risk worth taking in the interest of building up a new structure of peace in this strife torn subcontinent whose problems of poverty and social justice are crying out for an early solution . Sooner the leaders of the subcontinent learn to settle their differences bilaterally or trilaterally when necessary sooner will a new day dawn for the poor and deprived millions of this part of the world

This is not the moment for a contest of wills but a moment for common sense compromise and reconciliation. None of the three countries of the subcontinent can have everything its own way. They will have to adjust their differences and interests to the common advantage of them all. I therefore in all humility appeal to Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to prove his statesmanship and farsightedness at this moment of trial. I am making this appeal as a friend of Bangladesh and as one who did his best to serve its cause at the darkest moment of its history. I may be asked if President Bhutto should not also be asked to be statesman enough to accept the reality of Bangla Desh without any prior condition. This is a fair question. My reply is that *Mr Bhutto being in the position he finds himself in has to be helped by India and Bangla Desh to find his feet and face realities. India has risen to the occasion. I hope Bangla Desh will also do the same*⁹ (emphasis added)

The point often missed in such advocacy of peace and amity in the subcontinent is the character of the regime in Islamabad and the intentions of the person heading it. Success in the December 1970 elections in Pakistan has not necessarily made an angel of Bhutto. Instances are not rare when demagogues and others even worse have won democratic elections and used the parliamentary system for their self perpetuation in power. Hitler was a glaring example. There is very little difference in the attitudes of the Yahya regime and that headed by Bhutto towards civil liberties, tolerance of dissent and promotion of democratic conventions as we shall see presently. Only the tactics are different. Khan Wali Khan has put it candidly in a recent interview with the London correspondent of *Patriot*¹⁰

9 This is the theory hawked by some Indian journalists who visited Pakistan and met Bhutto there. Another version of it was propagated by a Pakistani columnist who visited India on his way to Bangla Desh. More of it later.

10 October 29 1972. Wali Khan said: I call him Adolf Bhutto because he is a fascist. His only aim in life is more power, absolute power, undiluted power and power where he will be the only man who will enjoy that power.

As for Jayaprakashji's appeal to Sheikh Mujib to match Bhutto's magnanimity in saving the Bangla Desh leader's life relations between countries cannot be shaped on such sentimentality. Secondly when the full truth is known there may be other opinions about Bhutto's so called magnanimity. In the course of a television interview with Gerald Stone¹¹ of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation Bhutto was asked what prompted him to release Mujib. His reply was revealing. He said it was all confusion in Islamabad and nobody knew what was happening where. After Yahya Khan had sworn him as President and Chief Martial Law Administrator Bhutto added he asked the General about Mujib. Yahya said it was a mistake on his part not to have executed the Bangla Desh leader earlier. Then Bhutto got him to Rawalpindi and started bargaining with him. So as for as saving Mujib's life is concerned Bhutto's role was only negative in the sense that he did not do what Yahya had not dared to partly due to US and other pressures and partly because of a rare realisation of the futility of such action. Bhutto no doubt gets full marks for letting Mujib go without holding him as a hostage. But does that mean that Mujib should go out of his way to help Bhutto entrench himself in unquestioned power in what remains of Pakistan? In a separate interview with the same journalist Mrs Gandhi rightly stressed that earlier Indian attempts to normalise relations with Pakistan did not succeed because they were centred on individual Pakistan leaders like Mohammed Ali or Ayub Khan and not on the people of Pakistan. The mistake was repeated at Simla the only purpose of which was to save Bhutto's regime. The subsequent high pressure propaganda that the Simla Agreement should be saved at all costs is another string to the same bow.

As for the Bangla Desh demand for prior and unconditional recognition by Pakistan it is a principle which allows no flexibility in interpretation. The plea that principles are not

¹¹ In a 1973 interview Bhutto compared the atrocities of the Pakistan army in Bangla Desh to the use of rubber bullets by the custodians of law and order in Western Europe against unruly mobs.

so important as the larger purpose they serve is expediency which young nations like Bangla Desh cannot afford. Even Peking which in recent years has earned the reputation of being a bull in a china shop swears by principles and even upholds them sometimes though it may have its own interpretation of them. The most attractive feature of India's foreign policy under Nehru was its adherence to principles which after the Sino Indian conflict of 1962 became anathema to his critics and came to be jettisoned by and by. For instance Nehru was never spared by them for his candid assessment of the Ayub regime in Pakistan as an unalloyed dictatorship and his outright rejection of Ayub Khan's suggestion of joint defence but retrospectively Nehru's stand has been proved correct. It was any day better than the present official posture of identifying Bhutto with Pakistan and putting all the Indian eggs in his basket. It is not a mere case of negotiating with Bhutto because he happens to be at the helm of affairs in Pakistan. It is a Munich style effort to link Bhutto's continuance in power with peace in the subcontinent. India has repeatedly suffered by basing its relations with other countries on individual leaders and personal relationship of their Indian counterparts with them. UNu of Burma was a glaring example. Luckily in the case of the Soviet Union the transition from Khrushchev to Kosygin did not affect Indo Soviet relations but the credit for it goes more to Moscow.

The advocates of a soft line on the part of Bangla Desh towards Pakistan are convinced that Bhutto's difficulties at home are genuine and that he needs active support from India and Bangla Desh to tide over them. In their estimate Bhutto deserves greater support and enjoys more credibility than Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. For instance the ludicrous legend that after an unconditional meeting with Sheikh Mujib Bhutto intends to address a public meeting in Lahore and get the endorsement of the audience for recognition of Bangla Desh has been swallowed hook line and sinker but the need for Sheikh Mujib to live up to his pledges about Pakistan and its troops is not conceded. This is the outcome of expediency.

cannot afford to ignore world opinion even if it is ill informed or illmotivated. Secondly India having never coveted the territory acquired during the December war there is no question of sticking to it on one pretext or another. In this perspective the Prime Minister's decision is hundred percent correct. But it need not have been made part of a document of doubtful virtue like the Simla Agreement. Just as in 1962 China unilaterally withdrew from the Indian territory in NEFA which it had overrun India could have similarly offered to vacate the Sind and Punjab areas into which our troops advanced last December. Even if Bhutto failed to reciprocate the gesture it would not have mattered because both in area and in strategic value the territory acquired by Pakistan is not very significant. Nor can Pakistan keep it for long. In respect of Kashmir the *status quo* could have been maintained as provided under the Simla Agreement but without such a formal deal with Bhutto. In that event the question of the line of control would not have assumed the present significance sidetracking the real issues in India Pakistan relations. If the people of Pakistan are in a position to see the Indian gesture for what it is it will be a big step forward towards normalisation of relations between the two peoples. Even if the Government in Pakistan prevents such a consummation Bhutto would not have got undue credit for the agreement on withdrawals.

Even the handling of the Kashmir question at the Simla Conference and subsequently is clumsy and counter productive. The provision in the Simla Agreement for future meetings between the Heads of the two Governments for among others a final settlement on Jammu and Kashmir has been interpreted by Swaran Singh and even Mrs Gandhi as a mere means to get the so called Azad Kashmir vacated by Pakistan. If Bhutto or any other Pakistan leader cannot afford to accept now the reality of the division of Kashmir along the ceasefire line old or new it is inconceivable that they can one day peacefully agree to surrender the Kashmir territory under Pakistan occupation for the last 25 years. If it were meant as a debating point against the Pakistani interpretation of the Simla

Agreement provision as a commitment by India to the right of self determination of the people of the State then it is nothing short of deception of gullible people in both the countries. Statesmanship demanded that taking advantage of the sense of national confidence generated by the December war and its aftermath India should have boldly and unilaterally repeated Nehru's 1953 offer of division of Kashmir along the ceasefire line with due modifications. It should have been also made clear that it was the farthest India could and would go towards a Kashmir settlement and that Pakistan could take it or leave it. If as claimed by the protagonists of the Simla Agreement the December war has put Pakistan in a chastened mood and that only a lunatic fringe of bigoted extremists is still clamouring for confrontation with India then there should be many takers for the Indian offer in that country. At least that would erode the Pakistani argument that a plebiscite in Kashmir was still on the agenda. Internationally it would have won plenty of support for India. Above all it would have put an end to the so called Kashmir problem.

The events of the last four months have once again confirmed that a step by step approach is not conducive to the solution of India Pakistan disputes. This was realised at the time of the 1966 Tashkent Conference itself but Soviet pressure on Lal Bahadur Shastri to vacate the Haji Pir area and Bhutto's antics in Pakistan to use the Tashkent Declaration to grab Kashmir led to its subversion. Before the Simla Conference Mrs Gandhi repeatedly and very rightly advocated a package deal based on friendship and good neighbourliness. But she was made to resile from that position by officials whose main concern was buttressing Bhutto's tenure in Pakistan. The result was again a step by step approach rather than a concerted plunge towards peace. When Jayaprakash Narayan asked Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to meet Bhutto unconditionally or when some Indian newspapermen pleaded for delinking the prisoners of war question from other Indo Pakistan issues the idea was such concessions by Bangla Desh and India were necessary to enable Bhutto to give up his past confrontationist policies towards India.

More recently following the visit to India of a Pakistani columnist on his way back home from Bangla Desh the save Bhutto campaign has been given a new dimension. It is based on the legend that while Bhutto is keen on honouring the Simla Agreement the Military led by General Tikka Khan is for a tough line. The US and China are supposed to be backing General Tikka Khan in such a posture. The setback to the agreement on the delineation of the line of control in Kashmir is cited as an illustration of this difference in approach. As a correspondent of the Press Trust of India put it observers in New Delhi are wondering which face of Pakistan—the Bhutto face the Tikka Khan face or the Washington Peking face—is to be taken seriously. Even more relevant is the question which face of Bhutto is the real face? Khan Wali Khan has unmasked it. But instead of seeing the light officials in South Block are preparing the ground for further appeasement of Bhutto in the name of helping him overcome General Tikka Khan. They have not cared to examine when and in what way has Bhutto ever disagreed with Tikka Khan either before December 1971 or after. Even if the tortuous negotiations on mapping out the 490 mile line of control in Kashmir are thus clinched by a further concession to Bhutto the upshot will be a new ceasefire line with or without UN observers not durable peace.

Equally fallacious is the excitement about the *spirit of detente* prevailing in the world and the need to capture it in the sub continent. Experts on international affairs like Dr Vidya Prakash Dutt M P have mentioned in this connection Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik and the unity talks between North and South Korea. The opening to the east by the German Federal Republic is the outcome of several national and international factors which do not obtain in the case of India and Pakistan. Secondly Willy Brandt did not try the step by step approach but straightaway reconciled himself and his people to the division of Germany though without detriment to the concept of a unified German nation. He took the plunge when he felt it was necessary to do so.

The Korean unity efforts on the other hand are not part of the larger East West *detente*. They represent a very clever attempt by the South Korean President Park Chung Hee to prolong his tenure and do away with all kinds of opposition. Because of its similarity with the Pakistan situation—Bhutto and Park have a striking commonality of outlook—I am recalling the South Korean gimmick here. Eleven years ago Park seized power in a military coup and entrenched himself on an anti communist and anti North Korean plank. Massive US economic and military aid was one of the concomitants of the policy. Last December when there was a setback in US Soviet efforts to come closer to each other and when the India Pakistan crisis was at its height Park declared a state of emergency in South Korea and armed himself with unquestioned executive power. The alibi was an imminent attack from North Korea.

Meanwhile came moves for a North South *entente*. Because of the widespread urge among the Korea people for unification Park could not say *no* to them. So he became such a staunch convert to the unity theme—shades of Bhutto—that he found in the constitution and the National Assembly impediments to the negotiations under way for unification. He has therefore scrapped the constitution and dissolved the National Assembly. The most salient feature of the new constitutional proposals since announced by Park is an extension of his term as self elected President due to expire in 1975. Thanks to the vigilance and strength of opposition parties like Khan Wali Khan's National Awami Party Bhutto does not find the going so smooth in Pakistan. He is also more sophisticated than Park in his style of self preservation. But the parallel is obvious.

Appendix 1

THE following is the text of the agreement on bilateral relations between India and Pakistan signed at Simla on July 2 1972

The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the sub continent so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their people

In order to achieve this objective the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan have agreed as follows

- 1) That the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall govern the relations between the two countries

- ii) That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them. Pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent the organisation assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations.
- iii) That the pre requisite for reconciliation good neighbourliness and durable peace between them is a commitment by both the countries to peaceful co existence respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and non interference in each other's internal affairs on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.
- iv) That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedevilled the relations between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be resolved by peaceful means.
- v) That they shall always respect each other's national unity territorial integrity political independence and sovereign equality.
- vi) That in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations they will refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other.

Both Governments will take all steps within their power to prevent hostile propaganda directed against each other. Both countries will encourage the dissemination of such information as would promote the development of friendly relations between them in order progressively to restore and normalise relations between the two countries step by step. It was agreed that

- i) Steps shall be taken to resume communications postal telegraphic sea land including border posts and air links including overflights
- ii) Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the nationals of the other country
- iii) Trade and co operation in economic and other agreed fields will be resumed as far as possible
- iv) Exchange in the fields of science and culture will be promoted

In this connection delegations from the two countries will meet from time to time to work out the necessary details

In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace both the Governments agree that

- i) Indian and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the international border
- ii) In Jammu and Kashmir the line of control resulting from the ceasefire of December 17 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line
- iii) The withdrawals shall commence upon entry into force of this agreement and shall be completed within a period of 30 days thereof

This agreement will be subject to ratification by both countries in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures and will come into force with effect from the date on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged

Both Governments agree that their respective heads will meet again at a mutually convenient time in the future and that in the meanwhile the representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further the modalities and arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalisation of relations including the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and the resumption of diplomatic relations

Appendix II

THE following is an edited version of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's pamphlet *The Great Tragedy* published in September 1971 by the Pakistan People's Party. Though the Pakistan President has since disowned his past policy of confrontation towards India reiterated in the pamphlet it provides an interesting insight into his basic approach to relations with India and Bangladesh. His ideas on the role of Islam in Pakistan's development are also spelt out. Of added significance is the withdrawal of the pamphlet from circulation in Pakistan.

Our starting point is 1940 when on March 23 the Muslims of India led by the Quaid-e-Azam demanded Pakistan a separate Muslim State in the sub-continent. This demand was formally contained in the Lahore Resolution sponsored by Fazlul Haque popularly called Sher-e-Bengal. The growing polarisation between the two Wings of the country has resulted in the last few years in the bitter re-opening of the debate on the Lahore Resolution. First Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1966 and then Maulana Bhashani contended that the Lahore Resolution envisaged two separate Muslim States one in the East Wing and the other in the West Wing. This is not an honest interpretation of the Resolution. No such meaning was seriously given

to the Resolution from the time of Pakistan's foundation till 1966. The Lahore Resolution sought to incorporate into Pakistan the whole of Punjab the whole of Bengal and the Province of Assam. Since Bengal and Punjab were divided and Assam denied to Pakistan the Resolution was accepted only in principle when the final Partition did take place. This apart the crux of the matter lies in the fact that the British who were responsible for the transfer of power in the sub continent effected that transfer through the Indian Independence Act of 1947 which created *not three but two sovereign States—India and Pakistan*.

Pakistan was created in 1947 in a massive upheaval more than three million lives were lost many more innocent people were uprooted. The laceration of the sub continent was an agonising affair and the departing British who weakened Pakistan at every stage left without remorse. The refugees who made the great trek to their new homes carrying on their bodies the scars of Partition and in their hearts the hatred of centuries exacerbated relations between India and Pakistan. The disputes over Hyderabad Junagarh and Kashmir erupted almost simultaneously and further embittered relations. In 1948 India and Pakistan went to war over Kashmir. It was a grave mistake to trust the United Nations on Kashmir and to agree to a cease fire in January 1949. Since that time the Kashmir dispute has spread its malignant cells in the body politic of the sub continent. Today after two decades of independence both States are ailing badly.

Our country has been a prey to the insatiable appetite of *Big Business and the caprices of ill educated leaders*. In the first ten years of Pakistan politicians and bureaucrats combined to play havoc with the interests of the people. In 1958 the Armed Forces overtly stepped in and tried to redress past grievances by a series of half measures. There was great enthusiasm for Ayub Khan when he took over the reins of government because the Armed Forces enjoyed the confidence of the people. He was acclaimed in both Wings of the country. People accepted him with a sigh of relief. No one could have

had a better opportunity than President Ayub Khan in 1958 to right past wrongs and to put Pakistan on the road to progress. But Ayub Khan lost this opportunity. The people looked to him but he was not a man of the people. Although he was hard working he was corrupt and his family members went on a veritable spree. He also suffered from many blind spots and had a heavy handed approach to problems. Above all he bore an intense prejudice against East Pakistan. In his time the links between East and West Pakistan were critically weakened. On the surface the regime was stable but a deep and dangerous decomposition was taking place. It was during this period that the plunder by Big Business reached its apogee. Ayub Khan built his power structure on the pillars of Big Business Bureaucracy and the Basic Democrats all anti people forces. It was during the latter part of this period that militant Bengali nationalism began to show its face.

The Indo Pakistan war in 1965 again galvanised the people. But their enthusiasm was soon dissipated. A nation that stood indivisibly united in September 1965 suddenly found itself torn apart in January 1966. The victory of Pakistan became the defeat of Pakistan. Ayub Khan betrayed the country at Tashkent in January 1966 when he capitulated to the dictates of the Great Powers. West Pakistan was filled with gloom by the Tashkent Declaration and in East Pakistan a sense of insecurity began to spread. If instead of succumbing to external pressure Ayub Khan had taken the people into his confidence he might have avoided or at least mitigated the disillusionment and humiliation in West Pakistan and the sense of isolation and insecurity in East Pakistan. But Ayub Khan dictator as he was chose to ignore the people and keep them in the dark.

The extremist leaders of East Pakistan deliberately misinterpreted the Chinese ultimatum in order to tell their people that East Pakistan had been saved not by the Armed Forces of Pakistan but by the Chinese ultimatum. The Chinese ultimatum did prevent India from attacking East Pakistan but this does not mean that our Armed Forces were not competent to

repel any such Indian aggression. The success of our diplomacy was turned against us because Ayub Khan refused to go to East Pakistan at this propitious moment to explain to the majority of our people the *correct position*. Taking advantage of this void the opponents of Ayub Khan collected in Lahore in February 1966 for what was called the All Pakistan National Conference. It was at this conference that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman introduced his Six Point formula to confront the regime of Ayub Khan.

There has been a great deal of curiosity over the authorship of Six Points. Some people believe that a bureaucrat close to Ayub Khan framed the formula to divert attention from the Tashkent fiasco and divide the people of East and West Pakistan in order to save Ayub Khan. A rumour persists that there was a foreign hand in the drafting of Six Points.

The origin of Six Points may be shrouded in mystery but there can be no doubt about the impact of the formula on Pakistan. President Ayub Khan's regime at first gave wide coverage to the statements of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on Six Points. By April 1966, fearing that a Frankenstein monster had been created and thinking the Tashkent crisis was over, President Ayub Khan clamped down on the Awami League and sent Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to jail. Later the Awami League leader was brought to trial in the Agartala Conspiracy Case.

President Ayub Khan survived the post Tashkent crisis but basic conditions continued to deteriorate and the people became more and more alienated. Finally their patience was exhausted. In September 1968, two and a half years after Tashkent, the Pakistan People's Party led the great revolt against the regime of Ayub Khan. It rallied the masses throughout the length and breadth of the West Wing of the country. By the end of November the people of East Pakistan joined the revolt. By February 1969 Ayub Khan released Mujibur Rahman from jail so that he could join the Round Table Conference of leaders summoned by Ayub Khan to save his tottering regime. The Pakistan People's Party refused to take part in the Round Table Conference. Instead it pushed on

relentlessly to defeat the great dictator with the power of the people

In March 1969 President Ayub Khan withdrew from the scene and handed over power to General Yahya Khan the Commander in Chief of the Army. On March 28 1969, General Yahya Khan informed the nation that democracy would be restored after the return of normal conditions. Thus in the twenty years of Pakistan's life its people had twice seen the proclamation of Martial Law and the abrogation of the Constitution. Side by side economic conditions continued to worsen. A general breakdown became apparent. By the time President Yahya Khan came to power Pakistan seemed like a patient in the last stages of tuberculosis. Centuries ago Machiavelli observed that wrong political decisions are like tuberculosis difficult to detect in the beginning but easy to cure and with the passage of time easy to detect but difficult to cure.

The future will tell whether President Yahya Khan's regime had sufficiently well qualified doctors to cure the tuberculosis of Pakistan. The hard reality is that a military regime lacking a political base has found itself in a dilemma. Being dependent entirely on bureaucrats the regime is simply not geared to give national direction and to grapple with a grave socio political crisis. Without roots in the people without the participation and support of the people no regime and least of all a military regime can successfully surmount a crisis as deep as the one which faces us today in Pakistan.

In essence the Six Point formula was meant to strike at the roots of our nationhood. Initially it would have created two Pakistans and later might well have brought five independent States into being. With provinces exercising quasi sovereign authority the overall control of the emasculated Central Government was to be so restricted as to give it no power of co ordination at all. The Awami League leaders also talked of a provision in the Constitution giving every province the right to secede from the federation using the totally inappropriate analogy of the Constitution of the Soviet Union. A scheme of this nature would have broken down in a few months with fragmentation following in its wake.

The Government made every effort to accommodate Mujibur Rahman and his party. The decision to hold the provincial elections after the Constitution was framed was reversed and these elections were held almost simultaneously with those for the National Assembly because the Government believed that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was more likely to compromise on the question of autonomy when both elections were over and the prospect of governing lay ahead. The provincial administration gave complete support to the Awami League and during the elections the Awami League workers were allowed a free hand and took full advantage of it.

A few politicians from the West Wing enthusiastically supported Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from the beginning because they also wanted the secession of their provinces in the West Wing. These same individuals had bitterly opposed the creation of Pakistan. In Six Points they saw their chance to destroy Pakistan. Big Business backed the Awami League leader believing that he only paid lip service to socialism. The national press, being in the hands of Big Business, gave him effective support.

The people of East Pakistan did indeed give a sweeping electoral victory to the Awami League. But the real question is: did the electorate vote for the Awami League to make East Pakistan a separate State or did the people vote for the Awami League to end their exploitation and misery within one Pakistan? These two positions are clearly wide apart. The common man in East Pakistan wanted an end to the ruthless exploitation which he suffered first under the Hindus before 1947 and then by the Hindus who remained behind and the West Pakistani capitalists. The common man who fought and suffered so bravely for Pakistan was not disloyal to Pakistan. The masses were not fed up with Pakistan—they were fed up with their economic conditions. The people of East Pakistan wanted economic salvation and not secession. The Awami League leadership thus repeatedly projected Six Points as the end of exploitation and not secession before and during the election campaign. In fact several Awami League members elected to

he National and Provincial Assembly could not when asked articulate Six points and most certainly the poor toiling masses could neither have known nor understood its significance. It was merely a symbol and a rallying point.

There can be no doubt that the vast majority of the people voted for the Awami League in the belief that Six Points would end their exploitation and not destroy their country. The entire Hindu vote however and the vote of much of the younger generation in the urban centres went to the Awami League in the expectation that Six Points would lead to a separate State of Bengal. The strength of the Awami League lay in two streams of sentiment one for bold Bengali leadership that would end the miseries of the people within Pakistan and the other for a nationalist Bengali leadership striving to break away from Pakistan. The latter although a minority ultimately proved to be a decisive force.

In West Pakistan there was much concern about our safety (when Mr Bhutto returned there from Dacca on March 26 1971). A tumultuous crowd welcomed us at Karachi airport on our return at 6.30 in the evening and insisted that I make a speech but I was in no mood for speeches. I nevertheless did manage to say: "By the Grace of God Pakistan has at last been saved. In my heart I hoped and prayed that I was right. The future will tell whether Pakistan has been saved or lost. But this much can safely be said that if the regime had not acted on the night of March 25 on the following day the Awami League would have declared the independence of Bangla Desh. Everything was made ready for it—the state of their armed preparedness the concentrations of their forces and the barricades on the streets were visible proof of this. The general strike called for March 27 was obviously a blind to lead the regime astray. The intention was to proclaim the independence of Bangla Desh on March 26 after Friday prayers."

The attitude of foreign powers in our crisis has been disappointing if not unfriendly. In so self evident a matter with a nation struggling for its own survival world opinion should have been unambiguously on the side of Pakistan.

Here was a country doing its fundamental duty to preserve its national integrity. Pakistan was not imposed upon the people of East Bengal. All the provinces constituting the State of Pakistan voluntarily chose to form an independent State. Indeed, had it not been for the will of the people, exercised so resolutely and with so many sacrifices, the State of Pakistan would not have come into being. Moreover, Pakistan has been in existence for 23 years and despite past blunders the nation has overcome a multitude of vicissitudes. Pakistan has withstood the intrigues of India and has repelled two armed attacks by her. It is the largest Islamic State and the fifth largest nation in the comity of nations. Does Pakistan need any further credentials for its survival ?

Except for India, Pakistan's relations with the world outside have to a large extent been cordial. Pakistan has rendered invaluable services to the Muslim world and to all Arab causes. Pakistan has been on friendly terms with the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and also with Western Europe and the United States. The country has remained faithful to the *Charter of the United Nations* and is a member of the *British Commonwealth*. From 1960 Pakistan has made sustained efforts to improve its relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern European nations, and since the Sino-Indian War of 1962 has developed productive relations with the People's Republic of China.

In spite of our good record in international relations the attitude of most countries except for China has been vacillating and ambivalent in our hour of crisis. Pakistan was not asking for support against another country. There was no question of taking a position in favour of Pakistan and against another country. No country was being put in a predicament to support Pakistan at the cost of its relations with any other country. Thus there should have been no reluctance for the foreign powers to reaffirm the well established principle of international law calling upon States not to interfere in each other's internal affairs.

The attitude of the British and the American Press has been to say the least deplorable. In general the Western

Press has unashamedly supported the secessionist movement. At the height of the crisis in East Pakistan many foreign correspondents exceeded all bounds of even journalistic partisanship and curiosity by openly distributing Bangla Desh flags and encouraging the secessionists.

Promoted by India the Soviet Union sent a *démarche* to the Government of Pakistan dictating a political solution for the crisis in East Pakistan. In doing this the Soviet Union chose to forget her own history, her own military interventions for self preservation even beyond her borders in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and called upon the Government of Pakistan to find a particular kind of solution to a problem that exclusively concerns the people of Pakistan. The United Kingdom has been equally partisan. A small but significant indication of British sympathy occurred when the British High Commission in Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi, knowing the crisis was not over, first issued invitations for a reception to celebrate the Queen's birthday on April 21 and then cancelled them because of the situation in East Pakistan. This was an extraordinary way of showing British sympathy for the secessionists. How would the British react if Pakistan were to cancel a function in London because of the bloodshed in Northern Ireland? These are only some of the instances of foreign sympathy for the secessionists. By a number of subtle and surreptitious measures several Western countries have interfered in Pakistan's internal affairs on the side of the secessionists. Only China, Pakistan's great and friendly neighbour, has come out boldly to support Pakistan. China has gone one step further. In a letter addressed to the President of Pakistan the Prime Minister of China assured the Pakistani people of China's complete support in the event of Indian aggression.

India's hostile attitude, although expected, has been unbecomingly in the extreme. She has blatantly interfered on the side of the secessionists. She has openly supported the forces seeking to destroy Pakistan. The Prime Minister of India waxed eloquent in support of the secessionists in the Lok Sabha and declared that the problems of East Pakistan could

not be regarded as the internal affair of Pakistan. Both Houses of Parliament unanimously passed resolutions in support of the aspirations of the secessionists. West Bengal has been turned into a springboard for Indian infiltrators to penetrate East Pakistan. It has also turned into a haven for the insurgents. The Border Security Forces of India have been sent in civilian clothes to East Pakistan. Large quantities of arms and ammunition have been supplied to the rebels. Indian forces have actively aided the rebels on the borders particularly in Sylhet, Khulna and Jessore. The Indian Navy harassed Pakistan's merchant ships and even attempted to blockade the Bay of Bengal. Funds for the secessionists are being collected throughout India. The State Legislatures are whipping up Indian public opinion in support of the secessionists.

India's actions cannot be passed off as spontaneous demonstration of support for an independent Bangla Desh. The conspiracy is as old as Partition and since the Agartala Conspiracy Case it has been considerably intensified. India always had a covetous eye on East Bengal as a first step in destroying Pakistan. The late Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru personally planned the policy of giving East Bengal different treatment from the rest of Pakistan. The over ten million strong Hindu population of East Bengal and the ethnic affinities of East Bengal to West Bengal were partly responsible for this separate treatment. When after Partition India introduced the Evacuee Laws as a matter of policy she did not apply them to East Pakistan. India encouraged border trade between East and West Bengal and did not apply between East Bengal and India the stringent rules for visas and permits. From the beginning India has tried to wean away East Bengal from Pakistan. Had it not been for the increased Communist influence in West Bengal, the Naxalite movement and her troubles with the Nagas and Mizos, India would have taken even more adventurous steps to inveigle East Pakistan as it is she has shown little inclination for restraint.

After the victory of the Awami League in the general elections the Prime Minister of India called snap general elect

ions to strengthen her hand so that she could assist ■ rebellion in East Bengal. During the Indian elections on the excuse of conducting orderly polls in West Bengal more than 120 000 Indian troops were massed in West Bengal. This was done in anticipation of the present crisis that has hit Pakistan. On January 30 1971 an Indian plane that was flying from Jammu was hijacked to Lahore. It now appears that this was ■ calculated move to find a pretext for the suspension of inter Wing flights. It was done to prevent direct communications between East and West Pakistan over Indian territory.

The present crisis has brought out into the open the strong links that India developed with the Awami League and its leaders. Indian missions abroad have taken up the cause of Bangla Desh as if it were their own. All India Radio continues to broadcast a tissue of lies in support of Bangla Desh. A number of secessionists have taken shelter in Calcutta and are being supported by the Government of West Bengal and the Indian Government. A clandestine radio station was set up by India in the River Hooghly to broadcast in the name of Bangla Desh. Had it not been for the forthright position taken by China and for India's own troubles in West Bengal and in Assam India might well have launched a full scale invasion of East Pakistan by this time.

Apart from a few friendly States like Iran and Turkey and some other countries in the Middle East in Asia and Africa international response to a matter which ■ exclusively within the jurisdiction of Pakistan has been disappointing. It is in marked contrast to the situation in 1965 when during the Indo Pakistan War the whole world with the exception of Yugoslavia and Malaysia supported Pakistan to such an extent that the late Prime Minister of India Mr Lal Bahadur Shastri had to bemoan the fact that India stood isolated.

The people of Pakistan should however remain undaunted. They must learn a permanent lesson from this crisis. They should learn to assert their own independence and prepare themselves to face every form of external interference. History bears ample testimony to the success of a people who take the

destiny of their nation into their hands who withstand foreign interference. If the people of Pakistan stand united under the right leadership and are determined to put their house in order no external influence can prevent them from realising their objectives. We cannot be overwhelmed by international intrigues and foreign interference unless our own people stumble. A popular leadership will not permit the people to falter—it will inspire them collectively to overcome the crisis.

The catalogue of mistakes and miscalculations over the past 23 years has been briefly stated earlier: how the combination of political blunders and the rapacious plunder of capitalism accentuated the dichotomy of Pakistan. President Yahya Khan's regime had tried to tackle the accumulated mistakes of the past but it had been caught in a vortex. It has not been free from mistakes. I would go so far as to say that President Yahya Khan acted in good faith in holding the general elections but political events escalated so rapidly that they could not be contained by the framework he put forward.

Why did the regime allow such latitude to the Awami League and its Six Point programme? There are many reasons but the main one was to be found in the prejudice against the Left. The authorities did not take kindly to the demand of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman for a para military force to crush the Left. In contrast the regime was extremely sensitive to the setting up of a similar force in the West Wing by the People's Party. Mujibur Rahman had boasted that he would liquidate the Leftists in East Pakistan. This was reassuring to those attached to the status quo. Big Business and their agents in the bureaucracy influenced the regime to give the benefit of the doubt to the Awami League. Ministers of the Central Government were inimical to the People's Party and several supported Mujibur Rahman. These Ministers came not only from East Pakistan but also from West Pakistan. Mr Mahmood Haroon, a Minister from West Pakistan, proudly proclaimed his long established association with the Awami League leader. His elder brother, Mr Yousuf Haroon, a man with foreign links and a tainted past for whom Mujibur Rahman worked as an

As a result of the elections the regime found it necessary to deal with the reality of power in the West Wing. The People's Party extended its co-operation to the regime without rancour in the search for a national solution. In my first meeting with President Yahya Khan in Karachi after the elections I told him that so far as I was concerned I did not want to dwell upon the administration's attitude towards the People's Party before and during the year-long election campaign. To me the past did not matter: national interest was the only consideration and it was solely in this spirit that I would look upon future developments. Moved by the same consideration the People's Party sought to co-operate with the Awami League but the Awami League leaders had intentions outside the national interest: thus meaningful co-operation could not be achieved.

In the process of transferring power the majority parties of the two wings had to arrive at an agreement but in reality the Armed Forces who held the reins of power and had to effect the transfer were also relevant. Moreover the Legal Framework Order made the President a party to the process. President Yahya Khan as head of the Armed Forces discharged a vital role in the political negotiations. He held crucial discussions with Mujibur Rahman both before the elections on November 3, 1970 and afterwards in January and March 1971. The President remarked to journalists at Larkana airport on January 18 that he was a link in the chain. President Yahya Khan was prepared to act as more than a link. He did everything in his power to come to terms with the Awami League. He even described Mujibur Rahman as the next Prime Minister of Pakistan. He was prepared to go to the edge of the abyss to get a settlement.

In spite of all this Sheikh Mujibur Rahman failed. Why did he fail when he was on the threshold of power? He could have undoubtedly become the Prime Minister of Pakistan in the first instance and with his parliamentary majority with control over the civil administration and Armed Forces with the co-operation of secessionist politicians and opportunists in

West Pakistan and the support of Big Business he could have consolidated his position and achieved in the second phase his objective an independent Bangla Desh. But Sheikh Mujibur Rahman missed this opportunity. He let it fall out of his hands whilst it was within his grasp. Disaster followed in his wake. The country has been plunged into bloodshed. The sufferings of his people of our people have contrary to his promise multiplied and not ended. If this was not sheer madness there must be some reason for it.

In 1966 when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman introduced his Six Points I advised President Ayub Khan that the exigencies of politics required a dialogue between them (the two wings). I could see that the scheme had the makings of a prairie fire. The Bengalis had a genuine cause: their grievances were not without substance. The cause had at last found a leader. It was necessary to redress the grievances urgently. I feared that from an appealing slogan Six Points might turn into a movement and from a movement to an avalanche. This was indeed the case. At the time that Six Points was introduced Mujibur Rahman freely confessed that the programme was negotiable. On a few occasions he stated that Six Points was not the Bible. There was no mention of foreign aid a subject of primary importance in a developing country being within the exclusive jurisdiction of the province. There was no restriction on the movement of goods between provinces no division of the internal and external debts of the two Wings and no allocation of the percentage of taxation to be levied on the provinces. At that time there was no talk of a constitutional provision permitting a province to secede from federation.

If Ayub Khan had at this stage heeded my advice a reasonable compromise could have been reached recognising the basic merits of the case. If Ayub Khan had done in 1966 what he sought to do at the Round Table Conference in 1969 the problems of Pakistan would not have come to such a pass. Unfortunately Ayub Khan chose what he called the language of weapons and not the weapon of language. He arrested Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The Agartala Conspiracy Case

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which followed was handled in a disastrously clumsy manner and boomeranged so seriously that we are still reeling from its consequences. Only Sheikh Mujibur Rahman benefited from this case.

Ayub Khan's protagonists may consider that recent events have vindicated his position. But Mujibur Rahman's incarceration between June 1966 and February 1969 did not mean that the situation in East Pakistan was being properly handled beneath the apparently silent surface seething discontent was growing. The cauldron was boiling only the lid was on. Ayub Khan merely postponed the crisis which intensified by the miscalculations of the present regime finally exploded in 1971.

After coming out of jail Sheikh Mujibur Rahman made a number of impetuous statements and committed some mistakes. The vested interests of West Pakistan collected around him and for a time it appeared that he might become the Prime Minister of Pakistan with Ayub Khan as President. Mr Yousuf Haroon who had been imported from the United States to become the Governor of West Pakistan contrived to bring about this arrangement. An unscrupulous bureaucrat also played an active part in these political negotiations. A compromise was sought by proposing a series of amendments to the 1962 Constitution to allow for the post of Prime Minister. This intrigue of the vested interests was defeated by the refusal of the Pakistan People's Party to participate in the Round Table Conference. The agitation was continued and finally Ayub Khan was forced to leave the scene.

Some observers contend that in the latter part of the crisis Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was a captive of the extremists. In my opinion this is not correct. He was as much in command as any leader could be of a mass movement. A man holding such decisive influence over the masses could not become a captive of a few student leaders or backroom extremists in the Awami League. As a part of his general strategy Mujibur Rahman tried on occasions to give the impression that he was a moderate being hard pressed by extremists but this was a ploy.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman made some fatal mistakes some serious errors of judgment. He sought to bypass the majority party of the West Wing trying to make a deal with the defeated and discredited politicians. He badly underestimated the strength of the Armed Forces and misunderstood their mood. After he launched his civil disobedience movement he misread the inaction of the Armed Forces. He thought he had overawed them and that the Army had virtually capitulated. With an overwhelming electoral victory behind him he believed that he could force his way through with a political blitzkrieg. But he over reached his mark.

Foreign pressure was partly responsible for the position eventually taken by him. It seems that India wanted him to call the Army's bluff and strike before it was too late. Perhaps India was getting worried about the turn of events in the Middle East and desperately wanted Mujibur Rahman to wrench Bangla Desh out of Pakistan before the Great Powers turned their attention again to the Middle East and other international developments. Or did India have an inkling of new initiatives in Sino American relations? Whatever the reasons he made disastrous miscalculations during the final phase of the political negotiations.

Whatever may have been Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's original intentions there can be no doubt about his intentions after his overwhelming electoral victory. Whether he achieved his goal in two stages or one whatever his tactics and timing his goal was an independent sovereign Bangla Desh. He hated West Pakistan and was totally disillusioned with Pakistan. If any further proof were necessary the events just before March 25 and the well and long planned conspiracy with India that came fully to light after March 25 are there for all to witness and judge.

For my part I recall a conversation a few months before the general election with Lieutenant General Peerzada the President's Principal Staff Officer in which he asked me out right what I thought were Mujibur Rahman's true intentions. Without hesitation I replied separation. Nevertheless after

the election I made every effort to arrive at a political settlement within the context of one Pakistan knowing as I did that the alternative would be bloodshed and slaughter

While everyone must abhor the bloodshed that has ensued since March 26 it must be remembered that had secession occurred on March 26 as planned the non Bengali population would have been decimated in East Pakistan and a mass exodus of millions would have taken place Doubtless the same treatment would in turn have been meted out to the Bengalis in the West Wing In fact it required the sustained efforts of the Pakistan People's Party to prevent reprisals in the West Wing when the Awami League went on their rampage in East Pakistan after March 2 It is to the credit of the People's Party that no Bengali was allowed to be attacked in the West Wing without our efforts this would not have been the case in the charged atmosphere prevailing

Today there is strife in the country India has openly involved herself on the side of Mujibur Rahman The nation is fighting for its survival It is imperative to keep the country together The military operations in East Pakistan continue The last pockets of resistance are being cleared It is essential to bring the situation under control although for a long time it is unlikely that conditions will return to normal Sporadic outbursts of violence and conflict will occur but these will have to be accepted as unavoidable What must be avoided is long protracted guerilla warfare East Pakistan with its large population with its broken terrain and poor communications with discontent among the people is ideal for guerilla warfare Fortunately however the Awami League's separatist movement was concentrated in the towns and had not filtered down to the villages Then again it is difficult for a Rightist movement to spearhead or sustain protracted guerilla action However if there is a delay in the political settlement guerilla activity may well intensify after a short lull

The Army will have to act with alacrity but not with brutality The rebels have to be ferreted out individually Mass destruction will not do It will only aggravate the problem

Innocent people will get exposed to military action thereby making them enemies and further military action necessary. This in turn will necessitate more troops and the cycle can be come unending. Tanks and heavy weapons cannot be used indefinitely nor can a soldier guard every vantage point or stand behind every individual. The border with India is 2 309 miles long and easily accessible. It cannot be sealed completely. The months of rain and floods are fast approaching. During these months military action will become more difficult which will be an advantage to guerilla activity. The regime will have to devise a system of mobile military operations. All this will depend in large measures on an efficient intelligence network and intelligence must in turn depend upon the local population.

The intelligence services have performed miserably particularly those of the East Pakistan administration. The arms build up in East Pakistan either went unnoticed or unchecked. How is it that 16 000 rifles were stockpiled in one Dacca police station and that so many barricades appeared on the streets on the night of March 25? Did nobody know that thousands of Bangla Desh flags were made ready for hoisting on March 23? Did nobody know the routes for infiltrators and supplies from India? If the administration did not turn a blind eye to all this then most certainly its intelligence services failed and the administration was not properly informed. It is inexcusable that the entire Awami League leadership with the exception of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was allowed to escape to Calcutta there establishing a so called Bangla Desh Government. The regime must greatly improve its intelligence services to cope with the emergency.

But it cannot be emphasised too strongly that the main problems will not arise once law and order is restored. The final solution must be of a political nature. Military measures become meaningless unless they are part of an over all political policy. To the maximum extent even immediate and short term measures must bear the ultimate objective in mind. What

is the objective in East Pakistan and how best can it be achieved ?

On the political level there must be a restoration of confidence along with a return to normal conditions. It was unavoidable to ban the Awami League the organisation that sought secession had to be outlawed. However a distinction must be made between the hard core secessionists in the organisation and the remaining Awami League leaders and workers. Those who dissociate themselves from the organisation and its secessionist leaders should admit that they were misled and must be pardoned. In a few instances it may amount to hair splitting but in most cases the distinction can be made with minimal risk. *Their membership in the Assemblies should not be forfeited and they should be permitted either to join existing parties or to remain independent.* The success of the regime will to a large extent depend upon the number of Awami League leaders and workers it can wean away from the secessionist cause. This can be largely achieved by giving the provinces maximum autonomy and an economic structure based on socialism.

The confidence of East Pakistanis cannot be gained by projecting politicians who have been routed in the elections and who are despised by the people of East Pakistan. These politicians might have a limited use in the immediate difficult days but their projection over a period of time will be counter productive. Efforts should be mainly directed towards those Awami Leaguers who admit they were deceived and misled by their High Command and are willing to work for the integrity of Pakistan.

As confidence is restored the animosity created by the Awami League towards the West Wing will diminish. Political figures in the West Wing must help in this process and not exacerbate East Pakistani susceptibilities by slogans like restoration of parity and talk of three provinces in the East Wing—concepts minimising the status and role of East Pakistan and

which look back instead of forward. Above all, irresponsible statements regarding a strong Centre will be read to mean further strangulation and exploitation. One cannot in this manner deprive East Pakistanis of their legitimate and inherent rights.

No efforts at the political level, however, can substitute for the restoration of a democratic order. Without the participation of the people, without the people controlling their own national destiny, without a people's government, the present crisis cannot be overcome nor progress made. The sooner the military regime restores power to the people's elected representatives, the sooner will a political solution to the country's problems be in sight. If a democratic order cannot be restored throughout Pakistan for the time being, it should at least be restored in those parts where it can. Agents of vested interests and political parties who have been defeated in the general elections are against the transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people. They advance the specious argument that if power is transferred to the elected representatives in the West Wing provinces immediately and not in East Pakistan, it will further aggravate the situation and may give support to the charge of colonial rule in East Pakistan. The real fear of this coterie, who created and perpetuated the internal colonial pattern, is that power will be transferred to the Pakistan People's Party—to the party determined to deal a deathblow to those very same vested interests and right past wrongs throughout the country. Moreover, they unabashedly accuse the People's Party of being hungry for power when it is they who have been rejected at the polls and who still seek to cling to power by every backroom device and manoeuvre. The call of the People's Party for the transfer of power reflects not a hunger for power but the aspirations and wishes of the people who voted for the Party.

Promotion of democracy in any part of Pakistan will facilitate its introduction throughout the country. If anything, it will provide an incentive to those people of East Pakistan

who are still fighting to lay down their arms to stop fighting and to assume their democratic rights and responsibilities. Apart from this it can well be asked why should the entire country and all the provinces suffer for the sins of one political party in East Pakistan nay a handful of individuals in that party ? It is common in most federations that if there is a crisis or breakdown in one federating unit the central authority takes charge in that particular unit only. In neighbouring India Presidential rule has been in force at one time in over one third of the federating units comprising more than half the total population of India.

The inescapable conclusion is that the people must participate in government. With military operations continuing in the East Wing with India on the point of going to war with mounting frustration in the West Wing the present regime can not continue its military bureaucratic rule and hope to overcome the crisis. Only a genuine representative government having the confidence and support of the people can succeed. For this reason the People's Party believes that representing the people it is not only its right but its duty to call for an early transfer of power to the elected representatives. If there is a delay in the transition from military to democratic rule the country may well reach the point of no return within a matter of months.

At the outset I said that the starting point of Pakistan was the Lahore Resolution of 1940. This date is arbitrary. In a sense the starting point of Pakistan goes back over a thousand years to when Mohammad Bin Kassim set foot on the soil of Sind and introduced Islam in the sub-continent. Almost from that time Hindus and Muslims have formed two distinct elements in the sub-continent. The study of the Moghul and British periods will show that the seeds of Pakistan took root in the sub-continent from the time the Muslims consolidated their position in India. The creation of the two sovereign States of India and Pakistan merely formalised this existing division. Pakistan is here to stay. This fact must be recognised and we must learn to live together.

Despite the fact that ~~Pakistan was created by the~~ free will of the Muslims of the sub continent there are many foreign observers who still persist in saying that Pakistan is an artificial State. One may well ask what is a natural State and an artificial State? If Pakistan is an artificial State how can Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia for instance be considered as natural States? What makes Malaysia a natural State? Many of the States that have come into being in Africa are the products of historical accidents. Their origin is to be found in the competing rivalries of the Imperial Powers of Europe it all depended on where and how the British the French the Portuguese and the Germans divided the continent of Africa. On this count many areas in Africa have been arbitrarily divided into separate States without regard for ethnic and tribal affinities. The same is true of some State in the Arab world. Many Westerners think it unnatural for East Bengal to be in Pakistan and West Bengal to be a part of India but they do not consider similar divisions to be unnatural in Africa and the Middle East. One of the most important States of Europe indeed of the world is Germany. Having one race one language and one culture with enormous pride in its destiny Germany is today nonetheless divided into two States. Then again the origins of Germany as a State and a nation are not exactly natural. Had it not been for Bismarck and the wars he fought in 1864 against Denmark in 1866 against Austria and in 1870 against France the German nation might not have come into existence. What would have been the fate of some of the States of Europe had it not been for Charlemagne? Would Italy have been a natural State if it had not been for Count Cavour or Garibaldi? What would have been the final shape of the Balkan States and the States of Central Europe without the force exercised by the Ottoman Empire or the Austro-Hungarian Empire? ~~To what extent is the Soviet Union~~ a natural State? How did it acquire its present shape? What are the common denominators between the Republic of Russia and the Republics of Central Asia? Where do their natural links lie?

Pakistan is as much a natural State or as much an unnatural State as most modern nation States. If Pakistan is considered to be an unnatural State because it came into being on account of religion what has made Israel based on religion and race and at the same time smaller than Metropolitan Karachi into a natural State? If Pakistan appears to be an unnatural State on account of its geographical separation then there are other States that are not geographically contiguous and some are comprised a chain of islands separated by great distances and stretching thousands of miles. It is said that we are not a natural States as we are divided by a hostile India. Does this mean that Pakistan will become a natural State the moment its relations normalise with India? Since Alaska is separated from the rest of the United States of America by Canada would the United States become an unnatural State if her relations with Canada deteriorated?

East Pakistan is an inseparable part of Pakistan. The majority of our people live in the East Wing. They fought for and won Pakistan. Now the people of East Pakistan demand justice the same justice that the people of the West Wing seek. The people did not fight and sacrifice for the creation of Pakistan so that they might be ruled indefinitely by a General's junta ruthlessly exploited by a handful of capitalists, bullied by bureaucrats and lashed into obedience on the orders of mobile military courts. Nor have the poor people of Pakistan toiled for 23 years to see their Pakistan come to this pass. The people demand the Pakistan for which they have fought, sacrificed and toiled in which they are their own masters free from all forms of exploitation and in which their children can be properly housed, fed, clothed and educated. Is it too much to demand after 23 years when all this and more enshrined in the Constitution and guaranteed by the rule of law was promised to them by the Founder of Pakistan? Only through a new order, a new leadership can the aspirations of the people be realised. They will not wait indefinitely. They have been betrayed too long. Either the forces of reaction will continue to betray the people and destroy Pakistan or the chosen leaders will come forward to answer the call of the people, surmount the great tragedy and save Pakistan.

Appendix III

THE following is an edited version of the Prime Minister's speech on the Simla Agreement in the Rajya Sabha on August 2, 1972.

This is an issue on which the entire world seems to be united. There has been tremendous enthusiasm for this Agreement and for the new spirit that they see awakened on our subcontinent. Where is the enthusiasm less? I wonder if my honourable friends have taken the trouble to examine this. Nobody has been quiet. But whose appreciation or enthusiasm has been muted? It is those people whose enthusiasm has been muted whenever there has been any question of the interest or strength of India—I would even say that it is those people who have been actively against our interests. These are the voices in the world today which are not so strong and enthusiastic in favour of this Agreement. Would it be wrong if we say, as some honourable friends have said, that this party is echoing those outside voices? I have no hesitation in repeating that what the Jana Sangh wants in India is what the military regime in Pakistan had wanted in Pakistan. History has shown that this policy has failed. This is the picture, a picture of confrontation. When I spoke of toys, I did not mean that land was a

to. I was speaking about the conception or the attitude of demanding a tooth for a tooth and an eye for an eye. That is not a mature attitude nor an attitude which in today's world can be advantageous to our country.

Neither is the spirit of bargaining which another honourable friend has advised. We are not out to bargain. We are a mature people who have only one aim before us and that is how to make our country strong. And by strength we do not mean merely military strength. I think that is a small part of a country's strength. When we talk of strength we mean the strength of the people. And that can come only when the people have understanding, when they have maturity and when the affairs of the nation are handled with a certain amount of sagacity and foresight. Nobody has made the claim for the Simla Agreement that all problems are solved. In fact I would say that this is simply not possible at any time anywhere in the world. Problems will always remain. Our endeavour is to take each step so as to be in a better position to face the new problems that must arise. With the Simla Agreement India is in a better position to face the future. In fact I would say that the Simla Agreement is in pursuance of the domestic and the international policy which India has followed all these years. Since independence and even before independence this is what the Congress Party has believed in. It believed even then in friendship with all countries. It believed even then in peace in the world and a co-operative endeavour to end the poverty and the misery of the underprivileged of the world. At a time when we had no strength in our hands or in our voices we had no wealth, no armaments or anything, even at that time we stood solidly by all those who were equally oppressed. We did not make the excuse that we had our own struggle and never could help the people of Africa that we could not pay attention to what was happening in Asia. On the contrary we stated this even though we were poor, we were weak, but whatever we had the strength of our voice, our moral support or whenever we can give more than moral support that would be at the disposal of all those who were in similar situations. Whatever

our relations with China today India was the first and the only country which sent a medical team to China at that time And in what conditions did this team live? I saw some of the members when they left and I saw them on their return I could not recognise them when they came back They looked more like skeletons This was because of lack of food and lack of sleep They could have refused to stay in such conditions and said We cannot work But they had gone to do a job and they did it This was the spirit This was the spirit of our policies and it is in this spirit that we act today also

We see that the countries which had opposed us and which had abused us are one by one coming round to our policy They may not use the word non alignment But what does non alignment mean? It means that regardless of the political systems of a country and regardless of the attitude of a country you can build bridges with that country Between no two countries was there greater enmity than the United States of America and China In fact if there was a certain amount of tension between us and the United States it was on this ground namely our friendship with China and the Soviet Union What do we find now? We are left behind and they are more bhai bhai than anybody else The best food is Chinese food and the best medical treatment is Acupuncture In the United States and many parts of Europe many think that the best is Chinese Soon after a journey to the Soviet Union was arranged and there were some more embracings and hand shakes What for? If any vindication or proof is necessary I do not think it is necessary—this shows ours is the right policy

We stand for particular policies Today a great change is taking place all over the world More and more people are accepting certain realities May be the US Administration in spite of its new found friendship with some countries is not changing But we cannot ignore the fact that the young people of America are giving deeper thought to these matters So the world is changing We have been told by some hon ble Members that there have been other agreements with Pakistan What has happened to them? And in spite of previous talks

about peace have there not been wars ? There have been wars. We cannot deny this. But we cannot deny also that today the situation in India has changed. Today there is more political cohesion and greater unity amongst the people. In every way the country is stronger and I think that our people have better understanding of the problems of the country and are willing to sacrifice to fight and to face the challenges of the future. There is a great change in Pakistan. It may be that the Pakistanis did not want that change. But the change is there regardless of whether they desire it or not. They cannot ignore that change. When we look at the situation, we cannot also ignore that this change has taken place. Even President Bhutto himself has admitted that he was the father of the policy of confrontation with India. He himself now acknowledges that the situation has changed today and that the need of the times is peace. So things have changed. Some opposition members have taken me and Sardar Swaran Singh to task because we have not categorically asserted that we know that there will be no war, that we know that President Bhutto is a different man. I don't do so. I am not used to making such categorical statements. I can only describe our assessment of the situation and I can also say with some assurance that so far I have not often been wrong in my assessment. So what I say is my assessment of the situation.

Some of the questions which are being put today : How do you know that this will not happen ? Peace will not be peace, etc. These same questions were posed at the time of Bangla Desh also. It was said very categorically : You say that the refugees will return. But we know that they will not return and we know that you will not be able to send them back. They did not think that Bangla Desh could be freed. But all those events did happen, this is obvious to all. A hundred and one events are taking place every day which are equally true, equally relevant, which are not so tangible to the opposition or even to some of us. Nevertheless these things are happening. There are vast forces at work in India, in Pakistan and all over the world. The question before us is this : do we encourage

these good forces or do we put a spoke in its wheel? To my mind this is a straightforward question before us. It is possible that one makes the best effort possible and yet one fails. But is that a reason to say that we should not make that effort? So we have made an effort and I believe that we have succeeded insofar as we can in the first step. I do not know whether at the second step we can go very much further. But I know that a beginning has been made from which it will be difficult for anybody to go back. If something untoward does happen as I have said in the other House and at other places if there is war well we are ready. Then we cannot say No. We have accepted peace and therefore we are not ready for this attack. But we will do everything possible to see that peace succeeds and succeeds with honour. Why? Because—I have said this many times—peace is an ideal and we do believe in ideals. But peace is also a necessity.

I have always believed and I do believe even today that India's major enemy is not Pakistan. It is not even the Big Powers which are interested in their spheres of influence. India's greatest enemy is the economic backwardness of the country. It is the poverty of the country. If we did not have that heavy handicap we could have done many things in the world. But we have the handicap and nobody is going to help us to overcome it except we ourselves and we cannot overcome it unless we have peace. Therefore peace is essential for our country and I believe that it is essential for Pakistan. I also believe that tension between the three countries of the subcontinent will always be a weakening factor and one which may be exploited by outside forces. So the second question before us is this: do we want interference by outside forces or do we want to settle our affairs ourselves however difficult they may be? We have believed that we must settle differences amongst ourselves however complex they may be and a beginning in that direction has also been made.

I am sorry I have diverted from my point about Asian unity. I have spoken about Asia. I should like the countries of Asia to be united. But unity for what purpose? You can

not have unity by giving up your ideals, values or your basic principles. In India we follow a certain policy. Why? Not because we do not like America and so if America does something we must be perverse and criticise America. Not at all. Personally I am not against America or any other country. But we do disapprove of what US Administration is doing in Vietnam. We believe that this US action is not only against the interests of the people of Vietnam, it is against the interests of every country in Asia and every country in the world. But there are countries in Asia which are supporting this American policy. What can we do? We want to be friends with them. But we can't have that close friendship with them as we can have with countries which agree with our policy.

Just a few months back, hon ble Members opposite were very anxious that we should be friends with Taiwan. I do not know whether their enthusiasm is as great today. The enthusiasm of the Western countries in this matter is not only waning, it has completely collapsed. The situation is developing as we had always thought it would one day. We could not prophesy that it would happen in 1970, 1971 or 1972. But we know that it would happen.

We want the countries of Asia to stand together—not against Africa or Latin America. We want them also. But when we can look after our own home first, only then can we be effective in a larger circle. From that point of view, what happens in Asia is our more immediate concern. But we are equally interested in the peaceful development and progress of the under privileged and developing countries of Africa and Latin America. But we can play a greater role in Asia and therefore we must at least try to solve the quarrels and tensions of Asia as soon as we can.

Hon ble Members, I hope, will forgive me if I digress a little. If you look back into history you will see that every country started with small units gradually increasing. India is one country. We know that each of our States has some problems with neighbouring States. Now they can quarrel

and they can go to war as did the old *rajars* on all kinds of small and big matters or they can settle these matters peacefully. One State may suffer a little or another may suffer a little. But in the process we evolve something by which we can all become much stronger. And it is this that makes a nation. Fortunately in our country we have that spirit in the States now. A number of long standing problems of the States are being gradually solved because each realises that by not coming to an agreement both suffer equally and the whole country suffers.

So we have to look at problem of friendship with Pakistan from that angle—not can we get something from Pakistan? Can Pakistan take something from us? But can we create an atmosphere and a situation in which we can together face the far greater outside dangers that threaten us?

The other point raised was How was it that at first no agreement could be reached and then suddenly at the end there was agreement? Now nothing happens so suddenly. There is preparation for whatever happens. You can say that war was won on a particular day. But we did not arrive at it suddenly. The battle is on before the war the preparation is there. When you are having talks you proceed gradually. Immediate decision does not come because naturally during the talks you make certain points and so on. But the preparation is there all the time. With every meeting you are moving. The agreement was signed at a certain time. Well that was because of circumstances. A dinner had been arranged. It was a formal dinner. It could not be postponed. A press conference had been arranged that could not be postponed. Obviously the final thing had to wait until after all this was over. If we could have said Let us postpone these and finish the business well that business could perhaps have been completed by six o'clock. It need not have waited for so long. These are all small points. It is not my intention to compare this agreement with the Tashkent one because as I have said the situation the circumstances in both the countries the attitudes of the people

all are entirely different. But since my hon ble friend opposite has quoted President Bhutto at such length I shall also refer to a remark. President Bhutto has said that he had not accepted the Tashkent Agreement. He did not accept it while he was in Tashkent. He went back and told his country he had not accepted it and according to him his country also did not accept. Well whether it was so or not I do not know. He has said this. But the Simla Agreement he has accepted and other parties in Pakistan have accepted it. Whether we like him or not he has also got elected with a fairly big majority. His party has the majority there but even in places where he has not other parties have accepted the agreement. President Bhutto is trying and I think trying with success to get the people of Pakistan to accept it. Just as there are some voices in India against it there are voices in Pakistan against it. So this is also a big difference between the two agreements.

Now I do not want to go into the business of the United Nations. Quite honestly I am not bothered whether they go to the United Nations or whether they do not go to the United Nations. I am sure of ourselves. I am sure of whatever delegation we send there. If Pakistan goes to the United Nations we can meet them there. I have no fear of their getting away with anything at the United Nations. If they want to go to war—as I said we do not want to go to war—we should like to do everything possible not to have war. But if they attack us we are prepared for that also. I am not afraid of that. I have full confidence in our armies. I have full confidence in our people. These are all false bogeys or red herrings to divert us from our real path.

Mention was made of opportunity. This was the very first opportunity we have had of making a new beginning towards peace and we have grasped that opportunity. If we had let this opportunity pass I do not think it would have come our way again at least in this generation. So we have not let any opportunity go.

From the beginning we have taken a number of initiatives and we do not intend to let the initiative out of our hands. As

in this country so abroad also our tactics have not been the tactics of confrontation even with the Jana Sangh much as they would like to provoke us. Occasionally some of our Members do get provoked but I do not think that this gains us anything and I have never supported this sort of thing. My way of handling situations is entirely different here or anywhere. It is to work for a situation which is conducive to certain thinking and action. Now the Jana Sangh was very vocal against socialism we do not hear that now. The Jana Sangh was very vocal against non alignment we do not hear that now. And not only the Jana Sangh you will not hear such remarks from almost anybody in public now. A situation is created a public opinion is created in which such remarks are not acceptable. It is in our hands to create a situation where on a larger screen even in international affairs certain things do not happen. I cannot prophesy that all will go as we want but we do have a certain strength a certain initiative in our hands and if we can use it to good purpose that is a much better way than to aggravate the atmosphere of confrontation.

What is the test of a people's loyalty? The test is that every time there was an invasion of Kashmir the people of Kashmir stood solidly by India. Does this not show that they are with us. To doubt their loyalty and sincerity is not good. I should like to express my deep appreciation of the past that in spite of religion being evoked—and we know that when religion is injected into any arguments people sometimes tend to lose their rationality—the people of Kashmir have been solidly with us in every crisis and I have no doubt that they will remain so. I am not afraid of any speeches.

There was some talk about our relations with our smaller neighbours. We want to have good relations with all our neighbours and we have done everything possible to convince them of our friendship for them of our concern for them and of our desire to help them but whether the sort of jingoistic and chauvinistic speeches which are sometimes made in the House or outside it is for the hon ble Members themselves to consider will inspire confidence in these small countries. If

the feeling is created that we are out to get what we can in a chauvinistic manner will these countries be confident of their safety I am just posing the question

So the basic issue before us is what sort of world do we want ? Are we concerned with the world or are we concerned only with India and do we think that India can develop isolated from the world ? The Jana Sangh although born much later than our party lives somewhat in the past and if I may say so they look further back into the more remote past than we live in the present and we look to the future It is only by looking towards the future and endeavouring to shape the future that the present can be made livable And to make the present livable we must have peace We must have a constructive and creative attitude The Simla Agreement with all its faults is a good step

